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vForeword
Public-private partnerships try to achieve the best of both worlds. Hopefully, they pro-
vide local public services with both the local government’s democratic accountability 
and the private sector’s management skills and cost eﬃciency.
This collection of case studies examines how far these ambitious aims have been 
achieved in ﬁve Central and South Eastern European countries. They illustrate success 
in modernizing and expanding public infrastructure, by raising extra capital and recov-
ering it over a longer time span than possible within a standard public budget. They 
also demonstrate the ability of private enterprise to supply technical capacity to design 
and manage plants serving larger catchment areas than individual municipalities and 
achieving more demanding environmental standards.
The inevitable risks of partnership are also illustrated. Eﬃciency relies heavily on 
the competitive tendering process—the integrity of its management by the municipal 
administration, the availability of multiple suppliers and the ability to specify at one 
moment of time the service needs with which the partner must comply. Partnership 
also runs the danger of fragmenting overall responsibility between the municipal and 
private sector partners with consequent costs in eﬃciency and responsiveness.
These accounts of country experience also raise a dilemma that has emerged in 
Western Europe. Public accountability necessitates a tight and complex legislative frame-
work that can restrict the capacity and appetite of the private sector for such partnerships, 
and thereby constrain the competition on which its eﬃciency and transparency depend. 
This volume is a valuable contribution to the public service reform literature at a 
time when the ﬂow of European structural funds is facilitating major improvements 
in public infrastructure but economic recession is restricting other sources of capital 
and putting pressure on the users’ pockets and municipal budgets from which running 
costs have to be met. LGI warmly extends its thanks to PALGO in Serbia for organizing 
the conference where these papers were submitted and to Gábor Péteri for editing the 
volume and presenting a digest of its main issues and conclusions.
Finally the reader should note that these reports were written in 2008, so they do 
not discuss changes in public-private partnerships and the impact of the economic 
downturn since late 2009.
Ken Davey
LGI Senior Advisor
November 2010
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THE RISE OF PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Business-oriented collaboration between governments and the private sector is wide-
spread. Public services are provided by the private companies in return for income 
from public funds. This “partnership” in reality is a simple market transaction, which 
might take various forms in a wide range of public service areas. On one side, there is 
a national or local government—the purchaser of services, products, or works—on the 
other side is a private company—the producer. 
Several characteristics of public-private partnerships (PPP) make the relationship 
more complicated. First of all, the incentives of the service provider are very diﬀerent 
from the motivations of the client, a public entity. Secondly, when public and private 
parties agree to cooperate, they have to develop appropriate planning, procurement 
and management practices as well as organizational schemes and payment methods. 
Under partnership arrangements, private actors are usually involved in the public 
project design from the early stages of a government decision. The actual organiza-
tional form of project implementation might be jointly controlled by the two types of 
potential owners, the public and the private entities. The payment could be a simple 
budget transfer or the contractor might be authorized by the elected government for 
collecting public revenues. 
Classical forms of PPP tended to be initiated by central governments in the form 
of concessions. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), launched in the United Kingdom 
in 1992, was the ﬁrst comprehensive government policy designed with this logic in 
mind. Local PPP projects were simpler, but came to be more widespread under various 
organizational and ﬁnancing schemes.
The need for public and private partnerships has evolved gradually since the early 
1980s, when serious criticism emerged towards ineﬃcient and unresponsive public 
service providers. At that time, as a reaction to the oil crisis and following a conservative 
shift in economic, social, and political thinking, two parallel reform trends evolved in 
the public sector. These reforms focused on the transformation of the government by 
(i) promoting decentralization and (ii) moving service management out of the public 
sector through privatization and other service mechanisms based in the private sector. 
Both of these trends in reform aimed to improve public services by separating the 
roles of provider and producer, and developing new forms of accountability by putting 
the users (the voters) of these services in the center of public decisions through improved 
customer orientation. Eventually, new techniques of public management were invented 
on the same principles in other areas of public administration and governance.
However, we are now witnessing an overall shift in the perception of the public 
sector: its roles, functions, and management rules are changing. In this new era—which 
began with the present economic downturn—public choice theory and the overuse of 
private sector mechanisms have been met with growing criticism. After three decades 
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of experiments and innovation in the public sector, fears are growing that businesses 
are too deeply involved in public service provision. 
The economic downturn has changed the macro-economic and ﬁscal conditions for 
national and local governments. They became more concerned with increasing budget 
deﬁcits, the emergence of new social problems, and the deterioration of their revenue 
base. These unexpected ﬁscal problems called attention to the long-term consequences 
of possible ineﬃciencies in public-private partnerships. It has been widely claimed that 
more power has to be allocated to the state as an owner, not just as a regulator. The 
market is regarded as a mechanism that creates monopolies, further increasing social 
inequalities. Hopes are high that stronger governments will be more eﬀective and fairer. 
In this speciﬁc period the main objectives of this publication on PPPs is the sharing 
information in support of sounder policy development. The target audience includes 
decision-makers at diﬀerent levels of government. But our intention was not to write 
another guidebook; several manuals have already been prepared by various interna-
tional organizations, technical assistance and training programs. Our aim is to assist 
local policymakers—including NGOs—by clarifying the key features of public-private 
partnerships. We hope that the experiences of the ﬁve countries presented here will aid 
in the preparation of capital investments ﬁnancing schemes and in managing these 
complex forms of service provision.1 
WHAT IS PPP? 
Public-private partnership is based on the concept of sharing risks. There are several 
factors that inﬂuence the successful management of joint public and private projects. 
Large, technically complicated infrastructure projects, with complex funding schemes, 
depend largely on external factors. This is especially true when the demand for these 
services is inﬂuenced by political decisions on eligibility, the price paid for the service, 
and the level and form of social subsidies. The probability of failure due to any of these 
factors is only one of the risks associated with PPPs. There are other internal risks related 
to internal factors, like construction, technology, and management.
A project or service can be regarded as a public-private partnership scheme when 
the construction risks, plus either the demand or availability risks, are managed by the 
private sector. This deﬁnition is used by the European Union, where public contracts 
are separated from oﬀ-budget activities primarily for accounting purposes. In the case 
of PPPs—beyond the successful completion of the construction work—the private 
partner is responsible if there are shortfalls in the market for the service (demand risk) 
or if the service is not performed at the level agreed (availability risk). 
PPPs can take two forms: a simple contractual partnership, when the private sector 
is involved in the design, ﬁnancing, and management of a service; or institutional PPPs, 
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when separate entities are jointly owned by the two partners (Green Paper 2004). Co-
operation between public and private bodies is stronger in the l atter case. The scale of 
private sector involvement is proportional to the level of private sector risk. The forms 
of PPPs vary from the simple design and build contracts through design-build-operate-
transfer schemes to complex concession agreements.
In a classical PPP scheme there are typically six types of actors connected through 
speciﬁc ﬂows of funds. In the case of a classical institutional PPP, the (i) project company 
is in the center of the service. Initial capital is put into this company by the (ii) owners. 
In return they expect a dividend of some kind, either cash or subsidized services. This 
project company might raise funds on the market, for example by borrowing from (iii) 
banks, which collect the debt service from the project company. 
When building a facility the project entity contracts a (iv) construction company, 
whose costs are paid from the revenues generated. The (v) operating entity is developed 
either within the project company or as a separate contractor, which is compensated for 
its operating costs. The ﬁnancial basis of all these ﬂows of funds is the (vi) service user, 
who pays fees or makes other ﬁnancial contributions. The owner—the local or central 
government—might also secure funds from general tax revenues for operational purposes. 
These roles might be merged, because sometimes several functions can be assigned to a 
single entity (e.g., when the operator is responsible for construction). 
Figure 1.
Actors and Flow of Funds in PPP
Source: UNIDO (1997).
Owners (government, investor)
Project company
Contractor Operator
Banks Users
Equity Dividends
Loan Debt service User charges
Operating costsConstruction costs
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There is a broader deﬁnition of public-private partnership, as well. Typically in 
urban development, public investments (e.g., building an access road, reconstructing 
a slum area) contribute to economic development (creating jobs, increasing the local 
tax base, etc.). In return, when the actual ﬂow of funds is tapped under more complex 
institutions, there are indirect beneﬁts for the public sector. In the United States these 
forms are widely used as special districts or other legal forms of tax increment ﬁnanc-
ing (when a speciﬁc increase in tax revenue is used to ﬁnance a project). In Europe the 
common objectives are formulated during the planning process and included in the 
urban development agreements.2
These characteristics of public-private partnership schemes already display a dis-
tinction from other organizational forms, policy preferences, and traditional methods 
of public service delivery. The major features of these two approaches of public service 
provision are compared in Table 1. 
Table 1.
Comparison of Classical Public Sector Schemes and PPP
Public sector Public-private Partnership
Policy objectives Responsivity (quality and 
effectiveness)
Best use of funds 
(efficiency, risk allocation)
Focus Narrow: capital or current budget Broad: full financing of capital and 
current expenditures
Funding Public: own, shared, grant revenues 
and public sector borrowing
Public and private funds, loans, user 
charges, other publicly controlled revenues
Ownership Public, with limited contractor 
influence
Usually mixed 
Timing Short term (election cycle) Long term 
(recovery within the project life cycle)
Procedure Simple: political, administrative. 
Legal, compliance with the rules 
and regulations
Complicated: must conform to public 
procedures and private sector rules. 
Transparency is a high priority
Capacity External: plan, build, manage, 
supervise
Internal: negotiate, cooperate, 
control/audit
The major diﬀerences between classical public projects and PPPs are clearly visible 
along these lines. In the case of public projects, the policy preferences are determined 
by the needs and eﬃcacy of services, while under PPP schemes the primary task is the 
eﬃcient use of the available private and public funds. Consequently, PPPs focus on 
the total costs of service provision, while in the public sector, decisions on capital and 
current budgets are usually separate. Sources of funding are more diverse in PPPs and 
the private owners have a greater say. 
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Timing of the PPP projects expands beyond the election cycle—they are evaluated 
over the long term, throughout the entire life of the project. Decision-making is simpler 
in the public sector, while the involvement of private actors requires the observance of 
new rules. The capacity for managing public-private partnerships should be developed 
internally, because the public actor usually does not have the required negotiation, con-
trol, and cooperation skills. When projects are ﬁnanced by the public sector, technical 
expertise is available externally.
WHY PPP? 
Governments are under constant pressure to improve the performance of public services 
with limited resources. In some countries presented in this publication, for example 
Hungary or Serbia, where legal and administrative limitations rendered public organiza-
tions less responsive than private entities, governments hoped actors from the private or 
the nongovernmental sector would be able to deliver more and higher quality. 
Such innovations are highly necessary during periods of ﬁscal restriction, when 
pressure on the public sector to decrease public employment and overall expenditures is 
especially high. Under some PPP schemes public employees might be shifted to the 
private contractor or the concessionaire, reducing the number of public employees. 
Beyond decreasing labor costs, public-private partnerships aim to attract additional 
resources to the public sector. One-time investment costs can be allocated over a longer 
period, which better ﬁts the revenue generation rules of the public sector. In the decades 
before the present economic downturn the private sector was able to borrow easily for 
these long-term projects, generating stable revenue ﬂow. PPPs also help public entities 
to comply with limitations on public debt. This is especially important among European 
Union member countries, where one of the Maastricht criteria is that public debt should 
not exceed 60 percent of GDP. 
In the utilities sector, better public services were sought through technology transfer. 
Especially during the early years of the transition, foreign companies had better access to 
modern equipment and management techniques. Compared to the deteriorated assets 
and obsolete technology used by public service organizations, these companies could 
make fast and visible improvements in service quality (municipal solid waste manage-
ment, water services, etc.). 
Expectations are high that PPPs will create eﬃciency gains. Contractual obligations 
mean construction projects are completed on time and their costs are rarely increased dur-
ing implementation. These expectations were not always met, but the carefully audited 
PFI program in the United Kingdom conﬁrms the advantages of PPP. 
A problem with ﬁnancial assessments of PPPs is that service performance targets 
are modiﬁed during the PPP contract period, so changes in eﬃciency are hard to track. 
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The methods used to calculate project costs might be biased in favor of the private sec-
tor. The lower costs of PPPs schemes have been questioned by the evidence—the proﬁt 
margin on private sector construction works is usually 1–2 percent, while the rate of 
return calculated on PPP is much higher (CEE Bankwatch Network 2008). 
The various PPP schemes are often promoted by international ﬁnancial institutions. 
European banks (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, 
and the European Investment Bank, EIB) and the World Bank actively support them 
through its Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) scheme. The “bank-
ability” of these modern forms of ﬁnancing public investment projects is more easily 
ensured if the large, international utility companies are involved during preparation. 
Some exceptions have cropped up recently, when support for establishing the institu-
tional conditions for private sector participation precedes the actual funding by the 
international ﬁnancial institutions.3
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PPPS
Public-private partnership is arranged within complex governance systems and inﬂuenced 
by the speciﬁc social and political environment. The scope and form of decentralization 
determines how actively local governments could take part in utilizing the beneﬁts of 
PPPs. Because they had to follow new rules of public ﬁnancing (e.g., in accounting) 
and public procurement, European Union membership has also brought signiﬁcant 
changes to the countries studied here. Changes in the general public attitude towards 
privatization and private sector participation also determine the acceptance of PPPs. 
For example, in the early 1990s local governments in Hungary were eager to estab-
lish various concessions and contract out schemes in the utility and communal sector. 
This was followed by a learning process, where agreements were sometimes signiﬁcantly 
modiﬁed or privatization arrangements were reversed (sometimes by the same political 
leadership, such as the forced buyout of minority foreign shareholders in Pécs, Hun-
gary). In Croatia, where PPP schemes were started after some delay, state institutions 
(the ministry of ﬁnance and the agency for PPPs) vigorously supported local capacity 
building in the areas of preparation, approval, implementation, and monitoring of both 
contractual and institutional public-private partnerships. 
In Serbia, with its long tradition of special self-government institutions, progress in 
the private sector‘s participation in communal services has been slow. There is no PPP-
related legislation, and local governments are not obliged to apply competitive tendering 
procedures. Direct negotiations are allowed only in exceptional cases. 
These cases, together with many other examples, show that public-private partner-
ship arrangements will be successful only in a supportive environment. The technical 
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conditions of the actual PPP projects are developed in a complex legal and institutional 
system. The following sections provide an initial inventory of those factors, which 
ultimately determine how much the public sector can beneﬁt from the PPP schemes.
Legal-administrative Environment
The complex legal framework of public-private partnership countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe were developed during the 1990s. The basic laws, like acts on concessions 
or on local government were critical and necessary, but not suﬃcient for creating a sup-
portive legal-administrative environment. They have to be accompanied by regulations 
on the technical aspects of private sector involvement: sectoral laws and strategies, public 
procurement procedures, diverse forms of service management, the status of public assets 
and especially local autonomy in managing municipal property. 
Poor quality legislation and lack of administrative capacity may also discourage 
private initiatives. For example, under the Serbian Law on Concessions, the govern-
ment is required to approve or disapprove of a municipal concession proposal within 
three months. The ministry has six months to prepare and submit a draft concession 
contract to the government. This means tendering can be delayed one or two years after 
the moment the concession initiative is conceived. This is the case even for cities like 
Belgrade that have highly developed technical, material, and professional resources. 
In addition to these legislative foundations, the success of PPP schemes very much 
depends on the overall rules of public ﬁnancial management. First of all, accounting rules 
deﬁne how the most critical decision on PPPs is made (or whether it is made at all): will 
a public or private ﬁnancing method be more favorable? What is the cost comparison 
under diﬀerent funding schemes?
Because revenues from service tariﬀs are usually the main source of ﬁnancing for 
projects in the utility sector, autonomy in setting user charges becomes an important 
related issue. The client local governments or national government agencies must retain 
the power to determine prices for services provided through PPPs. Decision-makers 
should be aware of the options available in setting user charges and the administration 
should be familiar with the various pricing methods. Since aﬀordability is also a critical 
condition of successful private service provision, governments must have an idea of how 
much the public can pay for services, what methods of social assistance are available, and 
how it will respond to non-payment or delays. 
Some countries have drafted speciﬁc laws on public-private partnerships. For example, 
Croatia and Poland have recently passed dedicated legislation on the general rules 
governing PPP, while the Czech Republic and Hungary were able to develop a diverse 
system of public-private partnerships without speciﬁc legislation, instead simply adjusting 
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existing laws to the new requirements. This is common practice in the EU, because a 2005 
communication from the European Commission (EC) states that speciﬁc regulations 
on all public contracts and concessions are unnecessary (EC 2005).
Local Incentives for Innovation 
Public-private partnership is still not a common form for ﬁnancing capital investments. 
According to a global survey, only four percent of all public sector investments are 
implemented within some form of PPP. Nor do they ﬁt into the traditional forms of 
funding for local government capital investments. Municipal investments are mostly 
ﬁnanced through national budget transfers and matching grant schemes. However, 
local governments are responsible for more than half of public sector investments, so 
their preferences in selecting ﬁnancing mechanisms determine the means of funding. 
Even classical forms of debt ﬁnancing are utilized at the lower levels in transition 
countries. The EU average for local government outstanding debt as a percentage of 
GDP is almost six percent, while in the most decentralized Central European countries, 
like Hungary or Poland, it is only approximately two percent (Dexia 2008). 
The system of intergovernmental ﬁnances primarily inspires local governments to 
search for alternative forms of ﬁnancing for capital investment projects. In many coun-
tries of South Eastern Europe the low share of own revenues and almost absolute lack 
of own capital revenues forces local governments to rely on transfers as the single source 
of capital investment ﬁnancing. Because local governments cannot assign municipal 
revenues to infrastructure projects, limited municipal inﬂuence on the setting of user 
charges also serves as an obstacle for PPPs. Centralized planning and funding schemes, 
as well as overregulation of capital investment during project design also hinder public-
private partnerships at the local level because they create legal and administrative barriers 
to borrowing and innovative forms of capital investment ﬁnancing. 
Gradual reforms in all these areas might support the wider use of PPPs. When the 
allocation of capital funds becomes less politicized and local governments have a greater 
stake in ﬁnancing investments, innovative forms of project funding will likely become 
more popular. It is also critical to change the management rules of local public utility 
and communal service organizations. In some countries top positions are assigned dur-
ing political negotiations, leading to overstaﬃng and lowered eﬃciency. Public-private 
partnerships with a greater emphasis on the economic aspects of service provision might 
help change this. 
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EU Policies
European Union policies target public-private partnerships from various angles, because 
PPP is not included in the legal institutions or terminology. Since 2004, several EU 
documents have dealt with PPPs and developed the overall strategies and regulations on 
(i) how PPP should be entered in accounting documents, (ii) procurement rules and (iii) 
how they are supported, and (iv) why PPP schemes are useful during economic recovery. 
The statistical approach and accounting regulations became relevant during EU 
enlargement in 2004. The principle of government debt accounting is based on the 
risk allocation method within public-private partnership. According to the European 
System of Accounts, projects could be regarded as nongovernment assets if they met the 
following dual criteria: the private partner bears the construction risk, as well as either 
the availability or demand risk.4 Otherwise it is a public asset and the loan ﬁnancing 
the project forms part of the public debt.
Early involvement of private actors in project development has inﬂuenced public 
procurement rules as well. In such cases, when works and service contracts are above 
the threshold, standard rules must be followed, but a competitive dialogue with the 
potential contractors is allowed. PPP schemes are usually rather complex, so govern-
ments would need technical input from the private sector. All public contracts or work 
concessions must follow the basic principles of transparency, equal treatment, and 
non-discrimination.
Similar principles are followed by the EU grants policy. Public-private partnership 
projects are equally eligible for public funding, both at the national and EU level. The 
main sources of potential funding are Structural Funds, European Investment Bank 
loans, and other EU schemes like the trans-European transportation network and the 
Joint Technology Initiative program. There are other joint development programs with 
the EIB and EBRD that include infrastructure projects, urban development, and micro- 
and medium-size enterprises.5
Recent EU economic recovery plans have highlighted the importance of public-private 
partnership. In general, ﬁnancing opportunities for the private sector are declining and 
many governments have stopped or postponed these projects. However, in some cases 
public support for PPP might be an option for more eﬃcient use of the means available 
for economic stimulus programs. The co-funding requirements for EU funds are high, 
and they might also crowd out private resources, which could justify more extensive 
use of PPP schemes. Some countries have introduced state guarantee schemes (France, 
Belgium, and Portugal); new types of public sector debt facilities (United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France) and also simpliﬁed the management rules of procurement for 
PPP projects (EPEC 2009).
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The Capacity to Design, Negotiate, and Manage PPPs
Public services involving private partners are more complicated than those that are 
internally managed. In the planning stage, when policy objectives are clearly set, the 
need to inform all interested parties is greater. An agreement on strategic goals and a 
better understanding of stakeholder motivation helps to manage potential conﬂicts 
during later stages of the project. 
During project preparation and implementation, speciﬁc issues of employment 
security, management of social problems, and ﬂexibility in service standards might come 
up. Regulatory capacity for PPP projects has to be developed, especially at the local 
government level, where customer representation and direct political inﬂuence might 
require completely new management skills. 
Experiences with PPP projects show that beyond technical knowledge, a better 
understanding of commercial logic and the broader institutional environment are most 
important. An overall business capability dominates the list of skills and capacities in 
the public sector: understanding end-users’ needs, procurement options, the strategic 
context and supply side incentives, communication and negotiation skills, ability to 
manage advisors, retain competitive tension, etc. According to a recent National Audit 
Oﬃce report these skills outnumber strictly technical expertise of project preparation 
and management (NAO 2009).
All this capacity might help balance information asymmetry, which otherwise puts 
the contractor-operator into a favorable position in comparison with the client-regulator 
local government. Governments usually rely on information provided by contractors, 
because the level of technical expertise is lower within public administration. This 
situation might have negative consequences. In response, bureaucratic pressure on the 
operator increases, or political inﬂuence on the contractor is enhanced (for example, 
pressure for cross subsidization or introducing windfall tax on anticipated proﬁts). 
One of the most common criticisms of PPP projects is that the interests of the 
business sector lead to unnecessary increases in project size. A World Bank study showed 
that about half of total infrastructure PPP contracts were awarded to 10 percent of the 
largest companies in developing countries. The water sector is especially dominated 
by companies like Veolia Environment or SUEZ (Estache 2009). The study concludes 
that despite the fact that larger projects result in economies of scale, a bundling strategy 
would limit competition, because only a few companies will qualify.
During project implementation, complex projects might limit clients’ powers. 
Agreements increase rigidity in service delivery, despite changes in demand or technol-
ogy. Ultimate managerial responsibility is hindered by PPP and subcontracting, simply 
because governments are not always in a position to guide and instruct contractors.
These management problems might be partially solved by greater transparency. The 
most critical step in public decision making over capital investments is project design. 
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The investigation of corruption cases showed that contractors and investors are able to 
increase costs and promote use of expensive technologies. Governments, then, should 
be able to control these early periods of capital investment planning and project design. 
During this stage of PPP preparation, project selection should be harmonized with local 
development plans and sectoral development strategies. 
Partners and contractors are usually selected through a competitive tendering pro-
cess. This process may diﬀer from classic public procurement, because the PPP tender 
process is implemented in stages, with the active involvement of potential bidders. A 
government plan’s ﬁrst confrontation with reality often occurs during negotiations with 
prequaliﬁed bidders. Project appraisal and design require that an iterative process be-
tween client and contractor proceed throughout the negotiations on outline proposals, 
preliminary, and ﬁnal invitations.6
Transparency could be increased by registering all PPP contracts, as is compulsory in 
Croatia and the Czech Republic. Openness during the public decision-making process 
over PPP agreements can be improved by signing an “Integrity Pact” (Transparency 
International 2010). This is a written agreement that covers rejecting bribes, collusion 
among competitors, and disclosure of information on payments related to the contract. 
Violation of these practices might lead to loss of contract, blacklisting, ﬁnes, and criminal 
actions. It is more a preventive tool than a real weapon against corruption. However, 
integrity pacts might have serious consequences on the market position of a company 
(and civil servants as well).
Another way to support informed decisions on complex projects is improve the 
knowledge base on PPP. The EC has launched an organizational capacity building pro-
gram at the European Investment Bank. The “European PPP Expertise Center” (EPEC)
improves expertise in both EU member and candidate countries through analysis and 
dissemination of practical guidance.7 The “C.R.E.A.M Europe PPP Alliance” is a profes-
sional and capacity building network for promoting these forms of capital investments. 
There are also national coordinators and innovation focal points of PPP in countries like 
the Czech Republic (PPP Centrum) or the ministerial unit in Hungary.
These forms of knowledge dissemination on PPP should be supported in the 
countries studied here. As capacity building is needed most at the municipal level, local 
government associations in Southeast Europe or their regional network (Network of 
Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe, NALAS) might become centers 
of information exchange.
Managing Risks 
Governments have the ultimate responsibility for providing a service included in their 
mandate. In this sense there is no limit to public risk, because utilities like water or 
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heating must be delivered and public sector employment should be protected as well. 
However, the risk, deﬁned as the “factor, event or inﬂuence that threatens the successful 
completion of a project in terms of time, cost or quality” might be limited (EU 2003). 
Risk management means assigning responsibilities to PPP parties able to successfully 
deal with the problem. As the case studies show, the most important threat to PPPs is 
imperfect risk analysis.8
The risks related to PPP projects can be categorized in many ways. The statistical 
approach speciﬁes construction, availability, and demand risk. Another grouping might 
by the separation of legal and commercial risks when the former is clearly managed by 
the government, while the latter is managed mostly by the private partner. It is important 
to further specify subcategories of risks—it is helpful to assess them, then decide which 
party might be able to limit which type of risk, and who is responsible for any failures. 
The categories used by the European Union guidelines include risks associated with 
foreign exchange, increased political and public acceptance, and the environmental and 
archeological risks associated with large infrastructure projects. Overly rigid contracts 
might aﬀect proﬁtability of PPP projects, where the ways potential gains will be shared 
with the public sector are not speciﬁed.
In designing public-private partnership deals, complex assessment methodologies 
have been developed. Value-for-money analysis is used widely in the United Kingdom. 
To determine strictly ﬁnancial factors, the method is known as the public sector com-
parator. This means comparing the costs of a PPP with the costs if the project were 
carried out through public procurement (OECD 2008). It also assumes public debt 
ﬁnancing, not only service payments from the operational budget that support private 
ﬁnancing in the PPP. 
Quantifying all potential costs of a hypothetical public project, starting from design 
to operation, is quite complex. Changes in assets also have to be forecast. Here, as in 
any feasibility study and impact assessment report, critical factors include the rate of 
inﬂation, the discount rate, and the calculation of overhead costs.
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN: OBSTACLE OR OPPORTUNITY
Local government capital investments form a signiﬁcant portion within the public sector: 
European Union member countries spend more than half of their capital at the local 
level (Péteri 2009). This amount is 1.5 percent of GDP, so any change in the volume 
of capital expenditures has an impact on the economy. The economic downturn that 
started in late 2008 has already had an unfavorable eﬀect in some countries. Assess-
ments of its eﬀect on local governments that same year already showed a four percent 
drop in the share of local investments within general government public investment. 
In some countries, this decline was exacerbated during the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 
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(e.g., –22 percent in Hungary), while in other countries it did not show its eﬀects 
(an 11-percent increase in Croatia and Poland). 
The overall declines in public funds will have a negative impact on the public-private 
partnerships in the countries studied here. As the EPEC research report showed, the 
ﬁrst nine months of 2009 saw an overall drop of 30 percent in the volume and number 
of PPP-funded schemes. 
The closure or slowdown of PPP projects was primarily caused by two factors. First, 
funds made available by the banking sector dried up or became more expensive. The 
ﬁnancial crisis halted more relaxed lending procedures in both private and public sectors. 
In some countries, preferences regarding funding for large local government projects 
changed. They started to experiment with bond issues, mainly to supplement incoming 
EU funds for public sector projects (e.g., Hungary and Poland). Second, use of market-
based solutions in the public sector met increasing reluctance. The economic crisis had 
to be managed by major government bailouts and public takeover of formerly private 
contracts—sometimes joint utility companies were bought outright. In this period of 
public hostility to market-based service management it is rather risky for local leaders 
to launch major PPP programs. 
However, the beneﬁts of alternative service delivery arrangements cannot be com-
pletely neglected. New forms of public management have made signiﬁcant improvements 
in service provision and government operation. There is still room for private sector 
based initiative, technology and management, market incentives, and private capital, 
which would create new opportunities for partnerships with the public sector. Evalua-
tion of the accomplishments and failures of these partnerships can guide public policy 
and private actions at decisive stages in the future.
European Union policy also emphasizes the importance of PPPs in sectors like the 
environment, energy, transportation, and even health care. After the present temporary 
decline, the number of public-private partnerships is likely to increase. Obviously lessons 
have to be learned from this recent experience. The relationship between the two actors 
should be made more balanced, and the accountability of the PPP decision-makers 
should be increased through greater transparency.
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NOTES
1 For their useful comments on this introductory chapter, I would like to extend my gratitude 
to my co-editors Dušan Damjanović and Tatijana Pavlović-Križanić, my colleagues working 
on the country chapters, and Ken Davey at LGI.
2 For example, in Hungary Law LXXVIII of 1997 on the Built Environment introduced the 
“settlement development contract.” This contract sets the rules for sharing responsibilities 
between the private sector (mostly investments) and local governments (typically guaran-
teeing favorable urban planning and zoning regulations).
3 For example, the World Bank PPIAF technical assistance projects on public utility company 
reform strategy in Serbia, Republic of Macedonia; or the assessment of governance structures, 
managerial capacity, ﬁnancial, and operational performance of Podgorica Waterworks before 
the actual privatization.
4 Eurostat News Release 18/2004: Treatment of public-private partnerships.
5 Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions; Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investment in City Areas; Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium 
Enterprises.
6 See CREAM (2010), EU (2003) and UN (2007).
7 Available online: http://www.eib.org/epec/about/index.htm.
8 From a statement by Ken Davey at the LGI Workshop in Belgrade on October 24, 2008.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Although public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a relatively new practice for Bulgarian 
municipalities, a number of surveys show that Bulgarian local governments have begun 
to give increasing importance to partnerships with the private sector, and often consider 
the approach of implementing infrastructure projects through PPPs due to their ability to 
overcome constraints like a lack of municipal ﬁnances and infrastructure. 
The concept behind the term public-private partnership is not always well understood 
in Bulgaria where there is a tendency to classify all types of business relationships between 
a municipality and the private sector as public-private partnerships. Bulgarian municipali-
ties have relied on PPPs mainly as opportunities to obtain new infrastructure, while not 
always appreciating all their features. Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that some 
undertakings have resulted in major misunderstandings or agreements where the public 
interest has been the last thing to be considered in managing PPP contracts. The essence 
of a PPP lies in the positive impact on the community as a result of improved services and 
infrastructure, not on the particular form of business relations between the municipality 
and the private sector under a PPP agreement. Local governments need to shift their focus 
from the acquisition of assets towards the provision of high quality services. 
As yet, Bulgaria has no special legislation regarding PPPs, and any future legal frame-
work needs to provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility with respect to the content and nature of the 
enterprise. PPPs are deﬁned and governed by a complex interaction between national and 
municipal legislation and regulations, as well as by the PPP contracts themselves. This ad-hoc 
approach to PPPs on the part of the government has led to uneven results from a public 
interest point of view. 
In the absence of a distinct national law governing PPPs, Bulgarian ministries have 
resorted to issuing their own internal guidelines, while the general framework in which 
municipalities may design and implement PPPs, depending on their ﬁnal form and pur-
pose, is taken from a combination of the Local Self-government and Local Administration 
Act, the Concessions Act, the Public Procurement Act, the Municipal Property Act, and 
the Social Assistance Act. Some checks are exercised on these endeavors to form PPPs by 
the National Audit Ofﬁce as well as a national registry and guidance is available from the 
national level, where permission to form PPPs ultimately lies. Those municipalities that have 
been ill-advised or clearly violated the procedures that would normally result in a mutually 
beneﬁcial partnership have gone on to suffer from severe ﬁnancial repercussions, inadver-
tently found their property portfolio much reduced due to transferring their properties to 
joint stock companies in which they have little leverage to stop any further sales, or simply 
not maximized the potential returns of the PPP that they entered.  
A review of Bulgarian practices demonstrates that the success of a PPP largely hinges 
on the overall planning process and the management of the most essential factors, such 
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as PPP organization, risks, partners, contractual arrangements, possible impacts, overall 
management, municipal policy, and its very objectives. One of the main problems has been 
insufﬁcient risk evaluation and allocation, leading to a heavy ﬁnancial burden for some local 
governments. For example, one of the key components of every PPP is the distribution of 
risks, and calculating such risks is a new and uncommon task for municipalities often over-
whelmed by the new responsibilities brought by political and administrative decentralization 
and democratization and unable to deliver on the promises of better, more efﬁcient services. 
That is not to say that cities, towns, and municipalities in Bulgaria have not tried in 
either a concession or a publicly-owned company to better their services or infrastructure for 
the greater public good, whether upgrading and managing a municipal swimming pool in 
Blagoevgrad, developing urban areas in Burgas, rebuilding a youth center in Gabrovo, call-
ing for a large tender to refurbish Soﬁa’s water supply and sewage network, or developing 
a complex local economic development project in Sevlievo, as the cases in this latter part 
of this study will make apparent. 
This study goes on to recommend that the Bulgarian government act to resolve and 
regulate the glaring and possibly illegal practice of property transfers to non-transparent 
joint stock companies; amend the Concessions Act to make it more ﬂexible to local condi-
tions, hand in hand with encouraging municipalities to develop local strategies for property 
management as well as local policies on public-private partnerships, whether for infra-
structure ﬁnancing or service provision; and insist that all PPPs have a clear assignment of 
responsibilities. Without these few regulatory steps, PPPs in Bulgaria will continue to yield 
sporadic results for municipalities, the private sector, and citizens alike. 
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1. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS—AN OVERVIEW 
1.1 Deﬁnition of PPP 
There is no single agreed upon deﬁnition of the term Public-private Partnership (PPP). 
But various deﬁnitions do exist in the practice regarding the substance of the public-
private partnerships. Since the concept of PPP is based on the idea of constantly 
improving and ﬁnding more eﬃcient ways to provide public infrastructure and services, 
the legal framework needs to provide suﬃcient ﬂexibility with respect to the content 
and nature of the various undertakings. 
In a broader sense, PPP is deﬁned as the implementation of all known types of co-
operation between the public sector and private partners, which, in many cases, leads 
to the establishment of joint ventures. The guidelines of the European Commission 
for successful PPP deﬁne the PPP as a “partnership between the public sector and the 
private sector for the purpose of delivering a project or a service, traditionally provided 
by the public sector.” Through this partnership, the strong sides of each of the two sec-
tors (public and private) are supplementing each other in the provision of services or 
in the building of an object for the beneﬁt of a particular community. As each sector 
does what it is best at, services and infrastructure are provided for society in the most 
economically eﬃcient manner. Such partnerships are characterized by the sharing of 
investment, risk, responsibility, and reward between the partners. 
Bulgarian legislation does not explicitly provide a common legal deﬁnition of the 
public-private partnership. Some documents have been issued by various ministries that 
provide a deﬁnition of PPP and its forms for the purposes of a speciﬁc sector or types 
of projects. The Ministry of Finance has published its “Methodological Guidelines for 
Public-Private Partnership,” where the following deﬁnition is provided: “The PPP is a 
long-term contractual agreement between persons from the public sector and the private 
sector for ﬁnancing, building, reconstruction, managing or maintaining infrastructure, 
where the private partner takes the construction risk (project completion) and at least 
one of the two risks—the risk of availability of a provided service or the risk of service 
demand.” This deﬁnition takes into account the Eurostat guidelines on the conditions 
under which a PPP could be taken oﬀ the national balance sheet. 
The Ministry of Economy and Energy has adopted internal rules for carrying out 
public-private partnerships where it deﬁnes the forms of PPP as: (1) a contract for design, 
construction, maintenance, operation and management of an object that is a public 
state property; (2) a contract for design, construction, maintenance and management 
of an object that is a private state property; (3) a contract for provision of services; (4) 
commercial company; (5) civic partnership. 
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1.2 Forms of PPPs 
While the roles and responsibilities of the public and the private sector partners diﬀer 
in individual partnership initiatives, the public-private partnership agreements may be 
achieved under various forms, depending on the sector, the risk allocation, the ﬁnancing 
and operating arrangements, and the potential implications on taxpayers. The subject 
matters of establishing such partnerships vary but PPP generally involves the ﬁnancing, 
design, building, operation, and maintenance of public infrastructure and services. 
The common forms of public private partnerships based on international experi-
ences are: 
  Operation and Maintenance. In this model, the public authority contracts with 
a private partner to operate and maintain a publicly owned facility. 
  Design–Build–Operate-Transfer (DBOT). In this model of PPP the private 
party is responsible for the design, building, and operation of infrastructure, 
which is used by the public sector. The ownership of the assets has to be trans-
ferred to the public sector at the end of the contract. Regular payments to the 
private sector are made for the provision of services in compliance with initial 
speciﬁcations. 
  Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT). This model of PPP is similar to the DBOT 
described above, with the only distinction that the public sector provides a 
drawn up design of the necessary infrastructure for the provision of services by 
the private partner. 
  Build–Transfer–Operate (BTO). This option for PPP is close to BOT, but in 
the present case the public sector becomes the owner of the infrastructure from 
the very beginning of the contract. 
  Build–Own–Operate (BOO). Here, the private party provides for the construc-
tion, ﬁnancing and operation of the infrastructure. A BOO diﬀers from a BTO 
in that the private party does not have the obligation to transfer the ownership 
of the assets to the public sector. There is an opportunity for the public sector 
to acquire the assets, by purchasing them at their residual balance value, after 
the end of the contractual period. 
  Concession. In the large sense of the deﬁnition given by the interpretative 
communication of the EU Commission, under a concession “the public 
authority entrusts to a third party … the total or partial management of services 
for which that authority would normally be responsible and for which the 
third party assumes the risk.” The ownership of assets remains usually within 
the public sector, while the private party is entitled to cover its expenditures 
through imposition of user fees. 
25
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  B u l g a r i a
Public procurement refers to the purchase, lease, rent, or hire of a good or a service 
by a public authority. Procurement is chosen because of the simplicity of desired goods 
or services, the possibility to choose from numerous providers, and the aim to minimize 
costs. Even in procurements involving construction work, typically the relationship 
is short term and the ﬁnancing is provided by the public sector. PPPs are related to 
traditional public procurements in that private partners are often selected on the basis 
of public procurement procedures. 
PPPs are more complex, frequently larger in ﬁnancing requirements, and are long-
term relationships as opposed to the one-oﬀ relationships under public procurement. 
Projects implemented through a PPP are largely ﬁnanced by the private sector. The 
transfer of the risks to the private partner also represents a major diﬀerence between 
the PPP and the public procurement. PPPs frequently provide the private partner with 
the right to operate over an extended term, to charge fees to users, and to assume key 
responsibilities, e.g., design, construction, ﬁnance, technical and commercial operation, 
and maintenance. 
 
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Bulgarian legislation does not explicitly reconcile the PPP relationship. There is no 
special law on public-private partnership. PPPs are deﬁned and governed by a complex 
interaction between national and municipal legislation and regulations, as well as by the 
project contractual agreements. New legislation was adopted in 2009 and existing acts 
have been amended in order to incorporate EU legal requirements into public contracts 
and concessions (Directive 2004/18/EC). Some of these amendments involve the regula-
tion of issues related to transparency, publicity, free competition, and the guarantee of 
public interests in the procedures. The recently amended Local Self-government and 
Local Administration Act (LSGLAA), together with the Concessions Act and the Public 
Procurement Act, provide the general legal framework for public-private partnerships 
in Bulgaria. 
2.1 Local Self-government and Local Administration Act 
The general legal framework for carrying out public private partnerships is found in 
the Local Self-government and Local Administration Act. It provides the legal basis for 
cooperation and partnership of municipalities with legal or natural persons for achieving 
objectives of mutual interest and for assigning municipal activities to external partners. 
The public-private partnership takes place on the basis of a signed cooperation agreement, 
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that has to be approved by the municipal council. In the cooperation agreement, the 
following items should be speciﬁed: 
 i) the parties under the agreement; 
 ii) the scope and subject-matter of the agreement; 
 iii) the purpose of cooperation; 
 iv) the forms of cooperation and/or the type of legal person: for example, coopera-
tion for implementation of a particular project, activity or establishment of a 
legal body with proﬁt or nonproﬁt purpose between municipalities, or between 
a municipality and legal and/or natural persons; 
 v) the rights and obligations of the parties; 
 vi) the share of participation by each one of the parties with ﬁnancial resources, 
property, and/or other forms of participation, for the achievement of the 
common goal. 
The LSGLAA also gives unrestricted rights to municipalities to perform business 
activities, to create partnerships with business organizations, and to invest ﬁnancial 
resources and properties in business activities. 
2.2 Municipal Property Act 
The rules and procedures for the commercial activities of municipalities are speciﬁed 
in the Municipal Property Act. The municipality may participate in diﬀerent forms of 
economic activities with ﬁnancial resources except subsidies from the state budget. Also, a 
municipality may participate in commercial entities provided its liability does not exceed 
the amount of its shares. Municipalities may not participate in unlimited liability com-
mercial entities. The municipality may make a decision for a partnership arrangement 
with legal or natural persons through the establishment of a joint stock company. 
The registration of such a company is subject to the provisions of the Commercial 
Act. Municipal councils are obligated to adopt an ordinance regulating the establishment 
of joint companies and the exercise of ownership rights of the municipality in these 
companies, according to the requirements of the Municipal Property Act. 
In reality, through these types of joint ventures, the municipality becomes a com-
mercial entity, which participates equally in the market with the rest of the commercial 
entities that have been registered and operate in accordance with the Commercial Act. 
The practical implementation of this type of institutionalized public-private partnership 
shows that the municipal contribution to almost every joint venture company is limited 
to the appropriation of real estate property, without taking into account the interests of 
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the local community. Details of the practice of joint stock companies with municipal 
participation are given in the next section of this paper. 
2.3 Concessions Act 
The Concessions Act is the general act that regulates public-private partnerships 
between the municipalities and the private sector. As a legal instrument, the concession 
has been a stimulus for public-private partnerships in Bulgaria for a long time. After a 
period of suspension, the concession has been reinstalled through the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1991. Later, concessions were regulated in a Concessions Act (1995). 
In view of the accession of Bulgaria to the EU and the harmonization of the Bulgarian 
legislation with the EU requirements in this ﬁeld, a new Concessions Act was adopted 
in 2006 and further amended in 2007 and 2008. The Concessions Act determines the 
rules and procedures for granting a concession. It outlines, in detail, the whole process, 
including preparation, tender procedure, content of the contract, and overall control 
of the implementation of the concession contract. Further regulation is provided in 
the rules for the implementation of the Concessions Act, adopted by the Council of 
Ministers. A large part of the Concessions Act concerns procedural matters. 
According to the Concessions Act, a concession is deﬁned as the right to operate a 
facility for the public interest, made available by a grantor to a merchant (the conces-
sionaire), in exchange for the latter’s obligation to build and/or operate and maintain 
the facility subject to the concession at his/her own risk. 
Types of Concessions
Depending on the object of the concession, three types of concessions are deﬁned—
public works, services, and mining concessions. 
 a) The public works concession represents the right of the concessionaire to build a 
facility and operate and manage the constructed facility for a deﬁned period. 
 b) The service concession represents the right of the concessionaire to manage and 
operate a public facility. It may also involve partial extension, partial reconstruc-
tion, partial rehabilitation, or renovation of the object of the concession. 
 c) The mining concession represents the right to extract ores and minerals, ﬁnanced 
with concessionaire funds and done at their own risk. 
As seen from the above deﬁnitions, the Bulgarian legislation regulates, by force of 
the same act, the conditions and the procedures for awarding both public works and 
service concessions. The procedures for both types of concessions are identical. As for 
the mining concession, a detailed regulation of the procedure is provided in the Ores 
and Minerals Act. 
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Terms of the Concession
The concession is provided on the basis of a long-term contract with particular mate-
rial interest, concluded between the grantor and the concessionaire, for a term not to 
exceed 35 years, without the right for extension. Several other limits to the concession 
term are found in speciﬁc sector legislation. 
Regarding the terms of the concessions, the Bulgarian Concessions Act does not dif-
ferentiate between a public works concession where the amount of investments requires a 
longer period of partnership, and concessions for the provision of public services, including 
for operation and management of public assets. In the latter, large investments are not 
involved (i.e., in the case of concessions for dams and beaches) and it is logical to deter-
mine a shorter concession term. The speciﬁc period is subject to concession contractual 
agreements and is determined after taking into consideration the ﬁnancial and economic 
indicators of the concession and the technical and technological speciﬁcations of the object. 
Financing and Payments
Against the granted right for operation, the concessionaire may be obligated to make 
concession payments. In the cases of concessions for construction or for services, the 
grantor may be obligated to provide a compensation payment to the concessionaire, 
in addition to the right of the concessionaire to operate the object of the concession. 
In this case, the compensation from the grantor covers part of the expenditures for 
the object of concession without exempting the concessionaire from the obligation to 
cover the major part of the risk for construction and/or for operation and maintenance 
of the object of concession. The possibilities for providing compensation and making 
concession payments are determined in the decision to launch a concession procedure, 
depending on the economic eﬃciency of the operation of the object of the concession, 
as deﬁned by the concession period and the estimated costs for construction, manage-
ment and maintenance, and the projected operational revenues. 
Ownership
The object of a concession may be a public or a private municipal property1 through 
which the economic activity is carried out. Under a concession the grantor retains 
its ownership rights over the object of the concession and the improvements on it, 
including improvements that are not made in fulﬁllment of the concession contract. 
The improvements become property of the grantor from the moment of their arising. 
In case of a transfer of ownership of the concession object, the concession contractual 
terms remain in eﬀect toward the new owner. 
Distribution of Risks
The Concessions Act has a few provisions regarding the distribution of the risk. It 
stipulates that the concessionaire assume the risk of construction and operation of the 
concession object. 
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Stages and Procedure for Granting a Concession
The Concessions Act regulates in detail the whole concession process. The granting of 
concessions goes through the following three stages: (1) preparatory works, (2) carrying 
out a procedure for granting a concession, and (3) conclusion of a concession contract. 
The procedure for granting a concession consists of the decision for launching a proce-
dure, the conduct of procedure, and the nomination of a concessionaire. 
The mayor of the municipality plays a central role in the preparatory works and the 
submission of proposals for the provision of concessions for objects, which are municipal 
property. For objects owned by municipal companies, the preparatory works have to be 
performed by the person who manages the company. 
The preparatory works include a justiﬁcation of the concession that should be based, 
at least, on a legal, ﬁnancial and economic, technical, and environmental analysis. The 
justiﬁcation states the rationale for granting a concession, and speciﬁes the characteristics 
of the object of concession and its basic content. Based on the justiﬁcation, drafts of 
the following documents are drawn up: 
 a) decision for opening of procedure for provision of concession; 
 b) notice for carrying out of procedure for provision of concession; 
 c) concession contract; 
 d) documentation for participation in the procedure (in the case of an open and 
restricted procedure) or a descriptive document (in the case of competitive 
dialogue). 
The types of procedures for selection of a concessionaire are: open procedure, re-
stricted procedure, competitive dialogue, or electronic auction (as a means of additional 
procedure in the case of an open or a restricted procedure). In the case of an open 
procedure, every person is entitled to submit an oﬀer, and in the case of a restricted 
procedure, only candidates who have received an invitation, after preliminary selection, 
may submit an oﬀer. In the case of a competitive dialogue procedure, a candidate who 
has received an invitation may submit the oﬀer only after interviews with candidates 
admitted to that procedure have been conducted. 
Overall Control of Granting Municipal Concessions
The National Audit Oﬃce controls and oversees the overall workings of the Conces-
sions Act, including follow-up control. The regional governor exercises control over 
the legitimacy of the decisions of the municipal council for the launch of concession 
procedures, as well as over the decision to amend or supplement them. The municipal 
council sends drafts of decisions for the launch of concession procedures or drafts of 
decisions for amending and/or supplementing them to the regional governor, and to 
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the ministers of Defense, interior and environment and water. These ministries assess 
whether the concessions might impose threats to national security and to the defense 
of the state; to the environment or human health; to protected territories, zones, and 
sites; and to public order. 
2.3.1 National Concession Register 
The Concessions Act regulates the establishment and the maintenance of a National 
Concessions Register (NCR). The body responsible for the maintenance of the register 
is the Council of Ministers. 
The National Concessions Register is public and is accessible via the Internet.2 It 
contains the ﬁles of all concessions and a public archive where original copies of con-
cessions are kept. Upon conclusion of a concession contract, every grantor is obligated 
to submit to the NCR an original copy of the contract and the related documents. 
Information from the concession contract, that is determined not conﬁdential in the 
Concessions Act, can be accessed from the archives under the provisions of the Access 
to Public Information Act. 
The NCR consists of three parts—for state concessions, for municipal concessions, 
and for public concessions. (These latter ones are, for example, mostly ﬁnanced by public 
funds, like the National Bank, the State Insurance Fund, or the State Health Insurance 
Fund.) Each part contains three sections: (a) information about procedures for granting 
concessions, (b) data for granted concessions, and (c) information on the execution of 
granted concessions, including concession payments. The scope of data that the grantors 
of concessions are obligated to report within 14 days after the conclusion or termina-
tion of the procedure for provision of a concession is in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Although the public register contains a section on annual statistical information 
about state and municipal concessions, this section is not well developed and there are 
no data available in this ﬁeld. 
2.4 Sector-speciﬁc Regulations 
Depending on the object of the concession, a number of sector speciﬁc acts—such as 
the Waters Act, the Ores and Minerals Act, the Forests Act, the Law on Black Sea Coast, 
the Railway Transport Act, the Roads Act, etc.—regulate the speciﬁc objects of a conces-
sion and stipulate the rules and procedures according to the speciﬁcs of the concession 
object. Usually, they also stipulate some obligations, limitations, and restrictions on the 
procedure, depending on the object of the concession, for example: 
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Obligation for granting concessions 
The Ores and Minerals Act stipulates that the extraction of ore and minerals is obliga-
tory and subject to a concession. The ores are exclusive state property, except for the 
construction materials that are municipal property. Therefore, if a municipality decides 
to establish a PPP for extraction of construction materials (stone, gravel, sand, marble), 
it is obligated to do it by granting a concession, after coordination with the minister of 
environment and waters. 
Limits of the term of the concession 
The Act on the Black Sea Coast stipulates that the concessions on beaches shall be up 
to 10 years. The Black Sea Coast is exclusive state property and the state may assign the 
management of the beaches, which are not granted to concessions, to the municipali-
ties. For their part, the municipalities may grant a concession for beaches, whose term 
shall not exceed 10 years. 
Obligation for coordination with a central government body 
Sector speciﬁc acts contain provisions that obligate the municipalities to consult and 
coordinate with a central government body prior to starting a procedure for granting 
a concession, depending on the object. For example, the Waters Act requires such 
consultation in case of granting a concession for mineral waters (with the Ministry of 
Environment and Waters). 
Regulation of concession payments 
The ordinance on the principles and methods of determination of the concession 
payments for extraction of ores and minerals provides a detailed methodology for de-
termination of such payments, including for construction materials. 
2.5 Social Assistance Act 
The provision of social services is regulated in a special chapter of the Social Assistance 
Act and the Rules for the Application of the Act. The same act also regulates the PPP 
agreements between the municipalities and nongovernmental organizations, private 
companies, or physical persons that provide social services. The act stipulates that the 
supply of social services by private bodies be based on a registration of the respective 
service provider in a special register to the Social Assistance Agency of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Policy. In addition, providers of social services for children under 18 
are required to obtain a license. 
32
P U B L I C - P R I V A T E  PA R T N E R S H I P S :  S U C C E S S E S  A N D  F A I L U R E S
The Agency implements the state policy in the ﬁeld of social assistance and social 
services, performs the overall control of the adopted criteria and standards for social 
services, issues permits for the opening and closing of specialized social services institu-
tions and registers the providers of social services. The registration is based on submission 
of a set of required documents. The deconcentrated structures of the Agency control 
the observation of social services criteria and standards (regarding personnel, nutrition, 
healthcare, educational services, provision of information, organization of personal free 
time, and contacts). 
Social services may be provided through joint participation of the public and the 
private sector on the basis of a contract between the municipality and the private partner. 
For this purpose, the mayor of the municipality may assign the management of special-
ized institutions or social services, provided within the community, to persons from the 
private sector, after holding a competition. Only suppliers of social services, who have 
been registered in the register to the Agency for Social Assistance, are entitled to take 
part in such competitions. The private sector is also entitled to apply for reception of 
ﬁnancial resources from municipal budgets for carrying out social services, upon the 
observation of the approved criteria and standards. 
For exercising public control over the performance of social assistance activities, 
every municipality should establish a public council, by decision of the municipal coun-
cil. The public council is a consulting body and consists of at least three and not more 
than nine persons, representatives of public institutions, legal persons, and individuals, 
dealing with social assistance activities. It has the following functions: 
 a) contributes to the implementation of social assistance policy in the municipality; 
 b) discusses regional strategies, programs, and projects related to social assistance; 
 c) cooperates with natural persons registered under the Commercial Act and with 
legal persons for the coordination of activities for the provision of social services; 
 d) performs an overall control of the quality of social services in compliance with 
approved criteria and standards; 
 e) provides opinions regarding the opening and closing of specialized social services 
institutions within the territory of the municipality. 
The public council has the right to require information from the regional structures of 
the Social Assistance Agency. In case of shortcomings or feedback from service users, the 
public council oﬃcially informs the municipal council and the Social Assistance Agency. 
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2.6 Institutional Arrangements 
The following central government structures have some functions with regard to the 
public-private partnership: 
  Public-Private Partnership Unit within the Management of EU Funds 
Directorate develops strategies for the application of PPPs in Bulgaria, moni-
tors the implementation of co-ﬁnanced and investment projects, and provides 
methodological guidelines for the implementation of PPP; 
  The Economic and Social Policy Directorate to the Council of Ministers 
provides methodological guidelines and legal assistance. It maintains the web-
based Public Concessions Register. 
  The Administrative Regulation and Services Directorate within the Ministry 
of State Administration performs analyses of the public administrative services 
and provides recommendations for their provision through PPP; 
  The Pre-accession Programs and Projects Directorate within the Ministry 
of Economy and Energy is the managing authority of Operational Program 
“Competitiveness” where special measures concern the implementation of PPP 
projects; 
  Specialized units with functions for preparing the procedures for granting 
state concessions and for performing the control of their implementation are 
established in other ministries. 
  The National Audit Oﬃce and the Agency for State Internal Financial Control 
to the Minister of Finance exert ﬁnancial control, including over PPP projects 
and contracts. 
The Ministry of Finance has developed several methodological guidelines to assist 
the municipalities and the public institutions in the process of preparation and imple-
mentation of projects. For example, the “Methodological Guidelines on Public Private 
Partnership” provide guidelines for analyses needed in the process of deﬁning and 
implementing a PPP project. It covers the following issues: analyses of the applicability 
and ﬁnancial feasibility of a PPP project, ﬁnancial and economic analyses, analysis of 
public expenditures, analysis and allocation of the risks, etc. 
Currently, the government undertakes measures to improve the capacity of central, 
regional, and local governments in the area of public private partnership, concessions and 
public procurement. Within the Operational Program “Administrative Capacity” several 
central government bodies have received funding for projects with the purpose of increas-
ing the capacity and strengthening the monitoring and control in the discussed ﬁeld. 
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3. PARTICIPATION OF BULGARIAN MUNICIPALITIES IN PPP 
PPP is a relatively new practice for Bulgarian municipalities and is still at an early 
stage of development. Despite this fact, a number of surveys show that Bulgarian local 
governments give high importance to partnerships with the private sector and consider 
the approach of implementing infrastructure projects through a PPP as an attractive 
alternative to the traditional model of procurement of works and services, because it 
can overcome constraints due to the lack of ﬁnances and infrastructure (both quality 
and quantity) in municipalities. 
At the same time, the concept behind the term public-private partnership is not 
always well understood. Firstly, municipalities rely on a PPP mainly as an opportunity 
to obtain new infrastructure. Secondly, there is a tendency for all types of business 
relations between a municipality and the private sector to be classiﬁed as PPPs. A typi-
cal example is the classiﬁcation of all types of joint stock companies with municipal 
participation as public private partnerships, although in many cases the public interest 
is the last thing considered in managing these companies. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the pubic opinion about these commercial activities of municipalities is strongly 
negative. A public private partnership suggests that a socially signiﬁcant public service 
or a service used by a large part of the population is provided by a private company on 
behalf of the public authority. 
The essence of a PPP lies in the positive impact on the community as a result of 
improved services and infrastructure rather than the particular form of business relations 
between the municipality and the private sector under a PPP. In this sense, a shift in 
the attitude of the local governments towards PPP is needed—from focusing mainly on 
acquisition of infrastructure (assets) towards provision of quality services. 
3.1 Problems with Municipal PPPs
The last several years have brought both positive and negative examples of PPP arrange-
ments. The review of the practices demonstrates that the success of a PPP is largely 
dependent on the overall process of estimation and management of a number of factors, 
such as PPP type, risks, partner, contractual arrangements, impacts, overall management, 
and municipal policy and objectives, etc. 
One of the main problems seems to be the risk evaluation and allocation, leading to 
an increased ﬁnancial burden for the local governments. As one of the key components 
of each PPP is the distribution of the risks, their calculation is a new exercise for the 
municipalities because such calculations have not been a practice. Local governments 
ﬁnd themselves in a weak position during renegotiation and are forced eventually into 
accepting to carry the major share of the risk, with visible eﬀects on the public accounts 
in the long run. 
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Quite often, municipalities enter into a public-private partnership by establishing 
joint stock companies or by granting a concession. The concessions are mainly for op-
eration and maintenance of public assets. Municipal PPPs with investment purposes 
are rather exceptional. This is logical, as in most cases these concessions involve limited 
ﬁnancial resources and can be applied to a broad range of municipal services. 
As mentioned earlier, the municipalities have an unrestricted right to perform ﬁnan-
cial and economic activities. Establishing a joint stock company is one of the main types 
of partnerships between municipalities and business entities and broadly practiced by 
local governments in Bulgaria. The municipal stock in such companies is almost always 
in the form of appropriation of municipal property. This scheme is notorious for its 
complete lack of transparency. The question is how the public interest is protected in 
this type of PPP. The regular reports of the National Audit Oﬃce regarding the man-
agement of municipal property and the management and control of the municipal 
share in joint stock companies show numerous examples of deﬁciencies that may be 
summarized as follows: 
 a) municipalities massively allocate property into joint stock companies (JSCs); 
 b) the appropriation of municipal private properties to the capital of the JSC is 
done without any provision of public information by the municipality regarding 
its investment intentions; 
 c) participation of the municipality in the creation of JCSs is done without adher-
ence to any prior developed criteria and procedures for the selection of the 
partner/s; 
 d) selection of the partner/s is done without a competition between interested 
stakeholders, thus bypassing a tool that would otherwise guarantee the achieve-
ment of municipal investment goals to a largest extent; 
 e) municipalities do not draw the dividend; 
 f ) municipalities do not have established mechanisms or procedures for monitoring, 
evaluating, and inﬂuencing the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of service provision 
and the ﬁnancial situation of the company. 
A common practice exists among municipal councils to increase or decrease the 
capital of JSCs through appropriation of properties to the capital of these companies. 
In reality, most of these properties do not serve the declared activity of the company. 
Following the appropriation, these properties are sold on the market and thus the com-
pany is ﬁnanced indirectly by the municipality. The end result is that the municipality 
is deprived of revenues that would be generated from the sale or rent of the property. 
The municipal councils’ decisions to appropriate properties to JSCs are not supported 
by detailed surveys of the current status of these properties. In addition, no speciﬁc 
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motivation or proof of the beneﬁts to the municipality are given. None of these deci-
sions are supported by ﬁnancial and economic analysis. Usually the municipal councils’ 
decisions simply stipulate which properties will be contributed to the capital of which 
companies and which properties will be sold. 
These companies, with small exceptions, do not carry out the main purpose for which 
they were established in the ﬁrst place. The research team did not ﬁnd a single JSC that 
has been created for the beneﬁt of the local community or to meet certain public needs. 
The legislation is used to transfer municipal property to private bodies free of charge 
or at a low price. Usually, the practice is that the municipality registers a joint stock 
company with a private partner (selected in a non-transparent way, sometimes without 
any competition) and contributes to the capital by appropriating municipal real estate 
property. Then the municipal council adopts a decision to delegate the right to man-
age this property to the new JSC. The JSC appreciates the municipal property in the 
capital of another commercial entity where it participates. This way, once apportioned 
to the joint stock company, the municipal assets are transferred to another company. In 
practice, the municipality is deprived of its property or does not receive any dividend. 
Although these operations are performed legally, the end result is a prolonged process 
of appropriations of properties, sales, and new appropriations. 
Box 1.1
The Cases of “Soﬁa Property” and Park Management
The municipal company “Soﬁyski Imoti” (“Soﬁa Property”) is a clear example of mismanage-
ment and a misunderstanding of the purpose of PPPs. According to the audit report by the 
Agency for State Internal Financial Control, in 2004 the municipal budget of Soﬁa had lost “at 
least BGN 33 million from the participation in joint stock companies. This amount represents 
around 10 percent of the annual budget of the Soﬁa municipality.” OK, what happened? 
The company sold land and premises to private companies at very low prices and under very 
obscure and unfavorable conditions. 
 The management of municipal parks and green areas in Soﬁa municipality is another 
typical case. Many land plots within these parks have been issued municipal property deeds 
that depict them as private municipal property. In reality, these properties serve a public 
purpose and should be issued property deeds that describe them as public municipal property. 
Yet, as private municipal property, these land plots are subject to business transactions. As 
such, they are appropriated to the capital of a JSC or simply sold. All these transactions were 
approved by decisions of the municipal council. The municipality has a minority stake and no 
practical inﬂuence. Only seven hectares of park remain in Soﬁa‘s South Park that have not 
been appropriated to a JSC “Soﬁa City Company.” Using the same approach, 3.5 hectares 
in the central part of Borisova Garden have been appropriated to another JSC. Again, the 
municipality has a minority share and no practical inﬂuence or control. Later the plots were 
transformed to construct residential areas or commercial facilities.
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3.2 Examples of Concessions
The concession is a common approach to PPP, applied by Bulgarian municipalities. 
Data from the National Concessions Register show that for the last ten years (late 1997 
through April 2008), 700 municipal concessions have been registered. 
The prevailing aspect of the granted concessions is that they are deﬁned as conces-
sions for services. Over 400 municipal concessions are granted for reservoirs and dams. 
Under these concessions, the municipality transfers the right to manage a dam’s mu-
nicipal property for a deﬁned period to a private entity. Typically, activities include ﬁsh 
farming and the provision of sport ﬁshing services, in which case the concessionaire 
collects user fees. 
Municipal concessions also involve the management of sport and leisure facilities (over 
40), which include stadiums, swimming pools, and other recreation facilities. In some 
cases, the concession contract requires construction or rehabilitation of the object of the 
concession as well. Around 25 concessions have been granted for mineral waters; 23 for 
the extraction of construction materials; and 11 for road facilities (parking) and subways. 
The municipal water supply and sewage services are sectors that are typically subject 
to public-private partnerships in EU member states. In Bulgaria, only two municipal 
concessions have been registered in the NCR for water supply and sewage networks—
one of them in Soﬁa. The current government drafted a new law on water supply and 
sewage systems that will be submitted to the parliament soon. It is expected that the 
adoption of the new act will speed up the process of establishing PPPs by municipalities 
for the provision of this service. 
More concessions are found in the ﬁeld of solid waste management (15). The scope of 
services under these concessions usually includes collection, transportation, and disposal 
of solid waste and street cleaning or a combination of some of them. The possibility for 
attracting the private sector to waste treatment services is completely based on the policy 
of the respective municipality. In view of the limited ﬁnances and budgetary resources, 
the municipalities should be encouraged to enter into public-private partnerships in 
this sector. Yet, only one municipal concession for landﬁll construction is registered in 
the National Concessions Register. 
About 200 concessions have been granted for providing other services—maintenance 
of green areas, management of kindergartens, provision of city transport services, etc. 
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4. SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
4.1 A Swimming Complex in Blagoevgrad 
Data on the concession: Swimming complex 
Concessionaire: Akva Park Ltd. 
Duration: 30 years 
Investment:  BGN 3,000,0003
The municipality of Blagoevgrad has provided the right of usage of a swimming com-
plex and other sport and recreation facilities, including the pertaining infrastructure 
and equipment, serving the swimming complex, to a concessionaire. The term of the 
concession is 30 years. 
Prior to the concession, the municipality had partial ownership and operated an 
indoor swimming pool, which was in very poor condition, and a small outdoor swimming 
pool, which was practically unusable. The swimming pools are situated along the so-called 
“Alley of Health,” along the Bistrica River in Blagoevgrad. The alley is a very popular 
recreational area for the town’s citizens. Both swimming pools were in dire need of a 
major overhaul and signiﬁcant investments. Academica JSC owned the swimming pools 
and the municipality owned the land (the land is public municipal property—12,700 
square meters). Neither Academica JSC nor the municipality was willing to invest in 
them. In 2004 the municipality bought the swimming pools from Academica JSC for 
approximately BGN 100,000 BGN and gained full ownership of the asset. 
The concessionaire selection process began with a decision by the municipal council 
in November 2004. The decision was made based on legal, economic, social, and ecologi-
cal analyses prepared by the municipal administration. The terms of the concession set 
by the municipal council required minimum investments of nearly BGN 940,000 and 
a 20-year concession period. The exact amount of the investments and the investment 
period are determined by the investment project, which is subject to a tender. 
By virtue of the contract, the concessionaire pledges to make investments at his 
own expense and in accordance with an approved investment program. The conces-
sionaire provides free usage of the covered swimming pool to kindergartens, secondary, 
specialized, vocational, and high schools and universities. At the end of each year the 
municipality signs an annex with the concessionaire, stipulating the terms of use for 
the indoor swimming pool for the next year. 
The municipal council set a requirement for the concession contract to guarantee 
to the municipality the following revenues from concession fees: 5.5 percent of the net 
revenues, but not less than BGN 20,418 for the ﬁrst year; 8 percent of the net revenues, 
but not less than BGN 30,000 for the period from the second to the seventh year of the 
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concession; 12 percent of net revenues, but not less than BGN 40,000 from the eighth 
year to the end of the contract. 
Based on the municipal council’s November 2004 decision, the municipal adminis-
tration organized a tender for selecting the concessionaire. In April 2005, the municipal 
council approved the selection of Akva Park Ltd., as the concessionaire for the swimming 
pools and authorized the municipal administration to sign a concession contract with 
the company. Akva Park Ltd., was the only company to submit an oﬀer. 
The approved oﬀer was for an investment of BGN 7,000,000 in three stages. For 
the ﬁrst phase, the proposed investment was BGN 3,000,000, which should have been 
completed by May 5, 2006. The proposal included construction renovation of the 
existing indoor swimming pool, construction of an Olympic-size outdoor swimming 
pool with stands, construction of a small swimming pool for children, several bars and 
a restaurant, a hotel, an underground parking lot, and several shops. A speciﬁc oﬀer 
made by Akva Park Ltd., is an integral part of the contract, but has not been made 
available to the public. 
In June 2006, the municipal council approved a 10-year extension of the concession 
contract, thus making the term of the concession 30 years. The speciﬁc reasons for the 
extension are not clear. In addition the new annex for the extension does not stipulate 
what the concession fees will be for the last 10 years of the contract, so it must be as-
sumed that they will be unchanged. Data regarding this annex is not available in the 
National Concessions Register. 
The initial experiences from this concession are very controversial. According to data 
provided by the municipality, as of December 2007, the municipality had encountered 
signiﬁcant diﬃculties in managing the concession. An internal audit, ordered by the 
new mayor of the municipality indicated that these problems were inherited by the new 
municipal administration, which took oﬃce in September 2007. Most of the problems 
seem to have arisen from the lack of or inadequate post-privatization control on the side 
of the municipality. Some of the construction plans from the ﬁrst phase of the invest-
ment—stands next to the Olympic-size pool, a main building with dressing rooms, a 
youth center, and sauna as well as the underground parking lot—have not been met. 
They have been postponed for phases two and three of the investment process, with ap-
proval from the municipality. The deadline for the completion of phases two and three 
of the investment is indeﬁnite and has not been set. 
In addition, the social aspect of the contract (free-of-charge usage of the covered 
swimming pool by schools, kindergartens, etc.) has hardly been fulﬁlled. Only a local 
university has used the swimming pool for six months. The municipal administration 
bears the fault for this, since it has not organized the schools and kindergartens and has 
not signed the necessary annex with the concessionaire. 
Other signiﬁcant problems with the concession are that the concessionaire has not 
insured the premises, as required by the contract. The concessionaire has not established 
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an adequate and transparent accounting system and the contractually mandated reports 
have not been provided to the municipality. Perhaps for this reason the concessionaire 
has been paying the minimum concession fees. 
A short ﬁnancial analysis of the economic eﬀectiveness of the concession is presented 
in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
 A Short Financial Analysis of the Economic Eﬀectiveness of the Concession
—Municipality of Blagoevgrad
Municipality of Blagoevgrad Traditional investment: 
municipality implements the 
project with its own resources 
Concession* 
Life of the project 30 years. 30 years. 
Initial investment BGN 300,000 BGN 3,000,000 
(under the concession 
agreement) 
Repayment of loan BGN 7,195,022  
Operational cost BGN 3,086,371 (excluding 
indirect administrative costs) 
BGN 0 
 Total costs: BGN 10,581,393  
Minimum revenues from concession fee BGN 0 BGN 514,874 
Revenues from user fees BGN 10,287,903 BGN 0
Total financial benefits for the municipality  BGN –293 490 BGN 514,874 
Note: * This analysis covers only the ﬁrst stage of the investment, since it is the only one that is complete. 
The actual size of the total investment cannot be determined. 
 
The analysis considers one alternative to the concession, where the municipality 
implements the project with its own resources. When implementing the project through 
a concession the municipality did not invest its own resources, rather it attracted external 
ﬁnances worth BGN 3,000,000. Through this approach the municipality did not incur 
operational costs or costs for repayments of loans. 
The concession contract guarantees the following revenues from concession fees to 
the municipality: 5.5 percent of the net revenues, but not less than BGN 20,418 for 
the ﬁrst year; eight percent of the net revenues, but not less than BGN 30,000 for the 
period from the second to the seventh year of the concession; 12 percent of the net 
revenues, but not less than BGN 40,000 for the period from the eighth year to the end 
of the contract. 
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In the alternative case, where the municipality implements the project with its own 
resources, the investment is again BGN 3,000,000. Since this is a considerable amount 
and can hardly be allocated from the municipal budget, a loan covering 90 percent of 
the investment (BGN 2,700,000) is foreseen for 30 years at an eight-percent interest 
rate. The remaining 10 percent of the investment (BGN 300,000) is covered by the 
municipal budget. Repayment of the loan requires 30 annual installments of BGN 
239,834. The projected revenues are BGN 10,287,903 calculated on the basis of the 
minimum net revenues used for the calculation of concession fees. Operational costs 
are estimated at 30 percent of the net revenues, amounting to BGN 3,086,371. Since 
the concessionaire has not established an adequate and transparent accounting and 
reporting system, these are estimates. Under these estimates, the municipality stands 
to lose BGN 290,490 from the investment. 
Based on this analysis and the fact that the municipality has guaranteed the free-
of-charge use of the swimming pool for the schools and kindergartens, one should 
evaluate the concession as good and beneﬁcial for the municipality. The problems in 
this concession stems not from the idea of establishing a PPP through a concession for 
the swimming pools, but rather from the speciﬁc contract that was signed and, more 
precisely, from the monitoring and reporting procedures that have not been established. 
4.2 Development of Urban Areas: Burgas 
Data on the concession:  City square for construction of underground parking lot 
Concessionaire:  Global Technology Company JSC 
Duration:   30 years 
Investment:  BGN 20,000,000
In 2005, the municipal council of Burgas granted a concession for the right to develop 
a public square, an underground parking lot on three levels, including the infrastructure 
and equipment servicing the quoted objects, according to an approved design, which 
will be built by and with the concessionaire using its resources. The speciﬁed term of 
the concession is 30 years. 
The concessionaire has the obligation to build the object of the concession, to un-
dertake the construction of the underground parking lot and of the ground-level square 
area, including the technical infrastructure and belongings necessary for their usage, in 
compliance with the approved design. The public square area shall be urbanized and 
planted in order to form a city forum for the performance of cultural events, relaxation, 
and social contact with street lighting and church lighting. The concessionaire shall 
maintain the improvements for the term of the concession. 
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The amount of the concession payment is BGN 4,500,000, payable in equal annual 
installments, each one in the amount of BGN 150,000. 
A short ﬁnancial analysis of the economic eﬀectiveness of the concession is presented 
in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2
A Short Financial Analysis of the Economic Eﬀectiveness of the Concession—Burgas
Burgas Traditional investment: 
municipality implements the 
project with own resources 
Concession 
Life of the project 30 years 30 years 
Invested resources BGN 20,000,000 BGN 20,000,000
Repayment of loan BGN –47,966,814  
Operational cost BGN 6,000,000  
Revenues from concession fee BGN 0 BGN 4,500,000 
Annual concession fee  BGN 150,000 
Revenues from user charges BGN 21,900,000 BGN 0 
Total financial benefits for the municipality  BGN –29,066,814 BGN 4,500,000 
 When implementing the project through a concession the municipality does not 
invest its own resources, rather it attracts external ﬁnances worth BGN 20,000,000. 
Through this approach, the municipality does not incur operational costs or costs for 
the repayments of loans. After the thirtieth year, the municipality gains ownership of 
the asset. 
The concession contract guarantees annual revenues from concession fees of BGN 
150,000, increased each year with the level of inﬂation, to the municipality. Thus the 
revenues from concession fees are BGN 4,500,000 
The municipality gains ownership of the asset after the thirtieth year. Making a very 
conservative assumption that the useful life of the asset is 50 years, and using straight 
line depreciation, at the end of the concession contract the municipality will receive 
a property worth BGN 8,000,000. The revenues from parking fees for 20 years are 
estimated at BGN 14,600,000, based on 400 parking spaces, occupied for ﬁve hours a 
day, 365 days per year and a parking ticket at BGN 1 per hour. But these revenues will 
go to the concessionaire. Annual operational costs are estimated at one percent of the 
investment cost—BGN 200,000, or BGN 4,000,000 for the 20-year period. Thus for 
a 50-year period the municipality stands to gain BGN 1,500,000.
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In the traditional investment pattern, where the municipality implements the 
project with its own resources, the investment is again BGN 20,000,000. Since this is 
a considerable amount and can hardly be allocated from the municipal budget, a loan 
covering 90 percent of the investment (BGN 18,000,000) is foreseen for 30 years with 
an interest rate of eight percent. Repayment of the loan requires 30 annual installments 
of BGN 1,598,893. Thus the total cost of the loan (principal and interest) is BGN 
47,966,814. The remaining 10 percent of the investment (BGN 2,000,000) are covered 
by the municipal budget. 
Operational costs are estimated at ﬁve percent of the size of the investment—BGN 
1,000,000. The projected revenues are projected at BGN 21,900,000, calculated the same 
way as above. Under these estimates, the municipality stands to lose BGN 29,066,814 
from the investment for the 30-year period.
Based on these assumptions one can evaluate the concession as good and beneﬁcial 
for the municipality. It must be noted that the actual useful life of the asset is probably 
100 years. 
4.3 A Youth Center in Gabrovo 
Data on the concession:  Municipal land plot for construction of a social center 
for the youth 
Concessionaire: YMCA Gabrovo 
Duration: 15 years 
Investment:  BGN 344,308
 
In 2003, the municipal council of Gabrovo provided the use of a building and 
construction site that would house the Gabrovo Youth Center for the education of 
children, young adults, and the disadvantaged. The building is situated on a land plot 
that is public municipal property, which the municipality provides for 15 years (the 
duration of the concession). The concession was signed in accordance with a decision 
of the municipal council in March 2003. The decision was based on an analysis of the 
ﬁnancial, economic, environmental, legal, social aspects of the potential youth center. 
The municipal council also based the decision on a prior decision in 2001, which 
required the preparation of the above-mentioned analysis and directed the municipal 
administration to ﬁnd an appropriate land plot for such a youth center. 
It appears that in 2001 and in 2003 there was a general agreement among the 
municipal councils and the municipal administration that there was a need for the 
establishment of a center that would provide training, education, and social activities, 
and organize events for youth and disadvantaged people. The six council committees 
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that reviewed the proposal for a concession—Urban Planning, Utilities and Transpor-
tation, Economy, Municipal Property, Restitution and Privatization, and Budget and 
Finance—approved the proposal. In addition to this, the shorthand record from the 
meeting of the municipal council indicates that all 23 councilors approved the estab-
lishment of such a center through a concession. The shorthand minutes do not show 
any opposition to the concession. 
The municipal council set the procedure for selection of a concessionaire to tender in 
the presence of the contestants and in accordance of the Municipal Property Act (MPA). 
It must be noted that in 2003 it was Chapter 7 of the MPA that set the procedure for 
establishing municipal concessions. 
The selected concessionaire was the YMCA Gabrovo. According to the contract, the 
concessionaire would prepare, at his own expense, the design of the object of concession, 
according to a schedule, coordinated with the grantor of the concession. The conces-
sionaire would also develop and present to the municipality a complete investment 
schedule by month for the building and equipping the center, as well as for improve-
ments to the area belonging to the concessionaire. The concessionaire also agreed to 
perform only those commercial activities expressly described in the contract. The value 
of the investment is estimated at BGN 150,000–300,000 for construction and BGN 
150,000 for equipment and for furnishing the premises. 
The annual concession fee is set at BGN 240 payable in one installment. The ﬁrst 
installment is due in the month after concession object operation begins, and the in-
stallment for each subsequent year—up to January 31. 
The initial concession experiences were generally positive. The property was well 
maintained. The due concession fees were paid regularly and in time, as was evidenced 
in the National Concession Register. 
According to Nikolaj Sirakov, Gabrovo Municipal Secretary, the quality of the 
service is good. The organization is active and organizes many events and trainings for 
youth. This is also evident on the center’s web site.4 In March 2007, the center was 
chosen by the National Agency for Youth and Sports as a regional Youth Information 
and Consultancy Center. 
The only negative signs related to this concession were from a report by the Regional 
Audit Oﬃce in November 2007. The report made 16 recommendations to the municipal 
administration, one of which was to increase the concession fee between the YMCA 
and Gabrovo municipality. The municipality did not follow the recommendation due 
to contractual legal obstacles. Apparently, the contract does not provide for concession 
fee increases or adjustments for inﬂation. 
A short ﬁnancial analysis of the economic eﬀectiveness of the concession is presented 
in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3
 A Short Financial Analysis of the Economic Eﬀectiveness of the Concession
—Gabrovo Municipality
Gabrovo municipality Traditional investment:
The municipality implements the 
project with own resources 
Concession 
Life of the project 15 years 15 years 
Invested resources (actual)* BGN 172,154 BGN 344,308 
Repayment of loan BGN –301,690 BGN 0 
Operational cost BGN 40,000  
Revenues from concession fees BGN 0 BGN 2,331 
Annual concession fee BGN 0 BGN 240 
Book value of the asset after the fifteenth year BGN 241,016 BGN 241,016 
Revenues from rents BGN 360,000 BGN 0 
Total financial benefits for the municipality BGN –113,844 BGN 2,331 
Note: * The current analysis is a modiﬁcation of the ﬁnancial and economic analysis, prepared by the 
municipal administration, in that it accounts for the actual cost of the investment—BGN 
344,308. 
 
The analysis considers one alternative to the concession, where the municipality 
implements the project with its own resources. 
When implementing the project through a concession the municipality did not invest 
its own resources, rather it attracted external ﬁnances worth BGN 344,308. Through 
this approach the municipality did not incur operational costs or costs for repayments 
of loans. After the ﬁfteenth year, the municipality gains ownership of the asset. 
The concession contract guarantees annual revenues from concession fees of BGN 
240, which are not indexed with the levels of inﬂation, to the municipality. The analysis 
incorporates a six percent level of inﬂation for the entire 15-year period with which the 
expected revenues are decreased. Thus, the revenues from concession fees, reduced with 
projected inﬂation, are BGN 241,016. 
Since the municipality gains ownership of the asset after the ﬁfteenth year, the 
analysis needs to take into consideration the book value and the potential revenues after 
the ﬁfteenth year. The property is a two-story building with a total area of 285 square 
meters. On the ﬁrst ﬂoor there are two halls used for meeting and working with the 
disabled children and a confectionary/pastry shop. Administrative oﬃces are located on 
the second ﬂoor. Thus, if after the ﬁfteenth year the municipality wishes to maintain 
the function of the building, the only revenue from the property will be from renting 
the confectionary/pastry shop. 
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Making a very conservative estimate that the useful life of the asset is 50 years and 
using straight line depreciation, at the end of the concession contract the municipality 
will receive a property worth BGN 241,000. With a monthly rent of BGN 2,000, the 
municipality will earn BGN 840,000 for the 35-year period after the concession. 
In the alternative case, where the municipality implements the project with its own 
resources, the investment is again BGN 344,308. A loan covering 50 percent of the 
investment (172,154 BGN) is foreseen for 15 years at an interest rate of eight percent 
. The remaining 50 percent of the investment is covered by the municipal budget. 
Repayment of the loan requires 15 annual installments of BGN 20,112. The projected 
revenues are BGN 360,000 calculated the same way as above. With these assumptions the 
municipality stands to lose BGN -113,844 from the investment for the 15-year period. 
Based on these assumptions one can evaluate the concession as good and beneﬁcial 
for the municipality. 
There are non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts from the concession which have not been calculated 
in the ﬁnancial and economic analysis. The analysis estimates that the number of people 
who will beneﬁt directly from the concession are 16,500 annually and 2,500–5,000 
will beneﬁt indirectly. Thus, the total number of people beneﬁting from the project is 
between 19,000 and 21,500 annually, under both options.
The prepared ﬁnancial and economic analysis on which the municipal council bases 
its decision does not look at alternative properties for the construction of the center. 
It also does not consider the value of the land on which the property is built (the land 
plot is 1,735 square meters), because it was not sold, just rented.
4.4 Water Supply and Sewage in Soﬁa 
The concession for the water supply and sewage services of Soﬁa municipality was granted 
by virtue of a contract in 2000. It was the ﬁrst municipal concession in this sector. In 
1989, Soﬁa registered a municipal enterprise, “ViK” (ViK—water supply and sewage 
system), with the purpose of: the design, maintenance, operation, and reconstruction of the 
water supply and sewage system; engineering activities related to the maintenance of the 
ViK network; management of mineral waters and mineral springs; design, construction, 
reconstruction, and maintenance of river beds in the territory of Soﬁa municipality. 
In 1997, the enterprise had been re-registered as a sole-proprietor stock company 
“ViK Soﬁa” with the same purpose. Since October 2000, the joint stock company 
“Soﬁyska Voda” had provided water supply and sewage services in Soﬁa. This was done 
under the provision of a concession contract between Soﬁa and the company for 25 
years. Company owners include Soﬁa municipality and “International Water,” a Brit-
ish operator. The purposes of the company are to operate the ViK networks and to 
undertake investments. 
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The value of the investments in the ﬁrst 15 years of the concession contract is around 
USD 152 million. In 2003, “International Water” transferred its share to “United Utili-
ties” and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Currently, 
the shares of the company are divided between Soﬁa municipality (25 percent) and 
United Utilities/EBRD (75 percent ). The ViK service covers over 1.5 million inhabitants 
and the company is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and the management 
of 4,077 kilometers of water mains and 2,086 kilometers of drains, and two wastewater 
treatment plants. The company has 1,000 personnel. 
4.4.1 Procedures for the Selection of the Concessionaire 
In 1998, the municipality of Soﬁa contracted PriceWaterhouseCoopers to prepare an 
analysis and an informational memorandum about the status of the water supply and 
sewage system in Soﬁa. 
That same year, the municipal council of Soﬁa adopted a decision for the procedural 
launch of a two-stage competition that would grant a concession for the provision of 
municipal water supply and sewage services. The competition was carried out according 
to the municipal ordinance on concessions that was in place at that time. The council’s 
decision did not contain one of the ordinance’s requisites—the type, amount, and 
method of payment for the concession price. 
The competition was carried out in two rounds—a prequaliﬁcation (preliminary 
selection of candidates) round and a ﬁnal round. Eight international companies applied 
and four companies were short-listed for the second round. The commission ranked 
“International Water Limited” ﬁrst, “Lyonnaise des Eaux” second, and “Vivendi/
Marubeni” third. 
One year later, in November 1999, the municipal council of Soﬁa approved the 
report of the selection commission, and announced “International Water Limited” as 
the winner and authorized the mayor to negotiate and sign a contract for the granting 
of a concession within one month. 
“International Water Limited” established and registered a joint stock company 
named “Soﬁyska Voda” with its headquarters in Soﬁa. 
The concession contract was signed in December 1999 between the Soﬁa municipal-
ity (the grantor) and “Soﬁyska Voda” (the concessionaire—in the process of registration). 
The concession term was 25 years. The contract became active in October 2000, after 
the signing of protocols for the fulﬁllment of the preliminary conditions, listed in the 
concession contract. 
48
P U B L I C - P R I V A T E  PA R T N E R S H I P S :  S U C C E S S E S  A N D  F A I L U R E S
4.4.2 Contractual Obligations
According to the provisions of the concession contract, “Soﬁyska Voda” was obligated 
to provide a performance guarantee in the amount of USD 750,000 to the municipal-
ity of Soﬁa on the date of the contract’s activation. The amount was to be deposited in 
an internationally recognized bank whose long-term loans were evaluated to at least a 
AA Standard and Poors rating or a comparable rating by Moody’s Investment Services. 
The performance guarantee was valid for a minimum period of 12 months and could 
be renewed or changed by the concessionaire in terms that would guarantee the mu-
nicipality access to the funds at any time during the contractual period. 
In December 2000, a loan agreement was signed between “Soﬁyska Voda” and the 
EBRD for a loan in the amount of EUR 31 million. One of the conditions for entering 
into the loan agreement was the provision of a guarantee on behalf of the municipality. 
Such a guarantee was signed between Soﬁa and the EBRD. The municipality guaranteed, 
unconditionally and unavoidably, the obligation of payment of all sums due by “Soﬁ-
yska Voda” under the loan agreement with the EBRD in case “Soﬁyska Voda” failed to 
meet the terms of the agreement. Thus, the municipality became a debtor to the bank. 
The two contracting companies agreed to an initial list of private assets owned by 
the municipality’s company, “Vik.” These assets would become capital for the joint stock 
company “Soﬁyska Voda,” to be used against shares. The municipal council adopted 
two decisions (July 2000 and April 2002), and approved the transfer of the assets of 
the sole proprietor municipal company “ViK” for the purpose of acquisition of shares 
at nominal value from the capital of the concessionaire. The transferred assets of the 
municipal company account for BGN 4,889,295. 
The fees for the water supply and sewage service and their review, corrections, and 
indexation are regulated by the concession contract. Basic prices are determined in 
an annex to the contract, and they shall apply for each of the ﬁrst three years of the 
contract. The price of the service is calculated based on basic prices, indexed, and cor-
rected during annual reviews. Indexation and corrections are carried out following a 
methodology explained in the ﬁnancial model. (Diﬀerent fees are set for drinking water, 
industrial water, sewage, and wastewater treatment. Fees are diﬀerentiated by groups of 
users (households, budgetary organizations, commercial entities.) 
The price increase for users between the initial and the ﬁnal period is from 28 to 
34 percent. 
4.4.3 Monitoring of the Concession Contract 
In accordance with the contract provisions and the agreement reached between the par-
ties, the municipality initiated a procedure for the selection of a concession monitoring 
49
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  B u l g a r i a
body. The municipality announced a competition for the selection of an expert team to 
perform the overall monitoring of the concession contract. One candidate applied and 
the municipality signed a ﬁve-year contract with Omonit Ltd. 
The main responsibilities of the consultant are to prepare expert contract performance 
analyses and recommendations for solving arising issues, and to submit periodic and 
annual reports to the municipal council. Reports include standard service performance 
analyses; implementation of the investment program; an explanation of cases where 
performance standards are not met, and the calculation of sanctions; and ﬁnancial 
monitoring and users’ claims. 
Concession activities are managed and overseen by the mayor of the municipality. 
The concession contract contains an annex regulating the sanctions in case perfor-
mance standards are not met. For the period between 2001–2003, the mayor of Soﬁa 
imposed sanctions in the amount of BGN 263,000 for performing below standards; 
“Soﬁyska Voda” paid the ﬁnes. 
4.5 A Complex Local Development Project in Sevlievo
A good practice of a very successful partnership between a municipality and the private 
sector is evident in the municipality of Sevlievo. The municipal leadership and the private 
companies operating on the territory of Sevlievo negotiated a partnership agreement and 
registered a nonproﬁt association “Sevlievo 21st Century.” The main objective behind 
the partnership was to involve private resources in municipal development. 
The objectives of the partnership are to contribute to the social and economic 
development of the municipality, to increase the living standard of the citizens of Sev-
lievo municipality, and to provide opportunities for young people to stay and work in 
Sevlievo. Members of the association are the local government and more than 40 small, 
medium, and large enterprises in the territory of the municipality. The management of 
the association is performed on a voluntary basis. The municipality and the businesses 
work together on municipal priorities, develop annual action plans, and undertake ac-
tions for the achievement of the partnership’s objectives. Areas of intervention include 
a broad range of sectors—health, social assistance, culture, sport, and others. 
Some of the achievements of the partnership “Sevlievo 21st century” ﬁnanced or 
co-ﬁnanced by the businesses include: 
 a) provision of a microbiology laboratory and an X-ray apparatus for the municipal 
hospital; 
 b) improvement of the living conditions (furniture and equipment) in the municipal 
social assistance establishments—for elderly people and for children with special 
needs; 
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 c) restoration of historical monuments and the church in Sevlievo; 
 d) building of a new movie theater; 
 e) organization and sponsorship of many cultural events—concerts, performances, 
exhibitions, competitions among children, etc.; 
 f ) reconstruction of sports facilities, including building a swimming pool and the 
rehabilitation of the city stadium; 
 g) sponsor the municipal sport clubs for samba, judo, and volleyball; 
 h) construction of playgrounds in the city park; 
 i) provision of ﬁnancial resources for the performance of the local football team;
 j) introduction of measures for road traﬃc safety. 
The keys to the success of “Sevlievo 21st Century” are the commitment of all partners 
to work for the achievement of the partnership’s objectives, the clear procedures for the 
implementation of the activities, and the clear roles of the partners. 
The case illustrates how public and private sector expertise and ﬁnancial resources 
can be mixed to create a strong operational partnership in the interest of all citizens 
in the municipality. Unfortunately, there is no detailed information or comparative 
literature available about this PPP. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations derived from our ﬁndings mostly focus on the regulatory changes 
and the measures to be taken by local governments. 
Transparency of joint stock companies 
The establishment of joint stock companies, as mentioned earlier, is made in an non-
transparent manner, ignoring the public interest. The establishment of such companies 
should be preceded by a large public discussion as part of an adopted municipal policy 
on a public-private partnership. The decision to register joint stock companies should be 
based on the principle of economic eﬃciency and proﬁt gains, thus ensuring additional 
resources to the municipal budget. 
Provisions of Concession Act should be adjusted to local conditions
One of the concession’s legal framework deﬁciencies regarding the municipalities is that 
the Concession Act does not allow individual municipalities to adopt local regulations 
that “adapt” the Concessions Act to their speciﬁcations. Instead, a centralized approach 
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has been chosen by adopting the Rules on the Application of the Concession Act. These 
rules provide for uniﬁed regulation of all the public bodies that grant concessions, 
including the municipalities. The Concession Act could be amended to give the mu-
nicipalities the opportunity to apply their own policies regarding the concessions within 
the framework of the Concession Act. Municipal councils should adopt ordinances 
on concessions where the rules and the procedures for granting municipal concessions 
should be speciﬁed, taking into account local speciﬁcations. 
Need for local strategy on municipal property management 
Municipal councils could initiate a public debate and adopt a municipal property man-
agement strategy after consultations with stakeholders. The strategy should deﬁne the 
municipal policy for the management of the municipal property, and outline the local 
government’s commercial activities objectives. Regarding concessions, the strategy should 
include the main characteristics of municipal real estate properties that will be subject to 
concession contracts. Based on the adopted policy, municipal councils should adopt an-
nual programs for the management and disposition of municipal property. The program 
should be adopted before the annual municipal budget and the section on concessions 
should contain forecasts of expected income and expenditures, as well as a description 
of the municipal assets for which the local government intends to grant concessions. 
Local policy on public-private partnership should be developed
The Bulgarian municipalities do not have policies on PPP. The ordinances on the 
management of municipal property, on establishing commercial companies, etc., are 
all local regulations for speciﬁc procedures. But there are issues unique to PPP that 
relate to the strategic municipal objectives in infrastructure ﬁnancing and service pro-
vision. Therefore, it is advisable that municipal councils adopt a decision laying down 
the municipal policy on PPP. Obviously, the scope and the content of such a formal 
document will vary from municipality to municipality. Some local governments may 
adopt policies that do not promote public private partnership as an option of service 
delivery or may have a restrictive policy on some types of PPP. Others may encourage 
the PPP in building infrastructure and providing services in both institutionalized and 
contract-based types of PPP. 
In any case, the principles and considerations should include such issues as the type 
of services or projects; the forms of PPP that will be considered; the degree of risk the 
local government is ready to accept and the risks it is not prepared to accept; positions 
on conﬂict of interest for those involved in the PPP; procedures for involving the lo-
cal community in the process; interrelations with other municipal policies, including 
ﬁnance, environment, employment; types of partners; as well as fundamental principles 
such as transparency, accountability, and fair competition. 
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Approved local policies will have a number of advantages for both the local govern-
ment and the local community. They will provide a clear message about the public’s 
interest when entering into public-private partnerships. In addition, they will facilitate 
and guide decisions when considering PPP agreements. The document should specify 
the principles, the rules and the procedures for the execution of PPP contracts, ensuring 
optimal usage of the municipal ﬁnancial resources and long-term tangible assets and 
protecting the public interest. A few larger municipalities (Soﬁa, Plovdiv) have initiated 
the adoption of a municipal ordinance on PPP. A few Bulgarian municipalities have 
also adopted an ethical code for work with private businesses. 
Clear assignment of responsibilities for PPP projects 
Once the local government has a clear policy on public-private partnerships, it should 
identify who within the municipality will be responsible for the PPP. Although the 
municipal council has the ultimate authority, the municipal administration and service 
departments initiate or review public private partnership initiatives before they are 
brought to the council. Given the fact that PPP may be applicable to diﬀerent types 
of municipal services and that the PPPs require speciﬁc expertise, it is advantageous 
to assign the functions of the public private partnership to a single department or in-
dividual within the municipal administration, and to one standing committee of the 
municipal council. 
This will lead to beneﬁts like, ensuring a consistent municipal policy on public 
private partnership; concentrating expertise, capacity, and support within the local 
government; making the lines of responsibilities clear; establishing a single point of 
contact for private sector interests; and improving the coordination of PPP activities 
for diﬀerent service departments. 
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APPENDIX
Data on Concessions in the National Register
1. Body having conducted the procedure for selection of a concessionaire—name, 
address
2. Type of concession
3. Location of the object of the concession
4. Individual description of the object of the concession
5. Description and scope of services and/or economic activities, which the conces-
sionaire is entitled to perform in connection with the object of the concession
6. Type of procedure and circumstances that justify its application
7. The name and nationality of candidates admitted to participation in the restricted 
procedure and in the competitive dialogue and the reasons for their admission
8. The name and nationality of the participant rated as the ﬁrst choice, and the reasons 
for the selection
9. The name and nationality of other participants in the procedure and an explanation 
of their evaluations
10. The value of obligations of the concessionaire for:
 a) construction
 b) other investments
 c) management costs
 d) operational costs
11. The date of termination of the procedure
12. The reasons for termination of the procedure
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NOTES
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estate, provided for the execution of the functions of the local government and the local 
administration; other real estates, speciﬁed by the municipal council assigned for the long-
term satisfaction of public needs. Private municipal property is all other municipal real 
estate and goods. The private municipal property, in contrast to public municipal property, 
is subject to business transactions. 
2  Available online: http://www.nkr.government.bg.
3  BGN 1 = EUR 0.5.
4  Available online: http://gb.mikc.bg/.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper focuses on the legal and institutional framework for public-private partnerships 
in Croatia where, in the last few years, there have been a handful of examples of local 
and regional government units that have shown a great deal of enthusiasm in discovering 
novel ways of ﬁnancing capital projects. Two successful cases of contractual public-private 
partnerships at the local level are analyzed here, the case of the city of Varaždin and its 
surrounding county attempting to ﬁnance, build, and operate the expansion of its schools 
and sports facilities, and likewise the city of Koprivnica’s school building program, though 
not all cases have been so rosy and positive for PPPs in Croatia. 
 Although the institutional framework for public-private partnerships in Croatia was only 
properly established in 2006, Croatian practice has shown a number of successful public-
private partnership projects at the national and local levels. When Croatia began setting up 
the institutional and legal framework for public-private partnerships in 2006, guidelines 
adopted that year for the implementation of contractual forms of public-private partner-
ships regulated only contractual public-private partnerships and not institutional ones. The 
Public-private Partnership Act was introduced in late October 2008, and a new Agency for 
Public-private Partnerships was registered on December 21, 2008, and it ofﬁcially opened 
its doors on January 8, 2009. More speciﬁc regulations on contracts, timing, structure, 
supervision, and even capacity building relevant to the management and monitoring of 
both infrastructure and provision of service PPPs followed in 2009, highlighting the ultimate 
authority of the Ministry of Finance in approving these contracts.
 For Croatian local governments, public-private partnerships represent a relatively new 
opportunity for securing the necessary funds to construct important urban facilities, hav-
ing already played a prominent role in the construction of major highways in Istria and 
Dalmatia and a water puriﬁcation system in the capital, Zagreb. So far, it has been a lack of 
public budgetary funds and limits on borrowing and debt that have been the predominant 
reason for local governments involving the private sector in local and regional investment 
and development projects. To illustrate two positive outcomes, two local self-government 
units were chosen for inclusion here as successful examples of how to establish new revenue 
sources to ﬁnance urban investment projects. 
 The city of Varaždin has been a pioneer in implementing local development strate-
gies, applying a mainly bottom-up approach. The city of Varaždin and Varaždin County 
were the ﬁrst cases in which new models for ﬁnancing the construction of schools and the 
reconstruction of the County Palace were put into practice in Croatia. The city opted for a 
public-private partnership, build-operate-transfer (BOT) model. Private partners ﬁnanced the 
construction and maintenance of public buildings owned by the city and county, while the 
city and county agreed to pay their private partner’s monthly fees over a period of 20–30 
58
P U B L I C - P R I V A T E  PA R T N E R S H I P S :  S U C C E S S E S  A N D  F A I L U R E S
years. So far, the cost-effectiveness and quality have met expectations and continue to the 
time of writing. 
 Meanwhile, the city of Koprivnica is important here, since it has not prepared any local 
strategic document. However, this fact has not decreased the local government’s interest in 
using a public-private partnership to ﬁnance the construction of a new school. The city of 
Koprivnica decided to implement a BOT model and was surprised to meet its own planning 
deadlines for the completion of the school. 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from these two case studies. The prepara-
tion of a strategic development document at the local and regional levels is essential for 
recognizing strategic priorities. This development document is also a tool for applying and 
receiving EU funds and should also be coordinated in conjunction with the local budget, 
for parallel adoption of a strategic program and a budget is essential. 
Yet local and regional self-government units in Croatia still share the problem of inad-
equate ﬁnancing. The practice of the selected case studies shows that local budgets are not 
the only source of revenue for the ﬁnancing of urban development projects. Because of a 
lack of public funds, the private sector’s involvement in the ﬁnancing of local and regional 
investment projects is necessary. Apart from this, there are several other reasons for private 
sector involvement in the ﬁnancing of urban projects: increased local and regional needs, 
the inadequate structure of local and regional revenue models, the size of local and regional 
development projects, and limitations on debt ﬁnancing at the local and regional levels. 
Public procurement and other forms of contracting are the tools of modern local gov-
ernment, creating value for money and reduced ﬁscal risk. Local economic development 
depends on a reasonable balance between the public and private sectors at the local level 
and the use of private sector methods in local public management, keeping in mind that 
size and scale are a very important factor in considering the costs and returns of PPPs. It is 
under the rubric of widespread decentralization, even in a state that tends to centralization 
like Croatia, that such initiatives can ﬂourish and ﬁnance capital projects. 
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1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last several years, there have been a number of examples of local and regional 
government units that have found new ways to ﬁnance capital projects, both inside and 
outside the framework of local strategic documents. 
Local strategic documents have been developed at the local and regional levels in 
Croatia, introducing a participative approach in planning development practices. There 
are diﬀerent practices involved in implementing local strategic documents, particularly 
with regard to their coordination with budget planning, including capital investment 
planning, and in overseeing performance results (Kelly and Rivenbark 2003; Shah 2007). 
Local governments all over the world face the problem of inadequate ﬁnancing. 
The structure of expenditures in local budgets everywhere demonstrates that current 
expenditures prevail. For the purpose of economic development, however, expenditures 
must be structured entirely diﬀerently. 
In order to secure appropriate funds for capital purposes, municipalities and towns 
must have the following: 
  The skills and necessary information to budget for the current and coming years 
(including both operating and capital budgets). 
  The ability to identify, prioritize, and plan capital investments. 
  The ability to compare diﬀerent options for ﬁnancial capital investments 
(including budget ﬁnancing, borrowing, issuing municipal bonds, or using a 
public-private partnership). 
  The ability to understand the impact of borrowing on capital investments—both 
annual debt service and annual operational and maintenance expenditures. 
A lack of public funds is the predominant reason for the private ﬁnancial sector’s 
involvement in local and regional investments and development projects. Apart from 
this, there are several other reasons for the private sector’s involvement in the ﬁnancing 
of such projects: 
  Increased local and regional needs; 
  Inadequate structure of local and regional revenues; 
  The size of local and regional capital projects; 
  Limitations on borrowing at the local and regional levels (Alibegović 2007a); and 
  Improvement in management practices and technology transfers. 
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Municipalities and towns must be able to identify and analyze all their technical 
and ﬁnancial options, and to assure private investors that they have suﬃcient, reliable 
revenues to meet their debt service obligations (Kandeva 2001). 
This paper focuses on the legal and institutional frameworks for public-private 
partnerships in Croatia. In this paper two cases of public-private partnerships at the 
local level are examined. The selected local self-government units have been chosen 
as examples of the successful use of new revenue sources for the ﬁnancing of urban 
investment projects. 
The major characteristics of public-private partnerships are speciﬁed in the second 
part of this paper. Short explanations of current legal and institutional frameworks for 
public-private partnerships in Croatia are given in the third part of this paper. The fourth 
part of the paper investigates two Croatian cases of public-private partnerships at the 
local level. The last part of the paper provides key conclusions and recommendations 
to be drawn from the analyzed examples. 
 
1.2  Public-private Partnerships 
A public-private partnership is a partnership established between the public and private 
sectors for the purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by the 
public sector. Public-private partnerships recognize that each sector has certain advan-
tages in the performance of certain speciﬁc tasks. By allowing each sector to do what 
it does best, public services and infrastructure can be provided in the most economical 
and eﬃcient manner. 
Regarding the aforementioned deﬁnition, it is important to note that the most 
important role of a public-private partnership is to serve as a new model for the ﬁnanc-
ing of capital projects. 
There are several public-private partnership models, and variations and combinations 
of them may be deﬁned by the local authority undertaking an infrastructure project. 
The Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) model, one of the better-known models, is 
a contractual arrangement whereby a developer undertakes the construction of a given 
infrastructure facility, including ﬁnancing, and oversees its operation and maintenance. 
The developer operates the facility over a ﬁxed period of time and in order to enable 
recovery of the project investment is entitled to charge users of the given facility the 
appropriate tolls, fees, rent, and other charges, which are not to exceed those proposed 
in the bid or negotiated and incorporated in the contract. The developer transfers the 
facility to the government, government agency or local authority at the end of the ﬁxed 
term speciﬁed in the concession agreement. This incorporates a supply-and-operate 
agreement, i.e., a contractual arrangement whereby, should the government, govern-
ment agency, or local authority require the supplier of equipment and machinery for an 
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infrastructure facility operates that facility while providing the appropriate training to 
designated individuals in the process of transferring the technology to the government, 
government agency, or local authority. 
The selection of one particular model depends on the length of participation by 
the private partner in the project, the type of compensation to the private partner for 
participation in the project, the private partner’s participation in making a proﬁt, and 
the level of private sector autonomy in setting the price for services rendered. 
There are several interested partners in a public-private partnership; these include: 
the public (especially consumers), building contractors, operators, maintenance services 
and suppliers, loan capital providers, investors, and insurance companies. 
A public-private partnership holds the promise of increasing the supply of infrastruc-
ture projects and other services without overburdening a country’s public ﬁnances. An 
inﬂow of private capital and management can ease ﬁscal constraints on infrastructure 
investments and boost their eﬃciency. 
However, public-private partnerships must be employed with great care. They are 
undoubtedly more eﬃcient than traditional public investments. Public-private partner-
ships can be used to move investments oﬀ the budget and debts oﬀ the government’s 
balance sheets. However, the government continues to bear most of the risk, and po-
tentially faces great costs that could be borne by taxpayers. 
The “risk matrix” consists of three diﬀerent groups of risks: construction, availability, 
and demand risks. 
If public-private partnerships aim to deliver high-quality, cost-eﬀective services to 
consumers and the government, there must be an adequate transfer of risk from the 
government to the private sector. The quality of services must be part of the contract, 
so that payments to service providers can be linked to performance, and the risk of 
costly contract regeneration may be minimized. There must either be competition or 
incentive-based regulations (Hemming and Ter-Minassian 2005). 
In Croatia, there are only a few examples of public-private partnerships. Most of 
these involve concession agreements for the construction of highways in Istria and 
Dalmatia. The BOT model is also an excellent example of a public-private partnership 
model used in Croatia, mostly in various infrastructure projects (for example, the water 
puriﬁcation system in the city of Zagreb). 
 
1.3 Legal and Institutional Framework 
The legislative framework for public-private partnerships in Croatia consists of the 
following documents: 
  The Guidelines for the Implementation of Contractual Forms of Public-private 
Partnerships (Oﬃcial Gazette 98/06); 
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  The Government of the Republic of Croatia’s Decree on Preliminary Consent to 
a Public-private Partnership Contract Based on the Private Financial Initiative 
Model (Oﬃcial Gazette 20/07); The Budget Implementation Act for 2009 
(Oﬃcial Gazette 149/08); 
  The Public-private Partnership Act (Oﬃcial Gazette 129/08);
  The Regulation on the Criteria for Assessment and Approval of PPP Projects 
(Oﬃcial Gazette 56/09);
  The Regulation on the Content of Public-private Partnership Contracts (Oﬃcial 
Gazette 56/09);
  The Regulation on the Supervision of Implementation of PPP Projects (Oﬃcial 
Gazette 56/09); and
  The Regulation on Training of Participants in the Procedures for the Preparation 
and Implementation of PPP Projects (Oﬃcial Gazette 56/09). 
The Guidelines for the Implementation of Contractual forms of Public-private Partnerships 
(Oﬃcial Gazette 98/06) deﬁne a public-private partnership as a form of cooperation 
between public and private partners aimed at ensuring ﬁnancing, construction, recon-
struction, management, infrastructure maintenance, and the provision of public services. 
The Government of the Republic of Croatia’s Decree on Preliminary Consent to a Public-
Private Partnership Contract Based on the Private Financial Initiative Model (Oﬃcial 
Gazette 20/07) sets forth the necessary elements of an application for preliminary con-
sent, all the required enclosures, and the manner of reporting on the implementation 
of such contracts. 
The Budget Implementation Act for 2008 (Oﬃcial Gazette 28/08) sets the limits for 
concluding public-private partnership contracts at the municipal, town, and county 
levels, according to the private ﬁnancial initiative model. A public-private partnership 
contract may be awarded if the total annual amount of all charges paid by the public 
partner to private partners pursuant to all public-private partnerships contracts does 
not exceed 35 percent of the budget revenue realized in the previous year, decreased 
by capital income, and only with the prior consent of the Ministry of Finance and the 
line ministry or public administration body in whose competence the subject of the 
contract lies. 
The Budget Implementation Act for 2009 (Oﬃcial Gazette 149/08) does not explicitly 
mention public-private partnership nor explicitly sets limits on annual fees on public-
private partnership contracts at the state, municipality, town, and county levels.
In late October 2008, the Public-private Partnership Act (Oﬃcial Gazette 129/08) was 
set up. The new act replaces the Guidelines and the Government Decree. The Public-
Private Partnership Act regulates: 
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 — preparation, nomination, and acceptance of public-private partnership project 
proposals; 
 — rights and obligations of public and private partners; and
 — establishment and competences of the Agency for Public-private Partnership. 
According to this new act all public-private partnership project proposals should 
be ﬁnancially sustainable and harmonized with: 
 — budget projections and ﬁscal risks and limitations; 
 — sectoral development plans and strategies; and
 — local development policies (local development strategies). 
The most important rights and obligations of public and private partners are de-
ﬁned in the public-private partnership contract. The law deﬁnes the duration of such 
contracts (between 5 and 40 years). 
The procedure for the proposing and approval of PPP projects is given in the next 
several paragraphs. 
By law, public bodies are the only ones authorized to propose the implementation 
of a PPP project. 
Before a proposal is adopted by the Agency for Public-private Partnership within 
the government, the Regulation on the Criteria of Assessment and Approval of PPP Projects 
will establish the professional criteria for the assessment and approval of PPP projects 
and a list of the documents to be submitted with the project proposals. 
The public body shall submit the project proposal and the accompanying docu-
mentation laid down in the Regulation on the Criteria of Assessment and Approval of PPP 
Projects to the Agency for Public-private Partnership. 
The Agency for Public-private Partnership shall evaluate the contents of the project 
proposal in line with the criteria laid down in the regulations. It will shall seek consent 
from the Ministry of Finance with regard to the project proposal’s compliance with the 
budgetary forecasts and plans, ﬁscal risks and limitations stipulated in special regula-
tions, and with regard to the ﬁnancial and ﬁscal viability of the project proposal. The 
Agency shall also seek the opinion of the competent line ministry as to the compliance 
of the project proposal with development plans and strategies, i.e., regulations relating 
to its area of competence. 
The competent local and regional self-government units shall submit their opinions 
as to the compliance of the project proposal with the development policy plans of these 
local, i.e., regional self-government units to the Agency for Public-private Partnership, 
at its request. 
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Within a period not exceeding 90 days from the day when the project proposal and 
the entire accompanying documentation are submitted, the Agency for Public-private 
Partnership shall adopt a decision on the approval of the implementation of the proposed 
project under one of the PPP models. 
The project proposal shall acquire the status of a PPP project solely on the basis of 
a decision by the Agency for Public-private Partnership. A public body may adopt a 
decision on the implementation of the project under one of the PPP models solely on 
the basis of the previously obtained decision of the Agency. 
Prior to initiating the procedure for the selection of a private partner the public body 
shall submit copies of tender documents and all accompanying annexes to the Agency 
for Public-private Partnership for assessment and approval. The Agency shall issue a 
decision on document compliance with the approved proposal of the project within 
a maximum of 30 days from the date that it receives the complete set of documents. 
Prior to reaching a decision on the selection of the private partner, the competent 
public body shall submit the ﬁnal draft of the PPP contract, including all the annexes 
to the Agency for Public-private Partnership for approval, and shall also obtain consent 
from the Ministry of Finance for the ﬁnal draft of the contract. 
Within 30 days from the ﬁnal draft date of receipt, the Agency for Public-private 
Partnership shall reach a decision on the granting of consent to the text of the draft 
contract. The Agency for Public-private Partnership shall issue the decision on the basis 
of the assessment of compliance of the draft contract with the tender documents and 
the provisions of the Regulation on the Content of Public-Private Partnership Contracts.
The PPP contract may be completed solely on the basis of a decision by the Agency for 
Public-private Partnership and the consent obtained from the Ministry of Finance for 
the ﬁnal draft contract. 
The selection procedure of the private partner shall be carried out in accordance 
with the regulations on public procurement. If the implementation of the PPP project 
presupposes the granting of a concession, the selection procedure of the private partner 
shall be carried out in accordance with the regulations on the procedure for the award 
of a concession. 
The Regulation on the Criteria for Assessment and Approval of the PPP Projects (Oﬃcial 
Gazette 56/09) establishes the criteria and procedure for the assessment and approval 
of public-private partnership project proposals, the criteria for assessment and approval 
of tender documentation, and the criteria for assessment and approval of the ﬁnal draft 
of public-private partnership contracts.
The Regulation on the Content of Public-private Partnership Contracts (Oﬃcial Gazette 
56/09) lays down the minimum content of public-private partnership contracts. The 
public-private partnership contract is a basic contractual agreement between a public 
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and a private partner, or a public partner and a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which, 
for the purpose of implementation of the public-private partnership project, regulates 
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract.
The contract, the subject matter of which is the provision to the ﬁnal beneﬁciaries of 
public services falling within the scope of the public partner, shall contain at least the fol-
lowing: preamble, contracting parties, deﬁnition of terms, purpose and subject-matter of 
the contract, duration of the contract, property rights of contracting parties, distribution 
of risks and related expenses, ﬁnancial guarantees, contracting parties’ payments, events 
which may cause damage and the manner in which contracting parties should proceed 
in the case of damages, insurance policies, consequences of failure to fulﬁll contractual 
obligations, the right of supervision by the public partner, force majeure, termination of 
contract, environmental protection, sending notiﬁcations during the contracted period, 
protection of intellectual property, business secrets and conﬁdentiality of data, service 
quality standards, subcontracting, settling disputes resulting from the contract, sever-
ability provisions, and forced entry into the contract. The annexes cover: standards of 
services, risk distribution matrix, decision on the selection of the most advantageous 
tenderer, excerpt from the court register and statute of the private partner, contract per-
formance guarantee, parent company SPV guarantee, private partner’s operating plan.
The Regulation on the Supervision of Implementation of PPP Projects (Oﬃcial Gazette 
56/09) governs the authorizations of the Agency for Public-private Partnerships concern-
ing the supervision of implementation of public-private partnership projects, practice 
in the course of supervision of implementation of PPP projects, as well as the rights 
and obligations of the contracting parties in the process of supervising PPP project 
implementation.
The Regulation on Training of Participants in Procedures for the Preparation and Implementa-
tion of PPP Projects (Oﬃcial Gazette 56/09) lays down the training program in the ﬁeld 
of public-private partnerships, the persons for whom the training shall be provided, the 
organization and manner in which training will be implemented, an acknowledgement 
of training completion, and a certiﬁcate for the completed training program.
Before the Agency for Public-private Partnership was established, the Trade and 
Investment Promotion Agency was a government agency whose main task was to provide 
full service to investors during and after the implementation of their investment proj-
ects. The Public-private Partnership Unit of the Agency was in charge of all PPP issues. 
Particular responsibilities of the unit included controlling the tendering and contractual 
documentation, managing the proposed distribution of risks and other elements of PPP 
contracts (which deﬁne leasing), and reviewing the documents submitted to conﬁrm 
that a PPP project was deﬁned under the leasing principles. 
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The Public-private Partnership Act was adopted by the Croatian Parliament on No-
vember 24, 2008, and after the publication of the adopted Act in the Oﬃcial Gazette 
129/08, the Agency for Public-private Partnership was registered on November 21, 
2008. The government of the Republic of Croatia adopted the decision to appoint the 
governing board of the Agency, and on January 1, 2009, the Agency began its work as 
the legal successor to the previous sector in the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency. 
The new legislation deﬁned numerous tasks for the Agency for Public-private 
Partnership. The Agency is the central national body in charge of the implementation 
of the Public-private Partnerships Act in the Republic of Croatia. The basic tasks and 
authorities of the Agency include:
  Approving public-private partnership project proposals, tender documents, and 
the ﬁnal draft contract;
  Publishing the list of approved PPP projects and presenting it to potential 
investors;
  Organizing and keeping the register of PPP contracts;
  Supervising the implementation of PPP contracts;
  International cooperation with the purpose of advancing the theory and the 
practice of PPP;
  Studying national and foreign PPP practices and promoting the implementation 
of the best practices;
  Participating in the creation of umbrella strategies important for the application 
of PPP;
  Proposing amendments to the acts and regulations relevant to the application 
of best practices in the preparation and implementation of PPP projects;
  Issuing instructions for implementation; and
  Giving expert opinions on certain issues in the area of PPP.
A set of public-private partnership projects exists in Croatia. Most of them are in the 
infrastructure sector. The majority of Croatian highways are ﬁnanced as public-private 
partnership projects. In the next part of the paper two case studies of public-private 
partnerships at the local level in Croatia are analyzed. 
 
2. CASE STUDIES 
This part of the paper is based on the author’s previous research, presented at various 
conferences.
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2.1 The City of Varaždin and Varaždin County 
This section concerns two Croatian local self-government units and their experience 
with public-private partnerships. The city of Varaždin and Varaždin County were the 
ﬁrst cases in which a new model for ﬁnancing the construction of schools and sports 
facilities was established. They opted for a public-private partnership model. 
The city of Varaždin has been a pioneer in implementing local development strategies, 
applying a mainly bottom-up approach. A city working group developed the economic 
development strategy of the city of Varaždin for economic development planning at 
the end of 2001. The strategy identiﬁes a very important question: “How to ensure and 
maintain the development of human resources and their connection with economic develop-
ment?” It also covers the need for improving the formal education system. Although 
the strategy does not clearly deﬁne the priority area of constructing new schools and 
enlarging existing ones, it emphasizes the importance of improving the formal system 
of education, orienting it towards contemporary educational standards that are harmo-
nized with global demands. 
An analysis of the city of Varaždin’s budget for the period beginning in 2002, when 
the city’s economic development strategy was adopted, reveals that several budget years 
had to pass in order for the development project—which involved the constructing of 
new schools and the enlarging of existing ones, as well as building school gyms—to be 
planned with transparency in the budget. 
Varaždin County was also among the ﬁrst counties in Croatia to have adopted a 
regional operational program for the period between 2006 through 2013, emphasizing 
eleven development priorities, one of them being “high-quality education available to 
all.” Although the regional operational program does not clearly deﬁne the priority area 
of constructing new schools and enlarging existing ones, several of its measures concern 
the need to improve the educational system. 
Varaždin County was the ﬁrst in Croatia to enter into a public-private partnership. 
One major advantage of public-private partnerships is that, under this model of ﬁnanc-
ing, local self-government units spend their current revenues, while capital revenues 
remain unspent and are saved for other tasks. Private partners ﬁnance the construction 
and maintenance of public buildings owned by Varaždin County; while Varaždin County 
pays its private partners monthly rental fees a period of 20–30 years. 
A public-private partnership was the model of ﬁnancing used in renovating the 
County Palace, constructing new schools, and enlarging 42 schools in Varaždin County. 
The County Palace was the ﬁrst project in Croatia to be realized as a public-private 
partnership. The entire project was completed in less than three months (the ground 
was broken on June 1, 2006 and was ﬁnished by September 1, 2006), during which the 
whole palace (totaling 2,240 m2) was completely renovated. It is important to mention 
that this palace is a world cultural heritage monument, built in the year 1772. The 
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cost of renovating the palace amounted to HRK 9 million. Varaždin County will pay 
monthly fees of HRK 84,000 to its private partner over the next 20 years, while the 
private partner, Meteor Group, has the obligation of maintaining the palace’s interior 
and exterior. 
Apart from the County Palace renovation project, Varaždin County has also under-
taken construction projects for two new schools and 15 school gyms, as well as enlarging 
27 school buildings, all involving the public-private partnership model (53,000 m2). 
The total value of these projects amounts to HRK 300 million, with ﬁnancing from 
the budget of Varaždin County, the budgets of local self-government units in Varaždin 
County, and the state budget. The largest amount is ﬁnanced from private sources via 
the public-private partnerships model. The construction was planned over two years: 
the ﬁrst 20,000 m2 in 2006 and the remaining 33,000 m2 in 2007. 
The basic goal of the project for building new schools and school gyms and enlarging 
existing school buildings in Varaždin County is to secure the space for various physical 
development programs for students and to enable single-shift instruction, better school 
planning and management, and an equal distribution of schools and gyms throughout 
the entire county area. 
The projects for building or enlarging schools and gyms are being carried out by 
public partners (investors)—Varaždin County and its towns and municipalities—and a 
private partner, a specially established company that will function until the BOT con-
tract expires. This company is responsible for designing, executing, and ﬁnancing the 
works, as well as acting as a consulting ﬁrm that manages the use and maintenance of 
the schools and gyms. 
The project for building or enlarging schools and gyms includes the following phases: 
 1.  Analyzing the current situation; 
 2.  Deﬁning the needs of the school system; 
 3.  Developing project documentation; 
 4.  Training public partners; 
 5.  Calls to interested parties; 
 6.  Binding oﬀers; 
 7.  Analysis and negotiations with investors; 
 8.  Signing a contract; 
 9.  Deadline for adaptation and construction; 
 10.  Maintenance of the facilities (20–30 years); and
 11.  Transfer of ownership to Varaždin County. 
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Although the regulations regarding public-private partnerships were adopted only 
in the second half of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, this did not prevent the highly-
motivated oﬃcials of the city of Varaždin and Varaždin County from applying the 
positive elements of this new model for ﬁnancing development projects (public-private 
partnership) even earlier, thus encouraging a whole wave of construction projects in the 
area. The basic advantages of ﬁnancing development projects using the public-private 
partnership model are decreased costs and increased loan potential for local self-gov-
ernment units, a division of responsibilities and risks among local self-government and 
private partners, and greater possibilities for realizing projects without extensive capital 
investment by local self-government units, thereby allowing them to concentrate on 
supervising public services, and increasing their level of quality. 
One disadvantage of public-private partnership lies in the fact that the desire for 
greater proﬁts and lower costs may lead to higher prices and a reduced quality of ser-
vices. It is thus necessary for local self-government to maintain tight supervision over 
the private partner’s activities, to see that they are in accordance with the provisions of 
the contract between the partners. 
 
2.2 The City of Koprivnica 
The city of Koprivnica has been selected due to its speciﬁc situation and, above all, 
because of the fact that it has not prepared any strategic development programs. How-
ever, this fact has not decreased the local government’s interest in using a public-private 
partnership to ﬁnance the construction of a new school. 
Today, the city of Koprivnica deﬁnes education and knowledge as an important 
precondition for local development. However, in mid-2004, when people in Koprivnica 
began thinking about the need to build a new school, no development strategy had been 
elaborated and no development priorities had been established, including the construc-
tion of any new school building. 
It was only in September 2005 that an informational seminar on the development of 
the new Local Agenda 21 for the City of Koprivnica was held. This was a long-term pro-
gram for sustainable development in Koprivnica, based on a balance between economic 
activities, protection of the environment, and social conditions, which was completed 
in 2006. The Local Agenda recognized the problem of the low level of education among 
the majority of Koprivnica’s population (a signiﬁcant number of people had not even 
completed primary school). A single-shift arrangement in schools proved to be the best 
solution, and it was determined that the secondary school population was too large for 
the existing school facilities. 
Although the city of Koprivnica had not adopted a development strategy, the build-
ing of a new school began to be discussed in mid-2004, as the existing school facility 
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accommodated three diﬀerent schools with 85 classes and 2,850 students in three or 
four shifts. Koprivnica-Križevac County and the city of Koprivnica were the only local 
government units in the Republic of Croatia where no secondary school had been built 
for more than 30 years. The educational structure of the population in both the city 
and the county was extremely unfavorable. 
The city of Koprivnica examined the possibilities for ﬁnancing construction of a 
new school. The city’s own budget did not have suﬃcient funds to ﬁnance a capital 
project, and there was no possibility of ﬁnancing the city’s development projects from 
the state budget. Debt ﬁnancing by local self-government units, and thus the city of 
Koprivnica, is severely restricted by the Budget Implementation Act, which limits lo-
cal self-government units’ debt ﬁnancing to no more than 35 percent of their budget 
revenue realized in the previous year, decreased by capital income, and only with the 
prior consent of the Ministry of Finance. In addition, it was not possible to obtain a 
loan for a period of 25 years. 
The city of Koprivnica’s only option was to ﬁnd a new way of ﬁnancing the con-
struction of a school by using a public-private partnerships model, thereby the city 
accomplishing its goal of protecting the public interest to the maximum and ensuring 
the quality of the building as per the contract over a period of 25 years. The total value 
of this project amounts to HRK 106 million. 
The chronology of the construction of the school funded by the public-private part-
nership model consisted of several phases, and lasted for three years and three months, 
beginning in June 2004 and ending in September 2007, when the school opened its doors. 
In June 2004 the city of Koprivnica examined the possibility of ﬁnancing construction 
of the school via public-private partnership. Only in December 2004 did the city coun-
cil adopt a decision to apply the public-private partnership model of ﬁnancing for the 
school. In December 2005 a public tender was announced for private partners interested 
in participating in the project. In January 2006 the suitability of companies that had 
expressed an interest in participating in the project was evaluated. In February 2006 a 
tender for binding oﬀers was announced, and in May 2006 the bids were opened. From 
May to July negotiations were held with all the bidders, and only on July 10, 2006 was a 
public-private partnership contract signed. Construction work began on July 24, 2006, 
and the school opened its doors in the beginning of the school year, September 3, 2007. 
The private partner entered into a contract with the city of Koprivnica concerning 
construction of the school with a 25-year right of use. The construction risks and avail-
ability were assumed by the investor, while the demand risk concerning occupancy of a 
sports hall for commercial purposes was divided, such that the contractor assumed 90 
percent and the investor 10 percent of demand risk. The compensation payment for the 
use of the school will be paid by the city of Koprivnica in 286 monthly installments of 
HRK 700,000. This means that a signiﬁcant part of the city of Koprivnica’s capital budget 
is free to use for ﬁnancing other important development and infrastructure projects. 
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In addition, the public-private partnership model has provided a number of other 
advantages: 
  the public partner paid for all the services delivered, for example, construction 
of the school canteen; 
  the same quality of service has been ensured for a period of 25 years, and 
the standard of the school’s maintenance was deﬁned as the private partner’s 
obligation; 
  construction of the school was ﬁnanced without any signiﬁcant budget burden, 
and without a deﬁcit; and
  public interest was protected to the maximum. 
The supervision and inspection of the construction is organized at the city level. 
This is contractual duty of a special ﬁrm for construction supervision. Maintenance is 
the duty of the private partner for period of 25 years. 
Today, with its new school, the city of Koprivnica may proudly state that knowledge 
and competence have been the major driving forces behind development in the city of 
Koprivnica, which is regarded as the place in Croatia with the most favorable conditions 
for education and the highest-quality educational services. 
3. RISK ALLOCATION 
Fiscal risk can be deﬁned as the exposure of the government’s or local government’s 
budget to the performance of underlying public investments either procured or managed 
in a traditional way or as a public-private partnership. In these two selected projects, 
local governments’ ﬁscal risk exposure depends on the division of tasks and risks with 
regard to the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and ﬁnancing of the proj-
ect. Public-private partnership is the joint realization of a public interest project by a 
public entity and a private partner (consortium). Public and private parties divide and/
or share tasks and responsibilities and the corresponding risks. The division of tasks, 
responsibilities, and risks is formalized through a public-private partnership contract, 
with private sector capital being at risk in the delivery of public services.
In selected Croatian cases public-private partnerships take the form of long-term 
contracts designed to transfer construction and maintenance risks from the public sec-
tor (cities and county) to the private sector (partner). Availability and operational risks 
as well as, partly, demand risk are transferred from the public (the city of Varaždin and 
Varaždin County, as well as the city of Koprivnica and Koprivnica-Križevci County) to 
the private sector, too. Public partners (the town of Koprivnica and Koprivnica-Križevci 
County) are responsible for one small part of the demand risk. 
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Since risks are allocated to the party best able to manage them, public-private 
partnership contracts are able to eﬀectively reduce risks (chance of occurrence and/or 
consequence) and local governments’ risk exposure, thereby creating value for money 
and reduced ﬁscal risk.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are several important conclusions to be drawn from these two Croatian case studies. 
Strategic development document 
The preparation of a strategic development document at the local and regional levels 
is essential for identifying strategic priorities, and also provides a tool for applying for 
and receiving EU funds. 
Coordination of strategic development document with local budget 
Another positive conclusion is to recognize the importance of the parallel adoption of 
a strategic program and a budget. 
 
Non-budget revenue sources to ﬁnance capital projects 
Local and regional self-government units in Croatia share the problem of inadequate 
ﬁnancing. The practice of the selected Croatian cities shows that local budgets are not 
the only source of revenue for ﬁnancing urban development projects. The solution for 
local and regional governments is to ﬁnd additional revenue sources for various devel-
opment projects. 
A lack of public funds is the predominant reason for private sector involvement in 
ﬁnancing local and regional investment projects. Apart from this, there are several other 
reasons for private sector involvement in the ﬁnancing of urban projects: increased local 
and regional needs, the inadequate structure of local and regional revenues, the size of 
local and regional development projects, and limitations on debt ﬁnancing at the local 
and regional levels. 
 
Future challenges in ﬁnancing capital projects 
Partnerships between central, regional, and local governments, nongovernmental organi-
zations, the private sector, and all the other major actors involved in regional and local 
development will create useful forms of eﬀective interaction, such as participation by 
representatives of various institutions in activities, initiatives, and procedural rules for 
consultation on budget drafting, or planning major capital projects in local areas. The 
existence of an active network of diﬀerent actors indicates an awareness of the need for 
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joint action and inter-institutional cooperation when seeking revenues for local and 
regional development. 
In order to play a major role in the coordination and promotion of regional and local 
development, regional and local governments must face the main challenges with regard 
to the demands and conditions of local economic development. This includes searching 
for a reasonable balance between the public and private sectors at the local level and 
the use of private sector methods and approaches in local public management. Public 
procurement and other forms of contracting are the tools of modern local government. 
Increasing tendencies towards liberalization, the shortage of funds in practically all 
budgets, and the process of internationalization have all created new market conditions in 
the infrastructure sectors of transport, energy, the environment, and community services, 
as well as in the building of schools and sports facilities. This means that public-private 
partnership is the keyword for development at the state, local, and regional levels alike. 
The state’s supervisory function is coupled with the operational eﬃciency of the private 
economy. Practice has shown that public-private partnerships represent a viable and 
frequent project ﬁnancing alternative in cases where a project is of suﬃcient size and 
possesses a high degree of self-ﬁnancing induced by cash ﬂow, as well as in cases where 
eﬃciency improvements can be successfully realized. 
The government of the Republic of Croatia has begun the process of decentraliza-
tion, deﬁning it as the leader for its future activity in many areas. The government has 
continually expressed its unequivocal political support for decentralization. This means 
that local development will depend on initiatives at the local level, including new ways 
of ﬁnancing capital projects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study initially takes a broad approach to methods of involving private service provid-
ers and capital in delivering public infrastructure. Before EU accession in 2004, there was 
practically no legal framework in Hungary that speciﬁcally deﬁned what a PPP is. PPP, from 
the national government’s perspective, is viewed as an important tool for avoiding various 
restrictions on the total stock of public debt (60 percent of GDP) and ﬁscal deﬁcits (no more 
than three percent of GDP). 
Policy recommendations based upon Hungary’s experience at the central level, and its 
limited, narrowly deﬁned PPP experience at the municipal level, will be aimed at complying 
with the Eurostat deﬁnition of off‐balance sheet, long-term service contracts with private 
ﬁnancing where the private sector assumes signiﬁcant risk. Eurostat compliance means that 
the legal and ﬁnancial framework of the project is analyzed from the perspective of which 
party—the public sector or the private sector—bears most of the risk. 
PPPs do not exist as a separate legal category in Hungary. In other words, PPP trans-
actions involve legal entities that are deﬁned elsewhere, using aspects of competition, 
procurement and concession law where appropriate. Secondary regulations, such as the 
deﬁnition of debt, have been inconsistently modiﬁed to acknowledge the presence of PPP 
arrangements. The Hungarian Treasury treats PPP obligations as a form of commitment that 
is limited by the annual budget (but not counted as national debt). On the other hand, the 
municipal law does not mention PPP speciﬁcally, and any long-term payment obligations 
of a municipality to a PPP operator (such as availability fees) are not recorded as municipal 
debt. In fact, long-term service contracts, if they are not a part of a concession agreement, 
also do not appear as long-term obligations, and do not hinder the municipality’s future 
borrowing capacity (even though free cash ﬂow is certainly inﬂuenced).  
The case study of Veszprém’s sports arena demonstrates that a PPP framework was 
chosen with creative features all aimed at avoiding “debt” while still legally assuming a 
long-term obligation to pay availability fees. The most evident risk, known as a “classiﬁca-
tion risk,” faced by PPP project sponsors in Hungary, regardless of whether they are central 
ministries or municipalities, is that their project is classiﬁed according to Eurostat standards 
as being state debt, or in the case of municipalities, the project’s ﬁnancing scheme burdens 
its debt service capacity needlessly. Since PPP payments are not yet regulated by national law 
at the municipal level, their inclusion in debt limits or in a separate category of obligation 
as exists at the state level, already means municipalities face signiﬁcant policy risk if they 
engage in projects that meet PPP standards. 
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“PPPs are a necessary evil. We would have never come up with schemes like these 
ourselves without outside inspiration. And the banks have always been able to 
outthink these ideas in short order.”1
 
1. NATIONAL AND LOCAL REGULATORY/LEGISLATIVE NORMS 
 GUIDING PPPS
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study initially takes a broad approach to methods of involving private service provid-
ers and capital in delivering public infrastructure, since before Hungary’s EU accession 
in 2004, there was practically no legal framework in Hungary that speciﬁcally deﬁned 
what a PPP is. Even the EU’s statistical oﬃce, Eurostat, only issued guidelines on what 
it considers an oﬀ-balance sheet PPP in 2004, several years after Hungary attempted to 
develop procedures for approving state-level PPP project proposals. Therefore, many 
projects that were heralded as examples of PPP in the 1990s and early 2000s have to 
be “relabeled” as quasi-disguised public debt or simple purchases of long-term services 
under a variety of ﬁnancing schemes. 
Policy recommendations, however, based upon Hungary’s experience at the central 
level and limited, narrowly-deﬁned PPP experience at the municipal level, will be aimed 
at complying with the Eurostat deﬁnition of oﬀ-balance sheet, long-term service contracts 
with private ﬁnancing where the private sector assumes signiﬁcant risk. Eurostat compli-
ance means that the legal and ﬁnancial framework of the project is analyzed from the 
perspective of which party, the public sector or the private sector, bears most of the risk. 
These risks include market risk, availability risk and performance risk. The private sector 
must bear performance risk and one other, or else the entire scheme is considered to be 
“public borrowing” and does not qualify as a “genuine” PPP structure. So while there 
are few “Eurostat compliant” examples of PPPs in Hungary, especially at the subnational 
(i.e., municipal) level, the wealth of experience going back to the ﬁrst concessions in 
the early 1990s do indeed oﬀer suggestions for municipal level prudence in evaluating 
options for public versus private ﬁnancing of investments through service contracts. 
The speciﬁc deﬁnition of what Eurostat considers to be a “genuine” PPP project that 
does not “hinder” either the annual deﬁcit nor total state debt is as follows: 
The investment being made is considered to be oﬀ-budget and oﬀ-balance 
sheet, if the following two conditions are met. First of all, the private investor 
has to assume all of the construction risk. Secondly, the private party has to 
assume one of the following risks, availability risk or demand risk. 
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If these conditions are not met, then Eurostat considers the project to be on the 
balance sheet and budget of the public entity. This deﬁnition may to be too restrictive 
for Hungary now, but in the long run, this type of Eurostat compatibilty could become 
a ﬁnal point on an evaluation checklist. A project that does not meet this deﬁnition still 
needs clearly identiﬁed and allocated risks, and very thorough analysis. In no way should 
one assume that projects that do not meet the above conditions are “not PPP” projects 
in every other sense. They could be, but any regulatory framework, PPP legislation, 
approval process, or evaluation system should take Eurostat into account. 
There are various models of PPP under design and implementation at both the state 
and municipal levels of government in Hungary. Financial institutions, construction 
companies, and private investors approach national and local governments by oﬀering 
various schemes for ﬁnancing government projects, using the full realm of ﬁnancial 
engineering such as BOTS, DBOT, and such. On the national government’s side, 
there was limited knowledge and information on PPP schemes until the creation of 
an Interministerial PPP Committee in 2003 to regulate PPPs in those cases where the 
state itself assumes a long running commitment. The contracting rules are not widely 
known, and the audit methods of PPP projects are underdeveloped, though they rely 
heavily on methods used in the United Kingdom, such as the public cost comparator 
or value-for-money analysis. 
PPP, from the national government’s perspective, is viewed as an important tool 
for avoiding various restrictions on the total stock of public debt (60 percent of GDP) 
and ﬁscal deﬁcits (no more than three percent of GDP). Many Hungarian State Audit 
Oﬃce (SAO) reports have determined that projects that use 20–30 year ﬁnancing 
through PPPs end up costing more in net present value terms than if the same invest-
ment were made using sovereign borrowing. The additional cost, it seems, is justiﬁed by 
the fact that an over-indebted country like Hungary can use PPPs to avoid increasing 
the budget deﬁcit or state debt. In fact, “Maastricht optimization” is a frequent subject 
of international conferences on PPP. PPP projects consequently are implemented for 
reasons other than “best value for money” in some cases, and this adds additional levels 
of risk (Báger 2007, 62).
Nonetheless, the Interministerial Committee on PPPs set up by the national govern-
ment in 2003, as well as evaluations of national level PPP projects such as motorways, 
university housing, and cultural facilities, do oﬀer many signiﬁcant lessons learned for 
developing regulations, best practices, or at least recommended practices for Hungary, 
Serbia, and other southwestern Balkan countries. Evaluations and lessons learned from 
national PPP regulation in Hungary will thus be “projected” onto the local level to the 
fullest extent possible. 
81
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  H u n g a r y
1.2 Background 
PPPs do not exist as a separate legal category in Hungary. In other words, PPP trans-
actions involve legal entities that are deﬁned elsewhere, using aspects of competition, 
procurement, and concession law where appropriate. Secondary regulations, such as the 
deﬁnition of debt, have been inconsistently modiﬁed to acknowledge the presence of 
PPP arrangements. The Hungarian Treasury treats PPP obligations as a form of commit-
ment that is limited by the annual budget law (but not counted as national debt). On 
the other hand, the municipal law does not mention PPPs speciﬁcally, and long-term 
payment obligations of a municipality to a PPP operator (such as availability fees) are 
not recorded as municipal debt. In fact, long-term service contracts, if they are not a 
part of a concession agreement, also do not appear as long-term obligations, and do 
not hinder the municipality’s future borrowing capacity (even though free cash ﬂow is 
certainly inﬂuenced). 
Concessions for water, wastewater, and solid waste services, and the assets that are 
created to provide these services and funds that move between the concession holder and 
the municipality are accounted for separately. In some limited cases, rental fees paid to a 
concession ﬁrm are deducted from cash available for other debt service. Concession fees, 
paid by an operator for “use” of municipal ﬁxed assets are also accounted for separately. 
These bookkeeping rules are important factors in the evaluation of PPP projects, i.e., 
whether they count as concessions, borrowing, or simply long-term service contracts. 
This kind of determination on the local level directly aﬀects borrowing capacity for other 
purposes. The most widespread involvement of enterprises organized on a commercial 
basis (though perhaps 100-percent municipally-owned) in service delivery is based upon 
long-term service contracts under commercial law or concessions under concession law 
and the applicable sectoral laws. 
PPPs per se are a latecomer in this game, as over 300 water and wastewater com-
panies serve nearly 3,200 municipal jurisdictions, and most of these ﬁrms are partially 
or entirely municipally-owned. Even the seven regional water companies that remain 
state-owned are organized as joint stock companies. New services are added, in most 
cases, under publicly-procured concession schemes. PPPs that meet the narrow deﬁni-
tion used by Eurostat have been, to date, inspired by national government programs 
made available at the local level, such as dormitories, swimming pools, gymnasia, or 
multifunctional arenas. 
Although the main thrust of this study should be lessons learned in the regulation of 
PPPs and risk management at the local or municipal level in Hungary, it is important to 
point out that the government decree on PPPs and the activities of the Interministerial 
Committee do not address PPPs at the municipal level. In fact, unlike the state level, the 
local level in Hungary does not list payment commitments in a PPP project as a part of 
municipal debt, and hence such payments do not count against the debt limits of local 
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governments. In contrast, the net present value of total payments by the central state 
for PPP projects may not at any time exceed three percent of the annual state budget. 
The state level uses PPP deals, instead of borrowing, to build major infrastructure 
items such as motorways, concert halls, college dormitories, prisons, and cultural fa-
cilities, in order to avoid increasing the current budget deﬁcit or adding to national 
debt. Regulation at the EU level had to catch up to the market, with Eurostat issuing 
instructions2 on evaluating and recording PPP deals only in 2004, a year after the In-
terministerial Committee issued their own PPP Handbook. 
In this ﬂuid regulatory environment, with the perverse incentive to avoid exceed-
ing the Maastricht budget deﬁcit and debt restrictions, Hungarian municipalities have 
rejected standard BOT and other PPP models in many cases, reverting to their own 
resources and bank ﬁnancing, since their PPP commitments do not count as debt, and 
the larger municipalities have not used up all of their borrowing capacity. 
1.3 Description of Legal Framework 
Although there is no single law on PPPs in Hungary, and the Concessions and Procure-
ment Laws, respectively, do not mention PPPs at all, there are three perspectives from 
which PPPs are regulated:
  First, the procedural steps to be taken by project sponsors, such as ministries and 
central government agencies, are deﬁned in a series of government decrees and 
decisions, but not by law. 
  Second, these same decrees and decisions require the compliance of proposed 
central government: PPP projects with national development priorities that are 
proposed by the National Development Agency, then approved by the cabinet 
twice a year. 
  Third, since the PPP projects that are regulated through these decrees and deci-
sions are all supported by the central budget (not by municipal budgets), the 
annual Budget Act, as well as the Budget System Law, regulate the procedure to 
be followed when the state assumes a new liability. Not all long-term liabilities, 
such as service contracts and PPP fees, are counted as “debt” under Hungary’s 
municipal regulations. If those long-term obligations meet Eurostat standards 
as “genuine” PPP projects, then no measure of debt service includes them. This 
leads to distorting behavior, and data on long-term obligations and creditwor-
thiness are also distorted by these attempts to avoid commitments explicitly 
identiﬁed as debt.
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These new liabilities, including current PPP liabilities expressed in present value 
terms, may be no more than three percent of the gross national budget. Thus, PPP 
projects proposed by central government “budget subjects” are screened from three 
perspectives: procedural and formal, compliance with national development goals, and 
impact on overall PPP liabilities. These national PPP projects are regulated only if the 
state assumes a partial liability, or wishes to classify a future stream of payments as an 
“oﬀ-budget” liability under Maastricht. 
This model outlined above does not apply to municipal PPP projects, unless there 
is a state budget transfer or subsidy involved, as there was in the case of the largely 
unsuccessful Sports 21 municipal swimming pool and sports center project. However, 
what was essentially a “three-pronged” compliance checklist could be used in modiﬁed 
form at the municipal level, since according to the SAO one of the most signiﬁcant 
problems in comparing PPP projects to traditional ﬁnancing options was selection of 
the proper discount rate and inappropriate, or even biased the ﬁnancial modeling, and 
risk allocation that was clearly to the advantage of the proposed private partner. 
Unfortunately for Hungarian municipalities, PPP obligations do not have to be 
listed as debt and are therefore not counted against debt limits. But, given that there is 
no separate obligation restriction as there is at the central level, Hungarian municipali-
ties ﬁnd that traditional bank or bond ﬁnancing is much more economical than PPP 
availability payments, hence they tend to shun PPPs since the public cost is apparently 
much less, and few municipalities have reached their borrowing limits. 
The Ministry of Economics and Transport (reorganized as the Ministry of Economic 
Development) was charged one year before EU accession (2004) with the responsibility 
of carrying out Government Decision 2098/2003 to create an interministerial commit-
tee on PPPs. The Economics Ministry handed oﬀ responsibility for the committee to 
a newly combined Ministry of Transport and Communications in June 2008, but for 
the purposes of this paper, almost all documents related to PPP were published by the 
Economics Ministry as late as January 2008.3
It became apparent that in the run up to EU accession, large infrastructure projects 
organized on an ad-hoc basis as PPPs (M1, M5 motorways) could have an eﬀect on 
Hungary’s public deﬁcit and debt statistics. As Eurostat did not issue an opinion until 
2004 (to be discussed later) that deﬁned what kind of PPP project is considered to be 
public debt and what is not, under ESA 95 (European System of Accounts), the ministry 
had to develop its own procedures in advance of Eurostat’s guidance. 
PPPs, in the opinion of the SAO (as expressed in numerous evaluations of motor-
way and cultural facility projects), and the Economics Ministry’s PPP Handbook (MoE 
2008), started in Hungary in the mid-1990s at the initiative of the private sector. As 
EU accession approached, it became apparent that PPPs would be critical in ﬁnancing 
public infrastructure “oﬀ the balance sheet.” So the regulatory framework expressed in 
Hungarian government decisions and decrees have to address the classiﬁcation system 
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of projects, i.e., whether they add to public debt according to Eurostat. Thus, the main 
justiﬁcation for PPP projects at the state level is not necessarily increased eﬃciency nor lower 
overall cost, but rather reduced ﬁscal pressure, perhaps quicker implementation, and easier 
compliance with the Maastricht criteria (PPP Handbook 2004, 16). 
Figure 3.1
Actors in the Central State PPP Project Approval Process in Hungary
Source: MoE 2008.
 
 
1.4 The Interministerial PPP Committee (2003–2009)4 
The Interministerial PPP Committee held its ﬁrst meeting in June 2003. Its members 
consist of the Ministry of Economics and Transport, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Justice, the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, and the Statistics Oﬃce. 
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Figure 3.2
Structure of the Interministerial Committee
Source: European Commission (2003–2006, 4).
 As of 2007, a representative of the National Development Agency was added. The 
committee published a very useful “Guidance Document” (MoE 2008) on PPPs in 
January 2008 that describes in detail the approval process for those PPP projects that are 
sponsored by central government ministries and agencies, and that meet Eurostat deﬁni-
tions and are in line with national development priorities set by the government. But the 
guidelines do not apply to municipal projects, unless there is a commitment of central budget 
funds, hence requiring the approval of the Finance Ministry, Cabinet, or even Parliament, 
depending on its scale. As municipal projects are neither approved nor guaranteed by 
the central government, the guidelines are only a useful potential example to follow.5
The Interministerial Committee, chaired at the state secretary level, has the follow-
ing responsibilities, among others: 
  Provide expert opinions on PPP plans before the economic cabinet, central 
government, or parliament considers them; 
  Methodological guidelines and information with the public administration 
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  Monitoring PPP projects as they are implemented; 
  Assessment of the post-implementation phase;
  Commenting upon needed changes in other legislation, such as public procure-
ment, concessions, competition, etc. 
  Issuing an annual report on the status of centrally-sponsored PPP projects; 
  Developing and improving the procedural rules for implementing PPP projects;
As PPP liabilities assumed by the central state in Hungary are subject to approval 
by the Cabinet, the scope of such liabilities is regulated by the Public Finance Law (Act 
XXXVIII, 1992, Article 126/B), and the annual commitment must appear in the state 
budget. This means that PPP proposals must entail a detailed justiﬁcation, an evalua-
tion of liabilities in net present value (NPV), a detailed ﬁnancing and investment plan, 
monitoring, etc., as well as calculation of the public sector comparator. The cabinet 
must, in all cases, approve these liabilities that may not exceed three percent of the ag-
gregate amount of the state budget. This means that existing liabilties, as well as new 
commitments must be calculated each year. The government also provides a biannual 
list of priorities that reﬂect development policy. The Interministerial Committee thus 
takes commitment limits as well national priorities into account when issuing opinions 
on projects. These projects must include cost-beneﬁt analysis, comparisons with alter-
native sources of funding, cash ﬂow plans, consideration of risks, cancellation policy, 
ownership issues, etc. The Committee has 45 days in which to evaluate proposals that 
are in compliance with national priorities. An important aspect is that Government 
Decree 161/2005 deﬁnes the methodology to be used for calculating the net present 
value of obligations and beneﬁts. The ministry publishes the applicable discount rates 
on its website. 
The guidebook also oﬀers a very useful outline for the project plan. This outline 
could be used at the municipal level, and is in most senses fully “exportable” to other 
regulatory systems. The full structure of the project plan used in the process above appears 
in the guidebook. Because of the sheer volume and level of sophistication involved in 
this procedure, it is apparent that most municipalities would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to comply 
without signiﬁcant external expertise. 
 
Lessons Learned by the Interministerial Committee 
The Committee is legally obligated to issue annual reports on its activities.8 In the 
period between 2000–2006, the only regulation in force regarding PPPs was Govern-
ment Decree 217/1998 on procedures for assuming liabilities on behalf of the state. 
The best and worst practices were thus left up to the individual program sponsors, that 
is, the line ministries. There were several problems in the way in which the Committee 
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worked to evaluate PPP proposals presented by various ministries. These included a lack 
of prescreening to determine whether the project was suitable for PPP, and whether 
there were funds available. The content and quality of the proposals varied widely. The 
Committee, despite a legal obligation on the part of project sponsors, was not contacted 
regularly during the procurement phase. There was no uniﬁed list of projects under 
way or proposed, nor was there a single list of state funds already committed to these 
projects. The Committee was not informed during the implementation stage, nor was 
there a single set of transparent operating procedures among the sponsors. Sponsors were 
not required to seek the preliminary opinion of the Committee before a project idea 
was presented to the Cabinet. Sometimes the Ministry of Finance received proposals 
that were not submitted to the Committee. These problems led to a new Government 
Decree, 24/2007, that regulates long-term obligations assumed in PPP schemes and 
corrected the coordination problems cited above. 
The Committee’s suggestions for improved procedures could be applicable in other 
countries considering a PPP framework for both the state and municipal levels. For 
example, the minimum scale for consideration by the Committee was suggested to be 
at least HUF one billion or EUR four million. Similar small projects should be pack-
aged using standardized forms and evaluated together. This means that a pilot project 
is to be carried out ﬁrst, then the standardized documentation applied universally. The 
problem of small projects in large numbers in the municipal sector still needs to be 
addressed by this regulatory scheme. 
 
1.5 Public Procurement and Concessions 
 
Depending on the type of project involved, implementation will be subject to the Public 
Procurement Law (Act XXIX 2003) or the Concession Law (Act XVI 1991). There is 
no speciﬁc mention of PPPs in either act, thus the type of procedure chosen depends on 
the content and value of the projects. However, this could be considered to be a missing 
aspect of policy; the procurement act already has over 400 articles, hence adding more 
may not be eﬃcient. The Public Procurement Act covers works and service concessions, 
under which most PPP projects may fall. If the works concession also falls under the 
Concession Act (water, wastewater, transport, etc.) then the appropriate section of the 
Procurement Act is used. The Public Procurement Act distinguishes between three types 
of procedures: (1) procedures applicable for projects with a value of at least equivalent 
to or exceeding the community thresholds, (2) procedures applicable for projects with a 
value equivalent to or exceeding the so-called national thresholds, (3) procedures appli-
cable for projects with a value equivalent to or exceeding the so-called simple thresholds. 
The following extract from the guidance document summarizes the relationship of 
PPP projects to both the concessions and procurement laws in Hungary: 
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The Community and the national rules of procedure are to a large 
extent similar; the regulation of the simple procedure is more ﬂexible 
due to the low value of purchases. In accordance with the Community’s 
public procurement directives the Public Procurement Act governs the 
purchases of two groups of awarding authorities, (1) the so-called classic 
awarding authorities—i.e., public participants and local governments in 
a broad context and organizations which do not belong to this scope of 
participants and had received aid either form the state or the EU—and 
(2) so-called utilities—i.e., organizations operating in the water, energy, 
transport or postal sectors. Rules of procedures governing utilities are 
more ﬂexible (MoE 2008: 20–23). 
 National PPP projects are generally implemented under procedures applicable to 
projects with a value equivalent to or exceeding the community threshold and initi-
ated by classic awarding authorities. Diﬀerent types of public procurement procedures 
exist. To put that simply, there are procedures where the awarding authority decides 
on awarding the contract (namely for PPPs it selects the private partner) based on the 
tenders received, without negotiations. As opposed to this, there are procedures that 
allow the awarding authority to negotiate the contract conditions. In this latter case, 
the contract shall be concluded with the tenderer whose tender proves to be the most 
favorably evaluated against predeﬁned criteria upon closing negotiations. Negotiated 
procedures may be initiated with or without the publication of a contract notice. These 
procedures can be applied solely in case the conditions speciﬁed in accordance with the 
community’s public procurement directives in the Public Procurement Act: 
Concession tenders are public; excluding restricted tenders when na-
tional defense or national security interests prevail. Public notices shall 
be published in at least two national daily papers; notices by local gov-
ernments shall be published also in the local daily paper. Rules relative 
to guarantees had been speciﬁed also in the Concession Act (e.g., the 
minimum period before the deadline for submission of tenders), still 
we can conclude that the rules relative to concession tenders are more 
ﬂexible than those on public procurement. The reason for this is the 
fact that community legislation has not yet been adopted in this ﬁeld, 
except for works concessions.
 
EU directives on procurement have not kept up with the development of PPPs, and 
certainly some legislative harmonization at the community level is still needed before 
this legislation can be optimized in Hungary. 
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The Unique Situation of Municipalities 
PPPs are not speciﬁcally regulated at the local government level in Hungary. In other 
words, the policy instruments described earlier, such as review and coordination pro-
cedures, compliance with national development goals, and restrictions on non-debt 
liabilities, only apply to projects proposed by the central government. The SAO (Báger 
2007, 78) has pointed out that even the State Audit Oﬃce does not have an inventory 
of municipal-level PPP projects, unless the municipality was involved in an audit, or 
there were state funds provided in a local PPP scheme (as is the case with Sports 21). 
What was apparent from previous investigations by the SAO is that at the municipal 
level most projects are poorly prepared, there is no examination of eﬃciencies, and that 
municipalities faced a capital budget deﬁcit, and wished to avoid burdening their bor-
rowing limit when they attempted a PPP approach to obtaining a service. 
To fully understand the regulatory context for PPPs in Hungary, it is important to 
point out that: 
  Hungarian municipalities received most former council and some types of state 
property within their jurisdiction in the early 1990s. 
  Hungarian municipalities have full property rights, except over “core property” 
used to deliver vital services (streets, water works, pipelines) and other obvious 
public spaces (parks, squares, statues, etc.) 
  All council-owned and state-owned enterprises, such as waterworks, had to be 
“transformed” in the early 1990s into limited or joint stock companies—i.e., 
despite municipal ownership, these limited companies are not “public enterprises 
or JKP” as in the former Yugoslavia. These could, but were not all necessarily, 
sold to private owners. 
  Hungarian municipalities have to “ensure the provision of ” a list of vital 
services9 such as public health, sanitation, street lighting, cemeteries, etc., but 
“how” these services are delivered is up to them as long as they comply with 
other sectoral laws. This means that contracting out, concessions, and the use 
of private ﬁrms perhaps not even in municipal ownership, has been standard 
practice since 1991. (PPPs have to operate in a crowded environment.) 
  The above means that Hungarian municipalities have 18 years of experience in 
“managing” rather than delivering vital services. 
  Municipalities have price-setting authority for water, wastewater, solid waste, 
chimney inspection, and similar communal services. Where a regional, state-
owned water company provides the raw water, there is a state-set wholesale price 
that the municipalities may mark up. In some areas, the state-owned regional 
water company sets rates directly if it is involved in retail distribution. 
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  Incentives to provide public services outside of the budgetary and administrative 
framework are mostly related to VAT reimbursement; amortization is realized 
through rental or leasing payments to the municipality to give an impression of 
greater eﬃciency, faster and more ﬂexible decision-making, and the opportunity 
to move expenses oﬀ-budget and keep revenues away from the budget. 
  Given restrictions on the non-public ownership of core assets constructed with 
public funds, such as sewers or landﬁlls, private capital is involved in operations, 
marketing, etc., while heavy infrastructure investment in municipal services 
hardware uses public funds (i.e., private capital is attracted in concession agree-
ments, where the assets remain in public ownership, but the ﬁnancing is private. 
PPPs have a similar logic at the state level). 
  The restriction on core property being mixed with private capital has been 
administratively loosened since January 2007, when municipalities may sign 
asset management contracts with private ﬁrms and this includes the right to 
amortize the asset being granted to the private ﬁrm. De jure ownership remains 
with the municipality. 
Mistakenly in Hungary and perhaps elsewhere in CEE, a full range of options, 
ranging from contracting out, joint ventures, leasing of assets, service contracts, and 
concessions, are identiﬁed as being forms of PPP outside of the Eurostat deﬁnition. 
Formal evaluation and policy on PPPs in Hungary exists at the state level since 2003, as 
PPPs engaged by municipal governments do not enjoy the guarantee of the state budget, 
unless speciﬁcally approved by Parliament. Municipal borrowing and other long-term 
commitments do not need ministry approval or review, and most municipalities operate 
signiﬁcantly below their borrowing limits. PPPs at the local level in Hungary are in a 
sense not properly recorded as debt or long-term commitments, and instead show up 
in diﬀerent forms, such as long-term service contracts or concessions. 
 In fact, some municipalities,6 such as the county capital Veszprém, actually rejected 
using a PPP scheme in 2006 to build a multifunction sports and convention facility, 
saving about 30 percent on construction costs by using its own borrowing capacity. 
County capitals such as Veszprém are far from exceeding their borrowing limits, unlike 
the national government, and do not need to resort to PPP schemes to reduce their debt 
stock or reduce a budget deﬁcit.7 This debt does not enjoy any sovereign or national 
budget guarantee, however, and does show up in the national debt ﬁgures. But overall 
municipal debt is less than ﬁve percent of overall public debt stock, so municipalities 
do not need to disguise their borrowing in the form of long-run service contracts under 
PPPs. Of course, the deﬁnition of debt in other forms such as long-term service con-
tracts, guarantees, etc., is still needed, but is not expected to greatly inﬂuence the total 
amount of public debt in Hungary.
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The government proposed the Sports 21 program to build up to 169 swimming 
pools, gymnasia, and other sports facilities in municipalities that were in underserved 
areas. The Ministry of Local Government, which holds the sports portfolio, prepared 
an application package with standardized proposals, plans, ﬁnancial analyses, etc. The 
program would involve a 30–50 percent budget subsidy to the availability fee to be paid 
by the municipality. The private partner would have assumed construction and avail-
ability risk. Only about 17–30 projects will be contracted and completed (more details 
to follow in the case study section) solely because municipalities could not aﬀord the 
availability fee for 15 years, even with the subsidy. Many went ahead and built their own 
facility using traditional ﬁnancing, and others backed away from the program. Another 
signiﬁcant problem was that the construction bids came in sometimes at a multiple of 
the original estimate. Banks were also reluctant, as the agreement packages were small 
and complicated, and perhaps the “value-for-money” principle really was applied cor-
rectly by all players (Bager 80). 
The SAO sees several areas in which municipalities may increase their PPP activity 
in the future if the legal framework were clariﬁed. These all involve mandatory munici-
pal functions such as: rental housing for social welfare, water and sewer, solid waste, 
local roads, local public transportation, daycare and kindergartens, sports facilities, 
health facilities, and homes for the elderly. The Concession Law, Local Government 
Law, and various sectoral laws sometimes hinder the use of PPPs in the municipalities. 
Up until 2007, the Local Government law did not allow municipal core property to 
be partially transferred for use only to the private sector. On January 1, 2007, a new 
property management clause was added to the Law on Local Government, essentially 
allowing municipalities to place some of their core assets into a trust, i.e., a private ﬁrm 
would have the right to amortize the property—to enjoy its fruits but at the same time 
be obligated to maintain and protect the property. This property management rights 
transfer to the private sector made this form of “alternative” PPP possible. A great deal 
of responsibility rests with the municipality, in that a local ordinance is needed to govern 
this arrangement. Typical of Hungary, the central government made this type of “trust” 
relationship possible without providing guidelines or examples to all the municipalities 
on suggested methodologies and actual legal texts. 
The SAO (Báger 2007, 82–83) concluded that two other important challenges 
need to be addressed at the municipal level. Namely, projects that are not sponsored 
in part by the central state (as in the case of Sports 21) have ambiguous bookkeeping 
and accounting methods, and the Treasury is uncertain as to whether municipal PPPs 
increase state debt overall, or meet the same standards as PPPs that have been screened 
by the Interministerial Committee. A second obstacle, mentioned the introduction, 
is that the language on debt limits referring to municipalities needs to be modiﬁed to 
include other obligations, such as availability fees in a PPP project, for example. Though 
it has not happened yet, the SAO hopes that such a change will prevent municipalities 
from using PPPs to dodge the borrowing limit by taking advantage of this loophole. 
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2. LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PPPS
 —TYPES OF PPP STRUCTURES 
 
Hungary has had experiences with outsourcing, service contracts, concessions, and the 
like since the early 1990s. These arrangements, including oﬀering the private sector 
the right to operate public assets such as wastewater plants, are not considered by the 
Economics Ministry’s Handbook as being versions of PPPs for the simple reason that 
the funding of the investment comes from public funds, and the asset in most cases is 
accounted for as a non-negotiable or “core” public asset. The handbook (MoE 2004, 
20–22) describes outsourcing in three forms: service contracts up to ﬁve years in dura-
tion, operational contracts in the medium term, and leasing. 
Under operational contracts, the contractor may be obligated to make improvements. 
In leasing arrangements, the private ﬁrm leases a new or existing public asset, such as 
a water system, and is responsible for refurbishment and renewal. These contracts usu-
ally generate their own revenue, and have terms of ﬁve to 15 years. These are the most 
typical “concession” contracts in Hungary, which oﬀer only the right to operate but not 
ownership of an asset. The concession form is used by municipalities to operate water 
and wastewater facilities that are a non-negotiable property of the municipality. In the 
1990s, genuine concessions could not be oﬀered in Hungary because public and private 
funds could not be combined for the building of new facilities that, by law, must be 
the core property of municipalities. In this sense, operational concessions in Hungary 
cannot really be classiﬁed as PPP projects, though the two sectors are cooperating. 
The Economics Ministry’s Handbooks (from 2004 and 2008) regard those arrange-
ments as PPP which integrate all phases of the project: planning, ﬁnancing, operation, 
construction. BOTs are still ﬁnanced by the state in the water and transportation sec-
tors. DBFOs (design-build-ﬁnance-operate) still require that the assets remain in state 
ownership over the duration of the contract, and the operator provides leasing payments 
to the owner (as in concessions). 
 A diﬃculty in deﬁning and regulating PPPs in Hungary stems from restrictions on 
transferring core municipal property (assets used to deliver mandatory services) to the 
private sector. Starting in January 2007, municipalities were allowed to transfer asset 
management rights over public property to private operators in “trust” arrangements. 
This means that, as in other countries, assets built with public funds could appear in 
the books of private operators while ultimate ownership remained in the public sector. 
This became possible at the municipal level only in 2007. Hence, there is still a dearth 
of “genuine” PPP projects among municipalities. 
The SAO, Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce, and the Interministerial Committee are 
obligated to use the ESA 95 deﬁnition of PPPs in their ranking and evaluation of PPP 
proposals at the national level. A project is only considered as being a PPP (and oﬀ the 
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national balance sheet) if it is a contract for long-term services, and not a disguised loan. 
The Statistical Oﬃce must use Eurostat’s 2004 guidelines and examine the complicated 
details of each proposed contract to determine whether the project meets PPP criteria. A 
project can only be labeled as being a PPP if it meets Eurostat’s requirements concerning 
risk allocation. These requirements are even today not always clearly met, and hence 
most of what look like PPP projects in Hungary cannot be really considered as being 
examples of PPP for these reasons. 
However, Eurostat’s guidelines were only published in 2004, so Hungary is not 
the only country with “false” PPP projects that could be reclassiﬁed as being disguised 
public debt. In order to be labeled as a PPP project, the private contract must assume all 
construction risk. Furthermore, the private ﬁrm must assume one of the following risks: 
availability risk or demand risk. Thus Hungary’s early motorway concessions in the late 
1990s that were later cancelled at great expense could not be considered as “genuine” 
PPPs since the state paid the concessionaire an availability fee, as well as a shadow toll 
guaranteeing a certain level of traﬃc regardless of actual usage. Water concessions at the 
municipal level also did not pass on either availability or demand risk, and therefore do 
not meet the Eurostat conditions for being considered a PPP project. 
 
2.1 Some Examples of PPPs in Hungary 
Until 2003, PPPs came about at the national level in areas such as motorways and cul-
tural facilities. These early attempts were expensive for the state, contained too many 
guarantees for the private investor, and were used mostly to avoid increasing current 
deﬁcits and for moving state debts oﬀ the national balance sheet. Despite a government 
decision in 2003 creating the Interministerial Committee on PPP, and the subsequent 
publication of guidelines and several editions of a PPP manual in 2004 and most re-
cently in early 2008, PPPs are still largely unregulated and unstandardized. The State 
Audit Oﬃce, in a report on PPPs issued in April 2003, asserted that its own audits of 
PPP projects, as well as the experiences of the Interministerial Committee, show that 
there still is a need in Hungary for rules on how to evaluate PPP proposals and how 
to conduct long-term forecasts and estimates of net present value. The Interministerial 
Committee and the SAO argued for changes in the Concessions Law and the Public 
Procurement Law to take PPPs into account. 
Table 3.1 from the PPP Committee’s 2007 report shows the status of “recognized” 
PPP projects in Hungary as of January 2008. 
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Table 3.1
The Status of “Recognized” PPP projects in Hungary as of January 2008 (MoT 2007, 6)
Description of the PPP project Indexed (estimated) fees (annual)
HUF million gross
Project NPV 
(Net Present Value) 
(without VAT)
HUF billion
Project 
manager
2006 2007 2008
Central Universitas Programme 384.0 2,997.4 6,021.0 OKM
Művészetek Palotája 
(Palace of Arts)
2,002.6 8,262.8 8,509.4 31.3* OKM
M5 motorway 36,949.7 39,023.3 537.8 GKM
M6 motorway: 
Érd–Dunaújváros
20,975.0 14,125.8 193.6 GKM
M6 motorway: Szekszárd–Bóly,
M60: Bóly–Pécs
266.1 GKM
M6 motorway: 
Dunaújváros–Szekszárd
208.3** GKM
Szombathely, prison 1,638.6 40.3 IRM
Tiszalök, prison 505.7 2,164.4 39.4 IRM
Sport 21 framework program 292.5 1,363.9 ÖTM
Altogether PPP 2,386.6 69,983.1 72,846.4 1,327.2
Share in the HTK fund 41% 47% 46%
Source: PM HTK records, as of January 31, 2008.
Notes: *  Investment value.
  ** Maximum value of commitment assumed under decree number 96/2007 (X.31.) OGY 
 (National Assembly) (currently, the project is under public procurement procedure).
Note that the Sports 21 program reﬂects partial state subsidies of municipal gym-
nasia and swimming pools. Another interesting factor is that even with the motorway 
projects that consume nearly two-thirds of the central government’s PPP budget, the 
state used less than half of the funds available for PPP commitments as of 2008. This 
reﬂects a diﬃculty in matching projects with priority development goals, in meeting the 
strict Eurostat conditionalities, as well as objectively showing that the PPP arrangement 
is more economical, i.e., provides more value for money, than the traditional forms of 
ﬁnancing and project implementation. 
Other service contracts, such as concessions for water, wastewater, and solid waste 
treatment; the contracting out of routine services such as security and housekeeping; 
operational leases for capital equipment and for energy and transportation prevail at the 
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municipal level. These are governed, however, by the Concession Law, Local Government 
Law, and sectoral laws, and do not really meet the criteria of being PPP arrangements. 
These arrangements are not long-term purchases of services by the public sector, where 
the private sector ﬁnances and creates an asset, takes most of the risks, and hands over 
a depreciated asset 15 to 25 years later. 
If we ignore the early concession arrangements that were later determined not to be 
PPP arrangements, given that all of the risk was borne by the state, then only the data 
provided by the Interministerial Committee is useful. Between 2003 and the end of 
2006, 85 project proposals were reviewed by the Committee. These projects included 
prisons, modernization of courthouses, university dormitories, theaters and cultural 
facilities of national importance, motorways, and studios for the state‐owned TV net-
work. In 2005, the Local Government and Sports Ministries began to propose sports 
facilities, swimming pools and gymnasia for municipalities with partial state funding 
of PPP fees. This program was aimed at constructing sports facilities in municipalities 
that were underserved. Discussed in detail elsewhere, very few of these facilities were 
built using the Sports 21 scheme, since municipalities considered the PPP fees to be too 
high, even after accepting the subsidy. And many municipalities of various sizes decided 
to use traditional borrowing and concessions contracts, hence realizing 30–50 percent 
savings. Of the 133 projects under consideration between 2003 and 2006, only 30 were 
actually contracted. The potential net present value of the 133 projects was about EUR 
four billion at the end of 2006 and EUR 5.2 billion by the end of 2007. 
 According to the Committee’s data from March 2008, 67 PPP projects were under 
way in Hungary. Of these, the M6 motorway8 accounted for over two-thirds of the 
funds committed. Further examples of “live” PPP projects include the Palace of Arts in 
Budapest, two prisons, 10 dormitories, 13 dormitory refurbishments, 15 research centers, 
seven gymnasiums, four training swimming pools, and one municipal sports complex. 
The PPP Committee’s guidelines suggest a risk matrix taking planning/construc-
tion, availability, and demand risk into account. These, of course, are only those risks 
associated with the Eurostat standards, and should be considered as the minimum. 
 
3. TYPES OF RISKS 
 
3.1 Classiﬁcation Risk 
 
The most evident risk—or classiﬁcation risk, faced by PPP project sponsors in Hun-
gary, regardless of whether they are central ministries or municipalities—is that their 
project is classiﬁed according to Eurostat standards as being state debt, or in the case of 
municipalities, the project’s ﬁnancing scheme needlessly burdens its debt service capac-
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ity. Since PPP payments are not yet regulated by national law at the municipal level, 
their inclusion in debt limits or in a separate category of obligation as exists at the state 
level already means municipalities face signiﬁcant policy risk if they engage in projects 
that meet PPP standards. Choosing a PPP arrangement only to avoid an accounting or 
statistical classiﬁcation is a potentially dangerous practice that is to be avoided through 
transparent instructions for conducting value for money, and public sector comparator 
analysis. This is the point at which the private sector has a dominant advantage over 
the public sector. 
Thus, relevant and useful PPP guidelines for calculating value for money and do-
ing the public sector comparison are areas where “liberalized” regulatory frameworks 
could help municipalities. PPP project review and approval by the central state are not 
needed if the framework is clear enough to be applied by a municipality acting in its 
own interest. (Certainly, there is some evidence that Hungarian municipalities have 
rejected PPP projects on the basis of cost and have gone ahead with other models of 
ﬁnancing/operation in order to implement their projects).  
Since PPP obligations are not regulated at the municipal level, and if they are not 
deemed to be classical forms of municipal debt such as leasing, bank loans, or bond pay-
ments, there is no obvious advantage to using the PPP model versus public borrowing. 
As stated before, PPP is used at the state level to take future payment obligations oﬀ 
the balance sheet and to prevent investment expenses from burdening current deﬁcits. 
There is no incentive at the municipal level to “hide” this kind of debt, since unlike at 
the central level, PPP obligations are not recorded as debt nor are they regulated either 
by the annual budget law or by the treasury. 
In other words, the large risk facing a Hungarian municipality is that assuming a 
PPP obligation will be one and half times to twice as expensive than standard bank or 
bond ﬁnancing. For this reason, when municipalities compare the all-inclusive cost of 
PPPs versus simple borrowing and the oﬀer of an operational concession, the latter wins. 
Thus, PPP arrangements are routinely rejected by the more sophisticated municipalities. 
 In contrast, the decision to go forward with a PPP project at the central level bears 
the risk that ex post facto the Statistical Oﬃce or even Eurostat could reclassify the project 
as sovereign debt. Hungary had to re-tender motorway concessions since the EU did 
not accept them as genuine PPP projects, and the government’s deﬁcit and debt ratio 
reduction plan was threatened. So this “inception risk” at the central level means the 
risk of reclassiﬁcation, whilst at the municipal level a decision to go ahead with a PPP 
without the appropriate calculations means an excessive cost for private provision that 
could be done for much less with traditional ﬁnancing and eventual contracting out 
in non‐PPP ways. 
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3.2 Risk Matrix: Construction, Availability, and Demand 
The guidance document’s “risk matrix” (MoE 2004) is useful not only at the central, but 
also at the municipal level for segregating construction, availability, and ﬁnally demand 
risk. Identifying, pricing, and allocating these three types of risk are a good practice for 
municipalities regardless of the type of project they are proposing. 
1. Planning and works risks 
  Who is responsible for planning the investment? 
  Does the contract primarily specify the volume and quality of the service or also 
requirements relative to the characteristics of the assets necessary to provide the 
services (size, design, and technical quality of the assets to be used)? 
  Is it the state or the PPP contractor who bears the risks emerging during the 
implementation of the investment (e.g., risks of increased costs, ﬁnancing risks 
due to faulty design/execution)? 
  What sanctions can be applied by the customer in case the investment fails, is 
delayed, or is implemented inadequately? 
 
2. Availability risk: Is it the state or the PPP contractor? 
  Who bears the risks emerging during operation (e.g., risks due to breakdowns, 
gaps in operation, or natural disasters)? 
  What sanctions apply if the contractor is unable to ensure the availability of the 
resources at the quality speciﬁed in the contract for a temporary period? 
  Can it happen that the state will have to provide contributions to ﬁnancing 
maintenance of the assets? 
  Which party is responsible for maintenance and insurance of the assets? 
  What are the sanctions applied by the competent ministry in case service quality 
is inappropriate? 
  Who bears the risks of increased operational costs? 
 
3. Demand risk 
  Who bears the demand risk? 
  Will the private partner be eligible for compensation in case the demand is 
lower than expected or speciﬁed in the contract? 
  Who bears the costs emerging from demand higher than expected or speciﬁed 
in the contract? 
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  May the contractor use the assets created to provide services in the framework 
of its business activities for a third party? 
 
Proper use of the three risk categories enables an analyst to determine whether a 
project meets Eurostat standards for being oﬀ the state’s balance sheet. In other words, 
the private partner is expected to bear all of construction risk, and one of either demand 
or availability risk. 
 
3.3 Approaches to Risk Assessment 
 
The Hungarian SAO has decided to adopt the National Audit Oﬃce’s “Framework for 
Evaluating the Implementation of Private Finance Initiative Projects” (SAO 2006). The 
NAO-SAO approach evaluates six separate stages of any PPP project. These are: strat-
egy, tendering, ﬁnalizing the contract, pre-implementation, the initial implementation 
period, and advance implementation. 
Most important for any regulatory framework would be the ability to strategically 
preempt or promote projects that serve a particular national development plan. The 
aspects to consider under “strategy” are the following: 
  Suitability of project to business needs 
  Appropriateness of PPP for the public sector stakeholders 
  Support of the project by partners 
  Quality of delivery of project 
  Optional balance between cost and quality 
  Eﬀective risk allocation 
 
These criteria appear to be “screening” criteria to be used before a project is actually 
started. The rest are more appropriate in an ex post facto situation where a supreme audit 
organization is likely to be involved. 
 
3.4 Stakeholders’ Risks 
 
There have not been any failed PPP projects in Hungary where the consequences of 
the risks have been made explicit to the stakeholders. The risks identiﬁed above (clas-
siﬁcation, construction, availability, and demand) for the most part are shared by the 
sponsor, that is the municipality, and by the private contractor. An obvious ﬁnancial 
risk for both parties involves the risk of default, that is, if the municipality cannot pay 
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the entire or even a part of the availability fee at some time during the 15–30 year term 
of a typical PPP project. Both parties face the risk of reduced or even changed demand 
for the service being provided. The private sector’s suppliers face most of their risk up 
front in the project. But by assumption, the private contractor will pay the suppliers 
and construction contractors on time, or else it will not reach the implementation phase 
and gain access to the long-term cash ﬂow that is promised in the deal. Thus, the risk 
faced by suppliers and other subcontractors seems to be minimal. 
The population, citizens, and customers face the risk of ultimate responsibility for 
municipal obligations over the long run. In other words, will local taxes be increased, 
user charges be raised, and the level of services altered in order to make availability 
payments over the long run? There are thus potential tradeoﬀs in the prices and avail-
ability of other public services that are not related to the original service being provided 
through the PPP. The user of the service also faces the risk of declining quality that, of 
course, should be regulated by contract. Other local stakeholders, perhaps originally 
competitors to the service being oﬀered by a PPP face the ultimate risk of losing their 
market over a very long run. If existing local businesses are displaced by the new service, 
the municipal budget also faces the risk of adjustment assistance, unemployment pay-
ments, and other forms of unrest. 
As some of the Hungarian examples have shown, the actual bids that arrive in the 
public procurement process are sometimes a multiple of the amount expected in the 
original PPP structure. This happens rather routinely and is not only a function of inex-
perienced sponsors. Rather, the private bidders decide to pass on all risks to the public 
sector through aggressive pricing, or have an exaggerated view of risk due to a lack of 
experience. Either way, many proposed PPP projects at the municipal level in Hungary 
(Sports 21 program gymnasia, pools, etc.) have failed at the point of tendering when 
bids simply came in at an exaggeratedly high price. 
Finally, the value for money analysis skills of the public sector are usually lacking 
in Hungary. Despite guidelines on discount rates to use when comparing net present 
values, this aspect of analysis is not well documented nor well supported by method-
ological guidelines or handbooks. Given the sensitive nature and complication of these 
calculations that assume certain cost and revenue trends will continue for the next 15–30 
years, municipalities at least conduct this analysis in the simplest of terms, attempting 
to use the lowest possible cost of borrowed funds and assuming a fully owned munici-
pal enterprise to make the comparison. Often, the project availability fee “oﬀered” by 
the Sports 21 program or by a private vendor is simply too high in nominal terms to 
be acceptable to municipalities, despite the multitude of potential advantages that are 
packaged in a PPP proposal. In other words, this is still an undeveloped frontier area. 
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4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM HUNGARY 
 
4.1 Regulatory Lessons Learned 
 
The Interministerial PPP Committee has proposed a standard set of documents to be 
used for PPP packaging at any level of government. These proposed documents have 
not yet been introduced nor approved, but could be useful in other transition countries. 
These documents (taking into account the contents detailed earlier in this report) include: 
  Preliminary evaluation form (to be used by approving authority) 
  Project template, business plan template, and project data sheet 
  Risk matrix template (risk allocation, ﬁnancial, compliance, etc.) 
  Approval form for “state aid” ﬁlled in by appropriate agency 
  Approval form to be ﬁlled out by the committee 
  Sample contracts 
  Treasury or Ministry of Finance reporting form where appropriate 
  Biannual reporting forms
Naturally, a set of detailed instructions would be required for each component in 
the documentation package. 
 
4.2 Evaluation Matrix 
 
The most practical approach to a Go/No go or somehow scaled evaluation system would 
be to adopt the risk allocation matrix (construction, availability, demand) checklist for 
basic ﬁnancial analysis, that is, to determine whether the public cost or the private route 
have a lower cost net of revenues in present value terms. 
 When conducting the calculation calling for a public sector comparator, it is neces-
sary to have speciﬁc data on the following: 
  Construction cost (what is the projected construction cost, usually appearing 
in the ﬁrst three years of the project?) 
  Annual availability fee: this consists of two parts usually, that is, an availability 
fee that is connected to capacity but not to a level of usage. This is where capital 
cost is realized, and assumes a level and quality of available service. The second 
component could be a shadow toll, that complements revenue that is actually 
collected from users. 
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  Present value of annual fees, using the discount rate that is called for by regu-
lation. Selection of the comparative private sector discount rate is, of course, 
critical to making the correct choice for the public sector. 
 
5. EXAMPLES AND VESZPRÉM CASE STUDY 
 
Before discussing the speciﬁc example of the Veszprém sports arena, that started out as a 
state-sponsored PPP project and ended up being fully ﬁnanced with a bank loan and the 
use of several municipal enterprises, we describe the context in which the government of 
Hungary attempted to initiate genuine PPP projects at the municipal level, 2004–2007. 
5.1 Sports 21 Program 
The Interior Ministry, through its sports portfolio, decided to launch a sports facility 
construction process for underserved areas. Municipalities would have received a partial 
subsidy from the state budget to pay the availability fees to private operators of swimming 
pools, gymnasia, and other facilities. An extract from the Interministerial Committee’ 
post-mortem on the program follows: 
The Government launched the Sport XXI Facility Establishment Pro-
gram through the Governmental decision number 1055/2004 (VI.8) on 
the transformation of the development and operating system of sports 
facilities. The programme covered three sub-programs where the IM 
PPP Committee carried out project opinionating tasks: 
– “Modern gymnasiums everywhere” sub-program (“gymnasiums”),
  – “Educational swimming pools in all small regions” sub-program 
(“children’s swimming pools”), 
  – “With sports for communities” sub-program (“sports halls”).
—Báger 2007, 12–13
 
The program was closed down as of January 31, 2007, and no applications can be 
made for new projects. In December 2006, the Interministerial PPP Committee made 
a summary report about the experiences related to the program of the National Oﬃce 
for Sports, which was sent to the leaders of the ministry portfolios and institutions 
dealing with PPPs. The most important critical remarks concerning the program were 
as follows: a lack of actually implemented sample projects (the sample projects were 
only one step ahead of the other projects); small project size; and low competition upon 
the requests for bids. All these elements together rendered the PPP scheme relatively 
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expensive, and for this reason, several local governments stepped back from the program 
and from contracting (ﬁnally, 37 out of the planned 121 projects will be implemented). 
Projects can be implemented economically only on a large scale (in Hungary: above 
an investment value of minimum about EUR four million = HUF one billion), or in a 
real package (totally identical project documentation and contract). 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 sum up the main features of the National Oﬃce for Sports and 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development projects.
Table 3.2
The Main Features of the National Oﬃce for Sports and Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Development Projects
Under approval Effective contract signed In operation Total
Gymnasium 3 8 7 18
Educational swimming pool — 14 4 18
Sports hall — 1 1 1
Total 37
Source: Status Report submitted to the IM PPP Committee, January 2008.
Table 3.3
Realized and Operating Facilities in the Program
Settlement Dross state charge 
contribution payable in 2007
(HUF thousands, gross)
Gross state charge 
contribution payable in 2008
(HUF thousands, gross)
Gymnasium Debrecen 19,440 23,794
Magyaratád 22,134 23,794
Szenna 22,134 23,794
Somogyjád 38,500 41,436
Kozármisleny 48,349 56,864
Nagybajom 30,152 41,436
Dédestapolcsány 5,533 23,794
Educational 
swimming pool
for children
Mohács 29,139 57,296
Bácsalmás 10,004 32,354
Szigetvár 4,393 57,296
Ibrány 0 53,843
Sports hall Kiskunfélegyháza 11,385 48,956
Source: Status Report submitted to the IM PPP Committee, January 2008.
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The list above hides the fact that the cities of Békés, Gyöngyös, Jászberény, 
Szigetszentmiklós, Veszprém, and Mosonmagyaróvár declared their tenders to be 
invalid given that the prices exceeded all expectations. Veszprem, as indicated earlier, 
just opened its multifunction sports arena in July 2008, at a cost at least one-third less 
than the PPP version, using its own ﬁrm and bank ﬁnancing. The city of Gyöngyös’s 
sports arena was eventually built using private ﬁnancing, without the state subsidy, for 
a lower cost than was proposed under the central government program. While not on 
the list above, Hódmezővásárhely opened its multifunction sports arena in August 2008, 
using the Sports 21 PPP program. A private operator built and will operate the system 
for 15 years, for an annual availability fee of HUF 120 million (about EUR 500,000), 
then hand oﬀ ownership to the city. The central government’s Sports 21 program will 
pay 42 percent of the fee. It seems Hódmezővásárhely is the exception to the rule, as 
more municipalities have rejected this program or have gone forward alone than have 
accepted it. 
Press reports on joint eﬀorts between the public and private sectors abound in Hun-
gary, and most reports claim that these are “PPP” projects, even if the Eurostat and other 
criteria are not met. Since there is no central review and approval nor a reporting system 
for projects labeled as being PPPs at the municipal level in Hungary, it is very diﬃcult, 
as the SAO has also said, to guess at the scale, type, and number of these endeavors. 
 
5.2 CASE STUDY: VESZPRÉM SPORTS ARENA 
The Sports 21 program was designed to partially subsidize sports facilities at the mu-
nicipal level, using a state budget allocation that required the Interministerial PPP 
Committee to get involved. The initial plan was that each county capital would construct 
a multifunction sports arena, much like the one already in existence in Debrecen. Of 
the remaining 18 county capitals, only nine began to plan arenas using the Sports 21 
program. Two dropped out of the program early, six invalidated procurement processes, 
and only Veszprém actually built an arena, albeit not using the state-supported form 
of PPP, instead developed their own model (to be described subsequently). In general, 
the public procurement process produced price bids that were 50–60 percent above 
the amount planned in the tender documentation. This demonstrates signiﬁcant risks 
perceived by the private sector that are shifted to the public sector through higher prices. 
Veszprém, a county capital with a thousand-year history, is located in central western 
Hungary, about 20 kilometers north of Lake Balaton with a population of 60,000. It 
is home to a professional handball team, MKB Veszprém, that routinely hosts teams 
from across Europe. The city decided in the mid-1990s to look into a multifunction 
sports arena, and found a model in Celje, Slovenia, that served as a blueprint for the 
technical plans. However, the arena was not planned from a ﬁnancial perspective until 
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2005, when the city council decided to take part in the government’s Sports 21 program 
and apply for the PPP subsidy. 
The ﬁrst tender was announced in early 2005, when four bidders submitted proposals 
for a 15-year PPP project that would cost HUF 15 billion (about EUR 60 million).The 
city’s calculations called for a total 15-year cost, including construction and operations, 
of no more than HUF nine billion (EUR 36 million). This tender was repeated in Sep-
tember 2006, one month before the October 2006 municipal elections that resulted in a 
complete change in power, including a new mayor and the victory of the former opposi-
tion party. The September 2006 tender had four bidders, three of which, unfortunately 
for the city, had to be disqualiﬁed for formal reasons. This tender called for a HUF 4.5 
billion construction cost, and about a HUF 4.5 billion operational cost over 15 years. 
The only bidder submitted a price that was close to the city’s objective. Instead of 
being satisﬁed with its own oﬀer, the winner attempted to ratchet the price up to over 
HUF 13 billion, and the city was unable to settle a contract with them. In the meantime, 
construction started in September 2006, before there was a ﬁnal construction permit. 
The cancellation of the last tender under the PPP scheme, the start of illegal construc-
tion, and the local elections had the eﬀect that the city continued to build the arena 
with no valid winner, even after the change in administration. In November 2006, the 
new administration temporarily halted construction. 
The former administration and opposition traded places in October 2006. But 
there was a consensus, despite all the public controversy, that Veszprém had to ﬁnish 
its arena by 2008 without using the government’s PPP scheme, however. Construction 
resumed in May 2007, after the city paid a ﬁne to the public administration oﬃce (a 
state level institution). The most interesting aspect is that the city developed a ﬁnancial 
scheme to avoid using PPP, an option they considered too expensive on the basis of 
two failed public tenders. 
The arena9 was ceremoniously opened in July 2008, at a construction cost of HUF 
4.5 billion or EUR 18 million. This cost was funded entirely by a bank loan to be repaid 
over 15 years. In addition, the availability fee added another HUF 4.5 billion over 15 
years, making the total nominal cost HUF nine billion (EUR 36 million). The arena, a 
larger version of the one in Celje, Slovenia, has 6,000 seats, and 2,000 square meters of 
ﬂoor space for events. In addition, it has a ballroom that can seat 650 guests. The city 
has reserved 70 percent of the space and time for itself, with the balance made available 
to the handball team and other professional sports. 
The Financial Scheme 
The 100-percent Veszprém Communal Services Company that serves essentially as a 
holding ﬁrm for all property and services except water and sanitation, borrowed HUF 
4.5 billion from a commercial bank. This communal company also owns the land upon 
which the arena was built. The city’s procurement tender called for the purchase of the 
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right to use an arena that meets the speciﬁcations of the one that was to be built. The 
“winner” of that tender to provide the service was Csarnok (Arena) Ltd., a ﬁrm entirely 
owned by Veszprém Communal Services. The city paid Csarnok Ltd. an availability 
fee equal to the estimated “loss” from operations, taking into account the commercial 
revenue Csarnok Ltd., could have from events at the arena. 
Debt service, per se, does not come directly from the city budget. Of course, the city 
budget guarantees the debt service on the HUF 4.5 billion owned by the Communal 
Company, but cash moves from the budget to the Communal Company, and ultimately 
to the bank, in a novel way. The city agreed to increase the subscribed capital of the 
Communal Services Company by about EUR two million per year until the loan was 
repaid. This does not count as debt service in the city budget, and thus does not hinder 
the city’s debt limit. This transaction does not incur a VAT liability either. The fee that 
the city pays to the operating company (Csarnok Ltd.) does incur a VAT liability that 
the city cannot get refunded. So the city is using a capital transaction on an annual 
basis to fund the debt service of an enterprise that it owns. The construction contract 
is between the holding company and the operating company, while the bank loans is 
between the bank and the holding company. The operating company is expected to 
break even, including the service fee and other revenues. 
The original PPP scheme became a long-term purchase of “arena services” by the 
city from its own enterprise, Csarnok Ltd., with ﬁnancial intermediation by another 
city enterprise, the asset management and communal service company. Of course, the 
scheme as described is more complicated in reality, but reﬂects ﬁnancial sophistication 
and creativity that does not exist at the state level. In the end, the arena was built for the 
original price, and seemingly will operate for 15 years as planned. There is even a chance 
that the operating company will make a proﬁt from the special events, a proﬁt that 
will show up on the balance sheet of the holding company and the operating company. 
Those retained earnings will be available to the city for other projects in the long run. 
 
Lessons from Veszprém 
Given that there was a dream in Veszprém to build a sports arena that spanned several 
electoral cycles, the existence of the Sports 21 PPP program proposed by the Sports 
Ministry was enough to spur several ill-fated public tenders. There was no doubt that 
the political leadership and the experts behind them who routinely played the role of 
opposition and “ruling” power at the local level, had developed a technical and ﬁnancial 
consensus that the arena would be built. All the public controversy and grandstanding 
notwithstanding, the local stakeholders had calculated, and agreed that the price of 
HUF nine billion was acceptable to them, and any oﬀer over that, as in the case of the 
two attempts at using the Sports 21 subsidy, was not acceptable. The local stakeholders 
had also agreed in advance to the extent of what were to be the acceptable direct budget 
transfers in the form of an availability fee to be paid to the operator. This is not always 
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the case. Finally, the capital increase over 15 years to cover the loan repayment was 
simply a stroke of genius that survived the change in administration in October 2006. 
The most important lesson is continuity at the stakeholder level, and an agreement on 
the acceptable cost, and the ultimate goal to be achieved. The PPP attempt was simply 
outside interference that stimulated more creative thinking at the municipal level. 
A second important lesson was that, in a tendering situation, if there is only one 
winner, that winner will attempt to maximize its position, even though tendering docu-
ments were clear about total cost expectations. Such a bidder should not press its luck 
excessively. But since there was an agreement among all the parties at the municipal level 
about the objective and price, the bidder overplayed its hand and lost in the end. Politi-
cal momentum, the desire to build a monument to the former mayor, and stakeholder 
interests in the end were important factors in developing a complicated ﬁnancial plan 
that, by deﬁnition, will span at least three more election cycles. 
According to several stakeholders, the current HUF nine billion option was not 
optimal either, since some estimates that an overall cost of HUF six billion may have 
been possible over the 15 years. But the two PPP-based public tenders established a 
baseline of HUF nine billion, and this was accepted by all the parties concerned. In a 
sense, the ultimate solution was shaped by the last failed PPP tender. In other words, 
the solution selected was better than any of the PPP options reviewed, but suboptimal 
were the city to start from a blank slate. 
Finally, given that, unlike the state, the city of Veszprém and others like it are cred-
itworthy, their motivation should be value for money above all. This goal was not met 
given the detour into subsidized PPP schemes proposed at the state level. At the secretariat 
of the PPP Committee, the experts are satisﬁed with the national level regulations and 
procedures. When queried as to how similar procedures could apply at the municipal 
level when state funds are not being committed, the answer was that each level should 
develop its own process.10 This comment, not too helpful, reﬂects a major feature of 
public ﬁnance in Hungary that is not likely to change very soon. That is, municipalities 
do not need the approval of the state in any form to incur obligations or debt, even if 
that obligation meets Eurostat PPP criteria. However, for countries where an agent of 
the state, represented most likely by the Ministry of Finance, is deeply involved in debt 
decisions, some standard for evaluating, ranking, and approving PPP projects should 
be explicitly developed. 
The ﬁnancial sector, as the Veszprém case shows, will work very closely with the 
public partner to “outwit” the formal constraints of a regulated PPP process. Therefore 
the emphasis should switch to projects that are sustainable in every sense, and are not 
primarily motivated by rent seeking (getting a partial state subsidy) or by avoidance of 
state debt restrictions (the usual justiﬁcation at the state level for PPP versus traditional 
ﬁnancing). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study initially takes a broad approach to the method of involving private service 
providers and capital in delivering public infrastructure. Before Hungary’s EU accession 
in 2004, there was practically no legal framework in Hungary that speciﬁcally deﬁned 
what a PPP is. Therefore, many projects that were heralded as examples of PPP in the 
1990s and early 2000s have to be “relabeled” as quasi-disguised public debt or simple 
purchases of long-term services under a variety of ﬁnancing schemes. 
Even though there is no single law on PPPs in Hungary—and the Concessions and 
Procurement Laws, respectively, do not mention PPPs at all—there are three perspec-
tives from which PPPs are regulated: 
  First, the procedural steps to be taken by project sponsors, such as ministries 
and central government agencies, are deﬁned in a series of government decrees 
and decisions, but not by law. 
  Second, these same decrees and decisions require the compliance of proposed 
central government PPP projects with national development priorities that are 
proposed by the National Development Agency, then approved by the cabinet 
twice a year. 
  Third, since the PPP projects that are regulated through these decrees and deci-
sions are all supported by the central budget (not by municipal budgets), the 
annual Budget Act, as well as the Budget System Law regulate the procedure to 
be followed when the state assumes a new liability (not necessarily a debt given 
that these investments are long term purchases of services and not borrowing 
if they meet Eurostat standards). 
PPPs are not speciﬁcally regulated in Hungary at the local government level. What 
was apparent from previous investigations by the SAO is that at the municipal level most 
projects are poorly prepared, there is no examination of eﬃciencies, and that munici-
palities faced a capital budget deﬁcit, and wished to avoid burdening their borrowing 
limit when they attempted a PPP approach to obtaining a service. 
The most evident risk—“classiﬁcation risk,” faced by PPP project sponsors in 
Hungary, regardless of whether they are central ministries or municipalities—is that 
their project is classiﬁed according to Eurostat standards as being state debt, or in the 
case of municipalities, the project’s ﬁnancing scheme burdens its debt service capacity 
needlessly. Since PPP payments are not yet regulated by national law at the municipal 
level, their inclusion in debt limits or in a separate category of obligations as exists at 
the state level already means municipalities face signiﬁcant policy risk if they engage 
in projects that meet PPP standards. Choosing a PPP arrangement only to avoid an 
accounting or statistical classiﬁcation is a potentially dangerous practice that is to be 
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avoided through transparent instructions for conducting value-for-money and public 
sector comparator analysis. 
PPP project review and approval by the central state are not needed if the framework 
is clear enough to be applied by a municipality acting in its own interest. (Certainly, 
there is some evidence that Hungarian municipalities have rejected PPP projects on the 
basis of cost and have gone ahead with other models of ﬁnancing/operation in order 
implement their projects). In other words, a large risk facing a Hungarian municipality 
is that assuming a PPP obligation will be one and a half to two times more expensive 
than standard bank or bond ﬁnancing. For this reason, when municipalities compare 
the all-inclusive cost of PPPs versus simple borrowing and oﬀering an operational 
concession, the latter wins, and PPP arrangements are routinely rejected by the more 
sophisticated municipalities. 
Finally, the value-for-money analysis skills of the public sector are usually lacking 
in Hungary. Despite guidelines on discount rates to use when comparing net present 
values, this aspect of analysis is not well documented nor well supported by method-
ological guidelines or handbooks. Given the sensitive nature and complication of these 
calculations that assume certain cost and revenue trends will continue for the next 15–30 
years, municipalities at least conduct this analysis in the simplest of terms, attempting to 
use the lowest possible cost of borrowed funds and assuming a fully-owned municipal 
enterprise to make the comparison. 
The most important lesson from the Veszprém sport arena is the importance of 
continuity at the stakeholder level, and an agreement on the acceptable cost, and the 
ultimate goal to be achieved. A second important lesson is, that in a tendering situa-
tion, if there is only one winner, that winner will attempt to maximize his position, 
even though tendering documents were clear about total cost expectations. According 
to several stakeholders, the current HUF nine billion option was not optimal either. 
In other words, the solution selected was better than any of the PPP options reviewed, 
but suboptimal were the city to start from a blank slate. 
Finally, given that unlike the state, the city of Veszprém and others like it are cred-
itworthy, their motivation should be value for money above all. This goal was not met 
given the detour into subsidized PPP schemes proposed at the state level. For countries 
where an agent of the state, represented most likely by the Ministry of Finance, is deeply 
involved in debt decisions, some standard for evaluating, ranking, and approving PPP 
projects should be explicitly developed. The ﬁnancial sector, as the Veszprém case shows, 
will work very closely with the public partner to “outwit” the formal constraints of a 
regulated PPP process, and the emphasis should switch to projects that are sustainable 
in every sense, and are not primarily motivated by rent seeking (getting a partial state 
subsidy) or by avoidance of state debt restrictions (the usual justiﬁcation at the state 
level for PPP versus traditional ﬁnancing).  
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NOTES
1 Mr. László Németh, Operations Clerk, Veszprém City, Urban Development and Communal 
Services Department.
2 These are: “New Decision of Eurostat on Deﬁcit and Debt: Treatment of Public-Private 
Partnerships.” In Eurostat News Release, 18/2004 and “ESA 95 Manual on Government 
Deﬁcit and Debt—Long Term Contracts between Government Units and Non-government 
Partners.” The 2008 version of the Hungarian Economics Ministry’s Guidance Document 
covers the issue of ESA 95 reporting, debt and deﬁcit implications of PPP projects at the 
central level.
3 The Interministerial Committee was disbanded by a government decree on October 1, 
2009. All of its functions were transferred to a new unit within the Ministry of Finance. At 
this point in time (January 2010), it is not apparent why this move was made, nor how the 
procedures will change, nor how evaluations of new PPP projects would be aﬀected.
4 As indicated previously, the functions of the committee have been assumed by a section in 
the Ministry of Finance as of October 1, 2009.
5 In regulatory environments like the former Yugoslav states of Serbia or Macedonia, where 
ministry, cabinet, or other approval is required for a municipal commitment of funds or for 
borrowing, the guidelines are particularly useful.
6 Attempts by the national government to build sports facilities, swimming pools, etc., on 
a joint venture basis with municipalities has been met with much resistance on the part of 
municipalities, who realized that their healthy borrowing capacity allowed them to complete 
such investments at a lower cost, than if they sign service contracts under a PPP scheme 
that ties up a portion of the budget for 15–20 years.
7 Budget deﬁcits for operational costs are not allowed at the municipal level (but exist in 
disguised forms). Capital investments may be ﬁnanced from bond sales or bank borrowing, 
and this type of borrowing does not need any approval from the national level (unless a 
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sovereign guarantee is requested). Rumors of restrictions on municipal borrowing in late 2007 
led to a boom in bond issues, where the bond debt of municipalities essentially doubled in six 
months. By all measures the municipal sector is far from reaching its maximum borrowing 
capacity, and this type of “preemptive borrowing” is expected to continue in the prevailing 
uncertain regulatory environment in 2008.
8 The M6 motorway (Budapest to Pécs) project received the “PPP of the Year, 2007” award 
from PFI Magazine. Despite such press, the project has been criticized for excessive cost 
(tunnels bored into low hills, too many viaducts) and a rather secretive set of feasibility 
studies. The discount rates and other assumptions used to model the PPP approach versus 
the public sector comparator may have distorted the results. The underlying calculations 
remain secret, which is not a good precedent.
9 Available online: http://www.veszpremarena.hu.
10 Comments made during a telephone interview with Judit Szöllőssy, Secretariat of the PPP 
Committee, Budapest, September 2008.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper describes the framework of public-private partnerships under which public services 
and utility projects can be carried out in Poland. 
Encouraged by the principles of the European Commission’s Guidelines for Successful 
Public-private Partnerships published in 2003, and the passing of the Community Law on 
Public Contracts and Concessions in 2004, Poland began to develop its own regulations and 
create a legal regime governing the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
The ﬁrst piece of legislation, the Polish Public Procurement Law, was passed in 2004, 
later accompanied by a trickle of resolutions from the Ministry of Finance and some sectoral 
laws on concessions, public services, and businesses that eventually culminated in the new 
Public-private Partnership Law that came into force in 2009. Unfortunately, due to various 
ﬂaws and shortcomings, a previous law governing PPPs—along with its implementing leg-
islation—was not used at all despite being in force for about three years previously. Only 
the future will tell if the new legislation from 2009 will be the spark needed to accelerate 
PPPs in Poland.
Assumed to alleviate pressures on public debt and local budgets, while usually bringing 
about gains in new infrastructure and efﬁciency in the provision of services, the PPPs in Poland 
illustrated in this paper include the establishment of a water and wastewater management 
company in Gda sk, another joint stock company established to manage the same sector 
in Bielsko-Biała, and two projects for street lighting and underground parking in Krakow. 
These examples can be typiﬁed as the following PPP models: the creation of new entities 
held by the public and private parties (companies with mixed capital), contracting based 
on the Public Procurement Law, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) investments, and concessions. 
An analysis of the Polish market for developing various forms of PPPs based on these 
cases reveals that municipal and network infrastructure projects, along with popular im-
provements to public sports and recreation facilities, and small PPPs under a value of EUR 
10 million make up the bulk of PPP activities. 
Any expansion of these agreements to include healthcare or major infrastructure projects 
in Poland requires more experience in planning, developing, and managing on the part of the 
local, regional, and national government, while some issues need to be resolved regarding 
administrative red tape, mistrust and barriers to implementing PPPs that also safeguard the 
public and private sectors’ interests in a mutually rewarding outcome for all.
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1. EU DOCUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF PPP IN POLAND 
 
1.1 Guidelines for Successful Public-private Partnerships 
The main document of the European Commission on PPPs is the Guidelines for Suc-
cessful Public-Private Partnerships, published in 2003. The document focuses on ﬁve 
areas (EC 2003): 
 1. PPP structures, suitability, and success factors 
 2. legal and regulatory structures 
 3. ﬁnancial and economic implications of PPPs 
 4. integration of grant ﬁnancing and PPP objectives
 5. conception, planning, and implementation of PPPs
The Guidelines place much stock in the private sector’s ability to conduct tasks in 
a manner that eﬀectively ensures eﬃcient management of assets, even in the case of 
traditionally public functions (EC 2003). The European Commission hopes that PPPs 
can play a key role in the development of new member states through a more eﬀective 
use of assets and public funds. The underlying theory is that PPPs will make it possible 
to raise investment funds in an amount unattainable under traditional forms of public 
sector ﬁnancial management, without excessive support from the EU budget or those 
of its member states, and by reducing grant ﬁnancing to an auxiliary role. Finally, by 
adding ﬂexibility to infrastructure development, based on cooperation with the private 
sector, the intent is to decouple as far as possible public infrastructure investment from 
EU budgetary cycles. 
The applicability to the situation in Poland of the European Commission’s desire 
for public authorities to cooperate more openly with strong private sectoral actors is 
clear, as the need continues to be great for investment in sectors that are crucial to eco-
nomic development (in particular, the transportation, energy, water and wastewater, 
and telecommunication sectors) as well as in social infrastructure, in particular health 
care, education, and public safety. 
 
1.2 The Green Paper and Community Law on Public Contracts 
 and Concessions 
The Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions of April 30, 2004 does not 
lay down any special rules governing PPPs. However, any act, whether contractual or 
unilateral, whereby a public entity entrusts the provision of an economic activity to a 
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third party, must be examined with respect to the rules and principles resulting from 
the Lisbon Treaty. Of particular importance are the principles of freedom of establish-
ment and freedom to provide services, which encompass in particular the principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, proportionality, and mutual recognition (EC 2004). The 
Green Paper draws the distinction between: 
 i) PPPs of a purely contractual nature, in which the partnership between the 
public and private sectors is based solely on contractual links, and
 ii) PPPs of an institutional nature, involving cooperation between the public and 
private sectors within a distinct entity (EC 2004). 
Under the contractual partnership, two basic models can be distinguished: 
  The concession model, characterized by a direct link between the private 
partner and the ﬁnal user: the private partner provides a service to the public, 
“in place,” though under the control of, the public partner. Another feature 
is the method of remuneration for the joint contractor, which comprises user 
charges, if necessary supplemented by subsidies from public authorities. In this 
model, the act of awarding the contract is deﬁned as a “concession.” 
  A private partner carries out and administers an infrastructure for the public 
authority. In this model, the remuneration for the private partner does not take 
the form of user charges, but of regular payments by the public partner. These 
payments may be ﬁxed or variable, for example, calculated based on the avail-
ability or level of use of the works or related services. In this model the act of 
awarding the contract is deﬁned as a “public contract” (Ministry of Economy 
2007).
Institutionalized PPPs involve the establishment of an entity held jointly by the public 
party and the private partner. The joint entity is tasked with ensuring the delivery of a 
work or service for public beneﬁt. In member states, public authorities sometimes have 
recourse to such structures, in particular, to administer public services at the local level 
(for example, for water supply or solid waste collection services). An institutionalized PPP 
can be put in place, either by creating an entity held jointly by the public sector and the 
private sector, or by the private sector taking control of an existing public undertaking. 
The PPP models described in the Green Paper are generally present in Poland, in 
particular, referring to concessions and public contracts. The Polish Public Procurement 
Law concerning the selection of a private partner follows the approach recommended 
in the Green Paper, which in particular refers to the competitive dialogue procedure, 
introduced into Polish law in 2007. 
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2. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM IN POLAND 
As Polish society and its economy develop, local governments face increasingly complex 
tasks. Local governments are the primary focus in this study beause they are assigned an 
increasingly greater range of public tasks that are not always covered by commensurate 
funding. This results not only in a decrease of resources available for spending on capital 
investment projects, but also the necessity to eﬃciently use available resources for the 
implementation of these new tasks. Local governments, charged with performing public 
tasks, at times without adequate funding, and at the same time needing to comply with 
environmental protection regulations on solid waste management, water quality, and 
wastewater management, are forced to increase public debt to ﬁnance these tasks and 
investments (Ministry of Economy 2007).
 
2.1 Deﬁcit and Public Debt 
Given that PPPs are intended to relieve pressure on public budgets (they would not be 
counted as a part of public debt) and the aforementioned increase in local government 
tasks without commensurate ﬁnancing, it is instructive to brieﬂy examine public debt 
in Poland. 
The deﬁcit and public debt of national and local government institutions in the 
period from 2004 to 2007 are presented in Table 1, below. 
 
Table 4.1
Public Debt in Poland, 2004–2008 (PLN million)
Speciﬁcation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 924,538 983,302 1,060,031 1,175,266 1,271,715 
Deficit of state government and 
local government institutions sector 
52,685 42,358 41,131 22,131 49,537
Percent GDP 5.7 4.3 3.9 1.9 3.9 
Debt of state government and local 
government institutions sector 
422,386 462,742 505,149 527,520 598,402
Percent GDP 45.7 47.1 47.7 44.9 47.1 
Moreover, according to the forecast of the Ministry of Finance, the deﬁcit of this 
sector in 2009 will amount to 6.3 percent of GDP, while public debt will amount to 
51.2 percent of GDP (Main Statistical Oﬃce 2008).
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2.1.1 Situation of Local Government Units (LGUs) 
The data in this section present the status of the local government sector in recent 
years with particular consideration to liabilities and investments. The indebtedness of 
local government units, that is, municipalities (gmina), counties (poviat), county-status 
cities, and provinces (voivodships) is presented in Table 2, below (Main Statistical 
Oﬃce 2008). 
Table 4.2
Total Local Government Debt (PLN million)
Year Total
2003 17,277
2004 19,105
2005 21,181
2006 24,949
2007 25,876
2008 33,897
  Source: Ministry of Finance 2009.
 
In 2008, the total amount of liabilities of LGUs had increased 31 percent since 
2007 and 36 percent since 2006. 
 
2.2 Public Investment 
 
Public sector investment in Poland continues to grow at a dramatic pace. In the 
2003–2008 period, the total investment outlays of the Polish public sector increased 
(see Table 3).
The increasing ﬁnancial obligations of the public sector, coupled with regulations 
and restrictions on public debt (total debt is limited to 55 percent of budget revenues 
and total debt service is limited to 15 percent of budget revenues), reduce local govern-
ments’ creditworthiness and thus its ability to use debt instruments (such as loans and 
bonds) for ﬁnancing. In Poland, EU structural funds may help (presently available for 
the budget period of 2007–2013). 
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Table 4.3
Public Sector Investment (PLN million)
Year Total
2003 35,197
2004 38,433
2005 45,679
2006 52,392
2007 61,415
2008 74,961
  Source: Main Statistical Oﬃce 2009. 
 
But, when used to ﬁnance municipal investments, structural funds require a local 
contribution as part of co-ﬁnancing. Moreover, if an investment project is co-ﬁnanced 
from structural funds, in principle it is ﬁnanced up-front by local governments, which 
are later reimbursed (usually upon completion of the project). This requires that a local 
government, as investor, have funds available even before a project is initiated. Thus, 
while large (structural) funds are available, local governments may not have adequate 
creditworthiness or available funds to implement them. These circumstances mean 
that the ﬁnancing for this “own contribution” may be lacking, which in turn makes it 
impossible to obtain structural funds for infrastructure development projects in Polish 
municipalities (Ministry of Economy 2007).
2.3 Beginnings of PPP 
The ﬁrst investments involving private capital in Poland were completed in the 1990s. 
In 1994, the Public Procurement Act came into eﬀect, under which “public entities” 
contracted construction works and services provided by private parties (entrepreneurs). 
The act did not include any provisions on concessions and did not fully comply with 
EU regulations on public procurement. After Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, 
the Public Procurement Act was replaced by another law on public procurement—the 
Law on Public Procurement, which has been amended several times in order to comply 
with EU regulations. The relevant provisions of this law are discussed below. Contract-
ing public services (“service contracts”) as a form of PPP is popular in Poland, while 
infrastructure operations and maintenance contracts are less common and usually ac-
company other PPP forms, for example, municipal infrastructure lease agreements and 
new entities held jointly by public and private sectors (companies with “mixed capital”). 
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Until 2005 (when the ﬁrst version of the Public-private Partnership Law came into 
eﬀect) there had been no speciﬁc regulations on the public-private partnership formula. 
Despite this, several major, PPP-type projects were completed in Poland (apart from the 
very common public contracts) based on provisions in the Civil Code and the Public 
Procurement Law with respect to the selection of contractors. The general conclusion 
for Poland, however, is that the low number of investments carried out under PPP sug-
gests that it is not a popular method of public services delivery. 
3. CURRENT PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LAW IN POLAND 
3.1 Legislation Directly Referring to PPP 
 
In general, the PPP regulations in Poland can be divided into two groups: legislation 
directly referring to PPP and legislation indirectly related to PPP. Those directly referring 
to PPP are the following:
  The Law on Public-private Partnership was introduced on December 19, 2008 
and came into force in February 2009. 
  Executive resolutions (implementing legislation)
  — Resolution of the Minister of Economy of June 9, 2006 on the scope, forms, 
and principles of preparing information on PPP contracts (Journal of Laws 
July 13, 2006) 
  — Resolution of the Minister of Finance of June 30, 2006 on the required 
elements of an analysis of a PPP project (Journal of Laws July 13, 2006) 
  — Resolution of the Minister of Economy of June 21, 2006 on the risks related 
to implementing projects under PPP (Journal of Laws July 13, 2006). 
3.2 Legislation Indirectly Related to PPP 
Such regulations play a complementary role to the Law on PPP. As of August 2008, 
these included: 
  The Public Procurement Law of January 29, 2004 (Journal of Laws No. 19, item 
177, as amended) in the scope that it aﬀects the process of selecting partners 
and concluding PPP contracts. 
  The Law on Concessions for Works or Services. 
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  The Public System Law in the scope that refers to authorizing public institu-
tions to conclude PPP contracts and set up legal and policy acts that also have 
an impact on the criteria for selection of a private partner and ﬁnal contents of 
PPP contracts. 
  The Budgetary Law, which deﬁnes the total maximum amount of ﬁnancial 
obligations due to PPPs up to which government bodies are allowed to incur 
(public debt). 
  The Civil Code—since the Polish legislature placed the entire PPP system in 
the domestic civil law system, regulations of this act have a key importance for 
the development and performance of obligations of the parties under the PPP 
contract. The new Law on PPP uses the Civil Code as its main point of regula-
tory reference. 
  The Commercial Companies Code in the scope necessary for creating a frame-
work for “mixed capital companies” (project companies) set up in order to 
implement PPP contracts. 
  Speciﬁc sectoral regulations referring to individual public tasks completed 
under PPP.
  Documents of the European Commission referring to PPPs. 
4. THE POLISH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LAW OF 2009
This section discusses the main components of the Polish Law on PPP of 2009. The 
law was passed in order to address the signiﬁcant shortcomings of the previous law. 
The previous law, long overdue and essentially toothless due to a lack of implementing 
legislation for a signiﬁcant period, was highly criticized for requiring huge outlays for 
studies and other preparatory works. As a result, no PPPs were registered under the 
rules of the previous law. While some PPP activity did take place—in particular, in 
the provision of municipal services such as water supply, solid waste collection, and 
recreation—examples were very few and were done outside the PPP structure and thus 
unregistered. One of the motivations for PPPs evident in other countries—public debt 
limits—has not been evident in Poland. 
4.1 General Provisions
The Law on Public-private Partnership was introduced on December 19, 2008 and 
came into force in February 2009. The law is intended to serve as “the foundation 
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for a new era of development in Poland,” help to de-monopolize operations of public 
administration by enabling commercial entities to take over certain public tasks, and 
enable more eﬃcient operation of public administration by providing better quality 
services to citizens at a lower cost to the government. 
The new law sets out ﬁve principles, namely: 
 1. freedom of partnership between public and private entities;
 2. protection of important public interests;
 3. protection of justiﬁed private interests;
 4. protection of public debt;
 5. compliance with EU law.
The new law contains much less detail than the previous version and is designed 
to provide only a framework, avoid creation of unnecessary provisions, and apply only 
proven legal solutions contained, inter alia, in commercial and civil law. It has also 
been designed to provide as much space as possible for both parties to craft approaches, 
particularly concerning contracts, that meet their needs.
4.1.1 What Is a PPP? 
The law deﬁnes a PPP as “joint completion of an undertaking based on division of tasks 
and risks between the public entity and private partner” (Article 1[2], 2[4]). The deﬁni-
tion of an undertaking is very broad, as it is based on concepts set out in civil law. The 
law does not limit the scope of PPPs to investment tasks, but accepts any public task 
as an eligible PPP, provided that public interest is shown to beneﬁt. Parties to the PPP 
enjoy freedom of contract based on binding law in Poland as well as to good practices 
and procedural models.
4.1.2 Participants of PPP
Under the Law on PPP, a public entity is that which is required to use the Public 
Procurement Law (Article 2[1], 2[2]). Because the list of contracting authorities also 
includes categories of private partners that are required to apply public procurement 
regulations, the catalogue of “public entities” is narrower and covers only these categories 
that deﬁnitely belong to the public sphere. Accordingly, under the Law on PPP, public 
entities are:
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  public ﬁnance sector units, as provided under public ﬁnance regulations;
  other state organizational units without status of a legal person;
  other legal persons established for the speciﬁc purpose of meeting public non-
industrial and non-commercial needs, if public entities:
  — provide more than 50 percent of ﬁnancing, or
  — hold more than a half of shares, or
  — supervise their managing bodies, or 
  — have the right to appoint over a half of their supervising or managing bodies; or
  — associations of the aforementioned entities.
Private partners include entrepreneurs, including foreign ones, deﬁned by the Law 
on the Freedom of Business Activity. The Law on PPP requires only that a private partner 
be authorized to conduct business activity in Poland. 
4.1.3 Own Contributions, Undertakings, and Assets
A public entity or private partner makes an own contribution by:
  incurring a portion of expenditures on an undertaking, including ﬁnancing a 
supplement to services provided by the private partner under the project; 
  contributing an asset (Article 2[3], 2[4], 2[5]).
The law makes extensive use of civil law concepts and deﬁnes an undertaking very 
broadly as one or more of the following activities associated with operating, maintain-
ing, or managing an asset that is the subject of or related to:
  constructing a building;
  providing services;
  performing work, particularly furnishing an asset with equipment that enhances 
its value or utility;
  other services or contributions not mentioned above.
In deﬁning an asset, the Law on PPP uses terminology from Civil Law. The broad 
deﬁnition of an “asset” makes it easier to adjust the duties of the PPP contract parties 
to concrete situations. Assets that can serve as an own contribution in a PPP include 
real estate, enterprises, buildings and structures, other permanent facilities, chattel, and 
property rights.
126
P U B L I C - P R I V A T E  PA R T N E R S H I P S :  S U C C E S S E S  A N D  F A I L U R E S
4.1.4 Selection and remuneration of a private partner
If remuneration of a private partner comes exclusively from a public entity, the private 
partner should be selected based on the Public Procurement Law (Article 4, 5, and 10). 
The law identiﬁes competitive dialogue as the most appropriate selection procedure. If, 
however, remuneration of a private partner stems from the right to derive beneﬁts from 
the partnership or this right and payment of a deﬁned amount of money, the private 
partner should be selected based on the Law on Concessions of December 9, 2009, 
with consideration toward the provisions of the Law on PPP.
If the PPP contract is terminated before the expiration of its term, the public entity 
either selects another private partner or completes the undertaking in a manner other 
than PPP. 
4.2 Value for Money
“Value for money” is deﬁned as the total of the criteria used to select the best oﬀer (Article 
6). Because in the case of a PPP price cannot be the sole selection criterion, the law sets 
out a list of criteria (both mandatory and optional) to be used to select the best oﬀer.
  Mandatory criteria:
  — distribution of tasks and risks between the private partner and public entity;
  — deadlines for completion and amounts of payments or other beneﬁts from 
the public entity (if planned).
  Optional (in particular) criteria:
  — distribution of proﬁts between the public entity and private partner;
  — ratio of the public entity’s own contribution to the private partner’s own 
contribution; 
  — eﬀectiveness of project completion, including the eﬀectiveness of use of assets;
  — quality, functionality, technical parameters, proposed technology level, 
maintenance costs, service.
4.3 Umbrella PPP Agreement
The PPP contract is an umbrella agreement (Articles 7 and 13). It is based on a:
  private partner undertakes the obligation to complete the project in exchange 
for payment and fully or partially to incur outlays for its completion or to cause 
a third party to incur the project expenses;
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  public entity makes an obligation to cooperate in order to achieve the objective 
of the undertaking by, in particular, making an in-kind contribution;
  each party incurs a portion of the project’s risk.
The remuneration of the private partner depends on the actual utilization or acces-
sibility of the object of the PPP. 
Individual obligations under a PPP contract can be expressed in forms allowed under 
the existing provisions of the Civil Code. The law interferes little in the contents of a 
PPP contract, stipulating that the contract should deﬁne the consequences of non- or 
incomplete performance of an obligation, in particular, contractual fees or a reduction 
of the private partner’s (or project company’s) remuneration. 
The law prohibits changing the contents of the PPP contract in relation to the 
contents of the proposal, based on which a private partner was selected, except for cir-
cumstances that could not have been foreseen at the moment of concluding the contract. 
4.3.1 Own Contributions of Parties
Own contributions of the parties in the form of assets can be made as sales, lending, 
right of use, rent, or lease (Article 9). If the asset contributed by the public entity is 
utilized by the private partner in a manner that obviously contradicts its purpose set out 
in the PPP contract, the private partner (or a project company) is obligated to return 
the asset to the public entity based on the provisions deﬁned in the PPP contract (or 
in the company articles). 
4.3.2 Project Control
Because the purpose of a partnership usually is to perform public tasks, as an exception 
to the freedom of contract, the new Law on PPP assigns the ongoing right of control 
to the public entity (Article 8). This deviation is meant to ensure that a standard of 
project performance is maintained, particularly concerning public facilities and tasks. 
The detailed procedures for control should be deﬁned in the PPP contract. 
4.3.3 Transfer of Assets upon Termination of Agreement
The law provides that upon the completion of a partnership, the “asset” that was used 
should be returned to the public entity, unless otherwise stipulated in the PPP contract 
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(Articles 11 and 12). The asset should be in an undiminished condition, except for 
wear and tear from proper use. The contract may also provide that the asset should be 
returned to a state or local government legal entity other than the one involved in the 
project or to a company set up by the public entity in order to implement the project. 
The private partner will have—both during the binding period of the PPP contract 
and directly after completion of the partnership—the right of preemption concerning 
the property (real estate) that constituted the public entity’s own contribution to the 
partnership, in the event of its sale. 
4.4 Flexible Forms of PPP
PPPs can be based on a PPP contract itself, or a special “project company” can be 
established in order to complete the project, the purpose and objectives of which are 
deﬁned by the parties to the PPP contract (Articles 14, 15, and 16). Thus, the Law on 
PPP leaves no doubt as to whether project companies constitute PPPs and devotes an 
entire chapter to project companies. Provisions concerning a project company are gener-
ally based on provisions from the Code of Commercial Companies with modiﬁcations 
aimed at the protection of public entities.
4.5 Risks Associated with PPP Undertakings
According to the Law on PPP, the partnership is based on a division of tasks and risks 
between the public entity and private partner. The law does not specify the risks and 
categories of risks, but simply underscores the fact that the partners should jointly carry 
out the undertaking and share the incumbent risks. Thus, the provisions on risk only 
provide a guide, without any speciﬁc regulations deﬁning the position of partners or 
the contract itself connected with this deﬁnition. 
4.6 Financing PPP from the State Budget
The Law on PPP provides that the total amount of ﬁnancial obligations made by public 
entities due to concluding PPP contracts in a given year should be deﬁned in the state 
Budget Law (Articles 17 and 18). The law introduces the requirement on obtaining 
consent of the Minister of Finance on contracts exceeding PLN 100 million (about 
EUR 24 million). Additionally, the Minister of Finance must consider the public 
ﬁnances and public debt in issuing a permit. The period for review of the request for 
consent is set as six weeks.
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4.7 PPP and EU Funds 
The Law on Rules for Implementing Development policy was amended by adding a 
provision that clearly permits co-ﬁnancing of PPP projects using EU funds, which is 
meant to remove any doubts as to whether such ﬁnancing is possible for projects imple-
mented under the PPP formula.
 
4.8 Competitive Dialogue Procedure to Select a Private Partner 
The competitive dialogue procedure was introduced with the Public Procurement Law in 
2007. Under this procedure, upon prior publication of a contract notice, the contracting 
authority conducts a dialogue with selected contractors and then invites them to submit 
bids. The contracting authority may award a contract under competitive dialogue if the 
following conditions are met:
  Award of the public contracts under open or restricted tender procedures is 
not possible. Due to the complexity of the contract, the subject matter of the 
contract cannot be described in accordance with the Public Procurement Law 
requirements, or it is impossible to deﬁne the legal or ﬁnancial conditions for 
performance of the contract.
  Price is not the only criterion for selecting the winning bid.
If the value of a works contract exceeds the equivalent (in PLN) of EUR 20 mil-
lion, and for supplies or services in excess of EUR 10 million, the application of the 
competitive dialogue tender procedures requires prior consent of the president of the 
Public Procurement Oﬃce in the form of an administrative decision. 
Contractors submit their applications for participation in the procedure and are then 
qualiﬁed to enter the next stage of negotiations. The contracting authority immediately 
informs those contractors that meet the procedural conditions and invites them to a 
dialogue. If the number of contractors that meet the criteria for participation in the 
procedure is higher than the number deﬁned in the notice, the contracting authority 
invites only those contractors that received the highest evaluation. The contracting 
authority conducts the dialogue until it is able to deﬁne the solution or solutions that 
meet its needs. 
After declaring the dialogue completed and informing the participants of this fact, 
the contracting authority invites the participants to submit ﬁnal tenders, based on the 
solution/solutions agreed during the dialogue. These tenders should contain all the 
requested elements necessary for execution of the project. Final tenders are evaluated 
by the contracting authority based on the criteria for the award of public contracts 
deﬁned in the tender notice. 
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It is important to note, however, that the new Law on PPP deﬁnes a tender diﬀer-
ently than the Public Procurement Law. According to the Law on PPP, the best bid is 
that which oﬀers the most favorable relationship between the remuneration and other 
criteria relevant to the undertaking, including distribution of tasks and risks between 
the public and private partner as well as deadlines and remuneration or other beneﬁts.
5. PUBLIC WORKS CONCESSIONS 
 
5.1 Concessions in EU Legislation 
Community law provides for the possibility of entrusting other parties with performance 
of public tasks based on concessions. Deﬁnitions of concessions are contained in Direc-
tive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe of March 
31, 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, 
public supply contracts, and public service contracts. In the case of public works con-
tracts, Directive 2004/18/EC regulates in detail the procedure binding the contracting 
authority, aimed at selecting the contractor with whom the contract will be concluded. 
The provisions related to public works concessions are general and limited. First of all, 
Directive 2004/18/EC applies only to those public work concessions where the value 
of the contracts is equal to or greater than EUR 5.15 million (the value changes and is 
calculated in accordance with the rules applicable to public works contracts in Article 
9 of the Directive).1
In the case of the award of public works concessions, the contracting authorities 
are obligated to apply regulations of Directive 2004/18/EC relating in particular to 
the obligation of publishing notices in the Oﬃcial Journal of the EU, and to deﬁne an 
appropriate time limit for the receipt of requests to participate. Directive 2004/18/EC 
does not regulate the concession procedure, leaving it to the discretion of member states. 
Selection of the concessionaire can be made under the procedures listed in Directive 
2004/18/EC (open, restricted, competitive dialogue, or negotiated procedure with prior 
publication of a contract notice), or any other method provided in national legislation. 
The Directive requires only that the minimum time limit for the receipt of requests 
to participate be kept. This means that in contrast to the rigorous procedures for the 
award of public contracts set out in Directive 2004/18/EC, EU member states enjoy 
considerable freedom in developing domestic regulations on the award of concessions. 
Polish legislation has implemented these rules into its Public Procurement Law. 
Under Polish law, the works concession is, in fact, a form of performing a task using 
mechanisms typical of a public-private partnership. 
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5.2 Concessions in Polish Law 
A public works concession is, in fact, a works contract that diﬀers from the contract in 
that the remuneration of the concessionaire exists either solely in the right to operate 
the work (the constructed facility) or in this right together with payment. The award 
of a concession is not an administrative act and does not constitute privatization of 
public tasks. Public entities continue to be responsible for their execution. Concession 
is a method of carrying out public tasks in which the majority of the economic risk of 
successful execution of an undertaking is transferred onto the private party, in contrast 
to public works contracts, in which the entire economic risk of the successful completion 
of a project is borne by the contracting authorities. Concessions are applied in those 
cases where the beneﬁciaries are third parties, that is, actual users of the eﬀects of the 
concession, and not the contracting authority. 
The concession regulated in the Public Procurement Law, in contrast to other 
available forms of performing public tasks, may be applied exclusively to construction 
works. The Law on Public Works and Services Concessions standardizes the procedures 
in reference to both works and services. 
Similarly as in the case of the public-private partnership, the concession can be 
awarded with the relevant application of the regulations on open procedure, restricted 
procedure, or negotiations with prior publication of a contract notice. The contracting 
authority and the entity awarding the works concession can be, inter alia, the public 
ﬁnance sector bodies, such as municipal, county, and provincial local governments, as 
well as their associations, budgetary units, and budgetary enterprises. 
In selecting the best tenders, apart from the criteria deﬁned in a terms of reference, 
the contracting authority is also allowed to take into consideration subjective criteria 
meant to evaluate contractors speciﬁcally, such as their technical, economic, and ﬁnancial 
capabilities. This is the basic diﬀerence between the procedures deﬁned in the Public-
private Partnership Law that precludes the application of such criteria in the selection 
of a private partner. The solution used for concessions obviously facilitates and makes 
the selection of the right partner more ﬂexible. 
As in the case of performing a task based on the Public-private Partnership Law, 
the remuneration for a contractor holding a works concession consists either solely of 
the right to exploit the work (constructed facility) or this right together with payment.2 
The concession contract should cover a period of time suﬃcient for the contractor to 
recover investment costs. Polish regulations do not require the consent of the president 
of the Public Procurement Oﬃce to enter into such a contract for a period longer than 
three years; the contract, however, should be concluded within a deﬁned period of time. 
Moreover, the concession contract can be concluded for more than three years with-
out meeting the conditions provided in this regard by the Public-private Partnership 
Law, that is, without conducting a relevance analysis with a consideration of the scope 
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of planned outlays and their payback period, the payment capacity of the contracting 
party, and the evaluation as to whether implementation of the contract in the applied 
period of time will result in savings of the project costs compared to the three-year period. 
If the value of a concession is less than the PLN equivalent of EUR 5.15 million, 
the contracting authority is obligated to publish a notice in the Public Procurement Bul-
letin. If the value is equal to or higher than this amount, the contracting authority must 
publish a notice in the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities. In summary, 
it can be concluded that in certain situations, the public works concession can be a 
simpler and more eﬀective form of carrying out a project in public-private partnership. 
Attention, however, should be drawn to the confusion concerning concessions, and 
particularly to the number of laws that refer to concessions. In Poland, particular sources 
of confusion include the Toll Highway Law, which duplicates many regulations of public 
procurement law. At the same time, the government passed the Law on Public Works 
and Public Services Concessions (Law on Concessions), which replaces the concession 
provisions in the Public Procurement Law. 
Despite the fact that the regulations on public work concessions (Polish regulations 
refer to them speciﬁcally as “construction works”) in the Public Procurement Law have 
been in force since 2004, the Polish market for these concessions remains very small. So 
far, the only example of an investment completed under the work concession model is 
an underground parking lot in Krakow (described later). The analysis of the market for 
PPPs, however, shows an increase in interest for this kind of PPP (see also the section 
on the market for PPPs). Since 2007, there have been 18 tender procedures for conces-
sionaires of public investments published. 
One reason for this is the fact that the procedure for awarding works concessions 
provided in the Public Procurement Law is very similar to the rigorous procedures for 
awarding public contracts. In addition, Polish law does not provide for the possibility 
of awarding public service concessions. The new law is intended to unblock the system 
of works concessions and create a new institution—the public service concession. The 
new law contains more ﬂexible regulations covering both institutions in a comprehen-
sive manner. The law replaces chapter 4 of the Law on Public Works Concessions and 
functions next to the new Law on PPP. 
6. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN POLAND 
Despite the fact that a Law on PPP has existed in one form or another in Poland for 
some years, cooperation between private and public partners has developed despite this 
legislation instead of due to it. 
The main forms of cooperation between the public and private partners in the public 
utility sector are as follows: 
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 1. creation of public utilities with mixed capital—mainly in the water and waste-
water sector (project companies or special purpose vehicles);
 2. contracting public utility services is a very common practice (on the basis of 
the Public Procurement Law);
 3. BOT-type investments; 
 4. (construction) works concessions (based on the Public Procurement Law), 
covering mainly municipal investments (in Poland also in the BOT system). 
PPPs are likely to be found in mixed capital companies. While the number of such 
companies is signiﬁcant in Poland, the total comprises just a small percentage of units 
carrying out public tasks. Information on such companies is collected and published 
by the Ministry of the Treasury in the annual document entitled Information on Trans-
formation and Privatization of Communal Property, issued based on Article 69 of the 
Commercialization and Privatization Law of 1996 (as amended). The last issue describes 
the status as of December 31, 2005. The report presents data collected from 94.6 percent 
of local government units. 
The data collected by the ministry enable the monitoring of organizational, struc-
tural, and ownership transformations (privatizations) in the entire public sector of the 
national economy. The report describes organizational and legal forms of public utilities. 
The following table presents these entities by economic sector and types of operation. 
From the table, it follows that mixed capital companies, limited liability, and joint stock 
companies, account for 477 (11 percent) and 151 (12 percent) of total public entities. 
Given that the vast majority of PPPs in Poland are in the water and wastewater 
sector, however, mixed capital companies are not a guarantee that a given approach 
constitutes a PPP. 
Contracting services are the most common method of cooperation between the pri-
vate and public sectors. The selected services are commissioned to private entities, usually 
selected in accordance with the Public Procurement Law for a period of several years. 
 The assessment of the number of public utility contracts is diﬃcult due to com-
monness of such practices and lack of any oﬃcial reports or studies prepared by relevant 
institutions, such as the Main Statistical Oﬃce. Thus, the sources of information on 
PPP include reports and publications of individual municipality or other interested 
organizations, such as law oﬃces. 
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 Table 4.4
Public Utilities by Organizational and Legal Forms (as of the end of 2005)
Speciﬁcation Total Budgetary 
establish-
ments
Budgetary 
units
Budgetary 
entities 
Limited liability 
companies
Joint stock 
companies (S.A.)
1* 2* 3* 1* 2* 3*
Public 
transportation
176 2 5 34 89 13 24 2 - 7
Water and 
wastewater
603 8 20 269 232 33 29 8 1 3
Supply and 
production of heat 
and electricity 
272 1 — 20 158 7 70 5 — 11
Waste disposal 234 3 13 68 80 13 50 3 — 4
Municipal and 
roadside greenery
340 4 276 21 24 1 13 — 1 —
Municipal 
housing mgmt.
676 9 33 266 277 20 66 1 — 4
Other public 
utility services
711 7 230 189 79 13 95 7 8 83
Multibranch 
public utility entities 
663 8 25 315 227 20 66 — — 2
Social services 410 — 299 63 25 3 15 2 1 2
Non-public 
utility entities 
135 2 1 2 40 5 49 1 — 35
Total 4,173 44 902  1,247 1,231 128 477 29 11 151
Source: Ministry of the Treasury (2006). 
Notes: * 1—one-shareholder companies (Ltd., S.A.) 
   2—companies owned by more than one local government (Ltd., S.A.) 
   3—mixed-capital (private and public) companies (Ltd., S.A.) 
 
 In addition, due to Polish regulations, elements that would be found in operating 
contracts for the water and sewerage sector in other countries are included in a number 
of documents required by law, such as: 
  permits;
  service regulations for providing water and collecting wastewater;
  multiyear investment plan;
  ordinance of the minister of construction on setting tariﬀs.
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For this reason, most municipalities and water and sewerage utilities do not prepare 
additional operating contracts, as they consider the foregoing documents to be suﬃcient 
to govern the relationship. Only the privatization of services necessitates a more precise 
deﬁnition of elements not governed in the aforementioned documents. 
 
6.1 Water and Wastewater Sector 
6.1.1 Establishment of the Water and Wastewater Management Company 
  in Gdańsk 
This venture is considered the ﬁrst project in Poland, and possibly in all of Central 
and Eastern Europe, implemented under PPP. This case combines a few PPP models: 
service contract, operation and maintenance contract, leasing and privatization. It 
involves establishing a company with mixed—private and public—capital, in eﬀect a 
project company. 
 
Table 4.5
Summary of Saur Neptun Gdańsk S.A.
Name of the project Saur Neptun Gdan´sk S.A. (Joint Stock Company)—SNG
Purpose of the undertaking Provision of water and wastewater services for residents of Gdańsk, 
Sopot, and neighboring municipalities
Selection of the private 
partner 
Negotiations between the parties 
Participants The city of Gdańsk and Saur—an international public utility group 
Organizational and legal 
PPP model 
Service contract, operation and maintenance contract, leasing of 
infrastructure 
Sector of the economy Water and wastewater management
Year of contract conclusion 1992
Financing The public entity finances investment—100 percent, the private 
partner pays a leasing fee and operates the infrastructure by 
providing water supply and wastewater disposal services based on 
agreements with the municipalities of Gdańsk and Sopot.
Model of cooperation 
 
Establishment of the mixed capital company: 51 percent—Saur and 
49 percent—the city of Gdańsk 
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Management structure/
cooperation principles 
 
The contract on operating the water network and waterworks 
equipment, and wastewater network, including wastewater pumping 
stations and water intake stations was concluded for 30 years. 
The public sector is responsible for investments in the storm water 
system, while the private partner is responsible for operations of the 
wastewater system, coordination of the investments (pays the leasing 
fee). User fees collected from residents comprise two components: 
operating fee (for SNG) and fixed fee (lease)—paid to the city budget 
and designated for asset rehabilitation. After an amendment to the 
contract in 2005, the fixed fee is paid to a new, municipally-owned 
company Gdańska Infrastruktura Wodociągowo-Kanalizacyjna 
(GIWK) (Gdańsk Water and Wastewater Network Infrastructure). 
GIWK took over the infrastructure and the responsibility for investment 
planning and financing. The city makes decisions on tariffs and controls 
the services provided by SNG; while SNG leases the infrastructure from 
the city, is responsible for the quality of services, customer relations, as 
well as maintenance and repair of the infrastructure. 
Source: SNG 2009.
Figure 4.1
Cooperation Schedule— Saur Neptun Gdańsk S.A.
Source: SNG 2009.
Municipality of Gdan´sk
49% of shares 100% of equity
51% of shares
Saur International
Joint Venture Company
“Saur Neptun Gdan´sk”
Operator of Water 
and Wastewater 
Infrastructure
Asset Holding Company
“Gdan´ska Infrastruktura 
Wodociagowo 
Kanalizacyjna”Payments for using the water 
and wastewater infrastructure
Water and wastewater 
services; service 
quality, client relations, 
maintenance, and repairs 
of infrastructure 
Investments 
(ﬁnancing and planning)
Contract on operating 
water and wastewater 
infrastructure; decision on 
tariffs; control of services
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The agreement between Gdańsk and Saur Neptun was signed in 1992. It was the 
ﬁrst PPP in water supply and sewer services in Poland. Gdańsk retains ownership of 
infrastructure (and is responsible for capital investments), while Saur Neptun is the 
operator and is responsible for coordinating the investment process (French PPP 
model). Shares in Saur Neptun belong to Saur (51 percent) and the city of Gdańsk (49 
percent). Currently, Saur Neptun provides services for a half million inhabitants from 
Gdańsk (and the nearby city of Sopot). Tariﬀs comprise two parts: an operating fee (for 
Saur Neptun) and a fee for modernization and capital investments (transferred to the 
municipal budget). The contract was signed for 30 years. 
 
. 
6.1.2 Aqua–Bielsko-Biała—First Water and Wastewater Joint Stock 
  Company
In the Bielsko-Biała, the water and wastewater services are provided by AQUA S.A. 
The origins of the company are related to privatization and ownership transformation. 
The ﬁrm is the ﬁrst water and wastewater company in Poland to be transformed into a 
joint stock company. Provision of public utility services is based on the management, 
operations and maintenance contracts and leasing agreement. 
 
 Table 4.6
Summary of Aqua S.A.
Name of the project AQUA S.A. 
Purpose of the undertaking The water and wastewater management in Bielsko-Biała and 14 
other municipalities of the Podbeskidzie region. The main activity 
of Aqua S.A. is the provision of water and wastewater services. 
They include: operating of water and wastewater facilities and 
installations, water intake, treatment and supply to the residents 
of the following municipalities: Bielsko-Biała, Szczyrk, Kęty, 
Wilamowice, and communes: Buczkowice, Jasienica, Jaworze, Kozy, 
Porąbka, Wilkowice, Andrychów, Bestwina, Chybie, Czechowice-
Dziedzice. The company provides also bulk water supply to the 
following municipalities: Andrychów, Czechowice-Dziedzice, Kęty, 
and Bestwina. Moreover, Aqua S.A. collects and treats wastewater 
from Bielsko-Biała, Szczyrk, Buczkowice, Wilkowice, Jasienica, and 
Jaworze. 
Selection of the private partner Privatization, ownership transformation 
Participants The city of Bielsko-Biała, other municipalities of the Podbeskidzie 
region 
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Organizational and legal 
PPP model 
Contracts on services, management, operations and maintenance, 
privatization 
Sector of the economy Water and wastewater management 
Year of contract conclusion 1990—beginning of ownership transformations
Financing Investments in the infrastructure are financed only from Aqua S.A.’s 
means, while the city of Bielsko-Biała invests only by purchasing 
stock issues.
Model of cooperation Joint stock company with the following ownership structure: Bielsko-
Biala Municipality—51.06 percent, United Utilities Poland B.V. 
—33.18 percent. The remaining stock (15.06 percent) is owned by 
the municipalities of the Podbeskidzie region and private investors. 
The stock capital as of end of 2005 amounted to about PLN 207 
million and was divided into about 12.9 million shares.
Management structure/
cooperation principles
Aqua S.A. provides water and wastewater services concerning, in 
particular, water treatment and supply in the area of 14 municipalities 
of the Podbeskidzie region, and wastewater collection and treatment 
in six municipalities. Presently, the total population served amounts 
to nearly a quarter million residents. While the main users are 
households, residential co-operatives, the number of public 
institutions and service and production businesses is significant as 
well. 
For its water operations, the company operates water intakes, water 
treatment stations, and networks. For its wastewater operations, the 
company uses wastewater networks and wastewater treatment plants. 
Aqua operates the infrastructure based on the leasing contract. The 
infrastructure is owned by the municipalities. 
The responsibilities for water supply, wastewater treatment, and storm water col-
lection are carried out by the joint stock company Aqua. The company operates in 
Bielsko-Biała (176,000 inhabitants) and nearby municipalities. Altogether, the company 
provides services for 225,000 inhabitants. The sewer system operated by Aqua comprises 
134 kilometers of combined sewers and 70 kilometers of storm sewers. Combined sew-
ers are located mostly in the old city center and are successively replaced with separate 
systems. Aqua is the owner of the infrastructure as well as the operator (British PPP 
model). In 1999, International Water UU Holdings B.V. (currently United Utilities 
(Poland) B.V.) purchased shares in Aqua. The ownership structure is as follows: munici-
pality of Bielsko-Biała (51 percent), United Utilities (Poland) B.V. (33 percent), and 
other shareholders (16 percent) (Aqua 2009). 
139
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  P o l a n d
6.2 Modernization of Street Lighting in Kraków (BOT) 
A BOT-type of PPP, this project involved an investment project for the moderniza-
tion of street lighting of the city of Kraków under the ESCO formula with third-party 
ﬁnancing. A similar investment project was also implemented in the city of Bytom. 
 
Table 4.7
Summary of Krakow Street Lighting BOT
Name of the project Modernization of street lighting in Kraków 
Purpose of the undertaking Modernization of city lighting (excluding the downtown area, which 
is subject to conservation laws). The following tasks were completed 
under the project: replacement of lighting fittings, light sources and 
(to a limited extent) replacement and renovation of the remaining 
elements of the installation (control panels and lighting poles).
Selection of the private partner In accordance with the Public Procurement Law 
Participants City of Kraków, consortium of the companies: Elektrim—ES System 
Krakow 
Organizational and legal model BOT 
Sector of the economy Municipal infrastructure—lighting 
Year of contract conclusion 1998 
Financing The private partner—100 percent of the investment costs 
Model of cooperation Completion, operations, and maintenance contact 
Value of the contract PLN 12.9 million—the base sum of annual payments set aside in the 
city budget for a period of six years (valorized annually) 
Management structure/
cooperation principles 
The contractor of the investment—the consortium Elektrim 
Warszawa—ES System Kraków financed and completed all works 
concerning modernization of the lighting system. 
Upon completion of the modernization works, the consortium 
operated the entire lighting system for six years, which enabled 
it to recover its investment costs from the generated savings. The 
institution responsible for the management of the lighting system is 
the Roads and Transportation Management Company (a municipal 
unit). The contractor received the difference between the valorized 
base amount (secured in the municipal budget) and the actual bills for 
electricity, presented by the Roads and Transportation Management 
Company. Thus, the contractor’s objective was to generate maximum 
possible energy savings and to reduce operating costs. 
The result of the project was a significant improvement of the street 
lighting in Kraków. As reported by the municipality, the operational 
reliability of the installation increased, the use of energy was reduced, 
and the general safety of traffic and movement increased. 
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6.3 Un derground Parking in Krakow—Concession (DBFO) 
The investment project is executed under a works concession. The contractor and the 
operator of the parking lot is a Spanish company—ASCAN Empresa Constructora y 
de Gestion S.A., selected under a tender. Thus, it is an example of DBFO model of 
PPP. In this particular case, the remuneration of the concessionaire is the right to use 
the facility and draw relevant proﬁts. The city of Kraków, based on its positive experi-
ence, plans completion of other municipal investment projects based on awarded works 
concessions. They include another three parking lots. 
In Poland, the market for such contracts has been developing since 2007. Accord-
ing to the document “Information on the Polish Public Contracts Market,” the study 
prepared by the Department of Computerization and System Analyses of the Public 
Procurement Oﬃce, there were ﬁve published notices of this type of contract in Poland 
in 2007 and thirteen in 2008 (up to July 31) (PPO 2009). The popularity of this form 
of cooperation appears to be increasing. 
 
Table 4.8
Summary of Krakow Underground Parking Lot DBFO
Name of the project Underground parking lot—“Na Groblach” Square in Kraków 
Purpose of the undertaking Construction of the underground parking lot (for 600 spots); pulling 
down and reconstruction of the School Sports Center facilities and 
sport fields. 
Private partner selection According to the Public Procurement Law 
Participants The city of Kraków, Ascan Empresa Constructora y de Gestion S.A. 
Organizational and 
formal model 
DBFO 
Economy sector Municipal infrastructure—parking lots 
Year of the contract signing 2006 
Financing The private partner covered 100 percent of investment costs 
Model of cooperation Works concession 
Value of the investment PLN 62.7 million 
Management structure/ 
cooperation rules 
 
The entire cost of investment is covered by the Spanish company, 
which in exchange was granted the right to charge parking fees for a 
period of 70 years. Additionally, the contractor pays the property tax 
and is obligated to renovate all of the streets and pavements around 
the square. The company is experienced in constructing similar 
facilities in historic urban areas. 
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7. MAR KET POTENTIAL FOR PPP 
In 2007 and 2008, two editions of a competition for the best PPP project were conducted 
in Poland (Investment Support 2009). The competitions were organized by the company 
Investment Support and the Ministry of the Economy under the patronage of the Public 
Procurement Oﬃce with the participation of private partners such as Lewiatan (a leading 
organization of Polish employers), a few large banks, and a Polish daily—Rzeczpospolita [Res 
Publica]. The rank of these competitions, and in particular the participation of the Min-
istry of the Economy, provides some insight into the market potential for PPP in Poland. 
PPP projects (submitted in both 2007 and 2008 editions) can be divided into four 
categories: 
  municipal infrastructure (municipal construction, revitalization programs, 
modernization and construction of public facilities);
  network infrastructure (projects in transportation, water and wastewater, and 
energy sectors);
  sports and recreation infrastructure (among others, sports and recreation centers, 
stadiums, sports and event halls);
  small PPPs (projects valued at less then EUR 10 million, regardless of the sector). 
7.1 2008 Edition of Best PPP 
A total of 42 projects of investments proposals for implementation together with private 
partners were submitted for the competition. A Pilot PPP Project Program was imple-
mented under this edition. The number of projects submitted by category is presented 
in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2
Projects Submitted in 2008, by Type
12 or 29% Municipal infrastructure
15 or 35% Sports and 
recreation infrastructure
4 or 10% Network infrastructure
11 or 26% Small PPPs
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 As in 2007, project proposals in the sports and recreation sector were once again 
most popular. These projects included construction of sports and event halls and vari-
ous types of water parks. The municipal infrastructure category included both projects 
from the health protection sector as well as those concerning construction of parking 
lots and revitalization of neighborhoods. The network infrastructure category included 
four transportation projects submitted by local governments. The small PPPs involved 
extension of water mains, construction of the city hall, and modernization of road 
infrastructure. Most submissions came from cities and smaller municipalities, which 
together comprised a total of 22 projects (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3
Local Government Types Submitting PPP Proposals in 2008
 
 
Geographically, most projects continued to be from the more developed regions 
of Poland, with a slight increase in projects from the poorer, eastern part of Poland, 
though still underrepresented. 
8. BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PPP IN POLAND 
In summary, the main barriers to the development of PPP in Poland can be divided 
into two main groups: (i) lack of experience, which gives rise to mistrust and other 
psychological barriers, and (ii) legal barriers, due to the lack of a workable legal frame-
work for PPPs. 
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8.1 Lack of Experience 
According to some experts, lack of experience and fear of the unknown constitute the 
main barrier to PPP development in Poland.3 In Poland, political and social doubts 
remain as to whether private partners can be trusted with public administration tasks. 
One of the most common concerns is the possibility of corruption at the point of con-
tact between private and public interests. Due to a lack of social consent, the need is 
acute for PPP regulations that will both dispel concerns and provide a framework for 
protection, particularly of local governments, from excessive project risk. 
Local governments typically have no professional legal resources at their disposal 
and it is up to municipal employees to assess the risks and beneﬁts of an investment 
project. Engaging consultants in the preparation of economic and legal studies is still 
not widely practiced in Polish local governments; consultants are used primarily to 
prepare applications for co-ﬁnancing from EU funds and supporting documentation, 
as well as technical studies required by law. 
The lack of experience in local government oﬃces coupled with their mistrust of 
businesses mean that local governments are seldom the agents of change in PPP projects. 
But, businesses are also not currently planning pilot projects at the local government 
level. Businesses in Poland remain of the opinion that the ﬁnancial responsibility for 
execution of such projects, especially for novel projects, should lay with government 
authorities. Thus, PPPs should be initiated by local governments since they best know 
the needs of their constituents. 
Local governments’ relatively low level of experience in cooperation with private 
partners results in a low interest in and initiative to undertake PPPs as a form of invest-
ment implementation. In order to disseminate and promote knowledge on PPPs, an 
initiative was created in October 2007 and the Public-private Partnership Center was 
established. An initiative of both private and public partners, the center is intended to be 
an independent civic institution organized by those organizations with the most needs. 
The main stakeholder is the Polish Confederation of Private Employers “Lewiatan,” 
operating in cooperation with several institutions, including other employer organiza-
tions, consulting companies, banks, law ﬁrms, and local government organizations. 
The underlying idea is to create an institution similar to those operating in many other 
European countries, such as Great Britain, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The 
center began operations in the fall of 2008. 
The objective of the PPP center is to facilitate implementation of PPPs in Poland 
by creating conditions that would shorten the time and costs of project preparation, as 
well as promoting the PPP concept. The center also intends to promote investments 
conducted jointly by public and private entities with an aim toward addressing the most 
urgent infrastructural needs such as roads and highways, railway networks, airports, 
local infrastructure, healthcare infrastructure, etc. 
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 The center is also intended to remove obstacles to PPP investments by collecting 
and disseminating the experiences and best practices from countries with successful 
PPPs. The center focuses on serving as a clearinghouse for PPPs, preparing standard 
contracts and procedures, monitoring PPP investments, and proposing amendments to 
applicable regulations. In addition to member contributions, the central government has 
committed to support ﬁnancially the center’s initiatives and the European Investment 
Bank has declared a willingness to provide technical assistance. 
 
8.2 Legal Barriers 
The previous Law on PPP was criticized for: 
  The need to prepare time and capital-intensive analysis before deciding on coop-
eration with a private partner. This obligation is particularly burdensome for 
minor projects and eﬀectively removes the incentive for their implementation. 
  Complicated initial procedures including the restrictive regulations concerning 
the selection of the private partner. 
  Formal and legal barriers, for example, the need to publish a notice on 
the planned undertaking in the Public Procurement Bulletin and the Public 
Information Bulletin. The forms recommended for use in developing a PPP, 
however, do not contain relevant sections on publishing the intent to implement 
a PPP project. Yet, according to the law, the failure to publish such information 
renders the PPP contract invalid. 
  Regulations safeguarding the interests of both parties in the contract are absent. 
  Unnecessary bureaucratic obligations hampering cooperation between local 
governments and businesses. 
Presently, it is not clear how and to what extent the contribution of a private partner 
in the PPP venture can be connected to the budget of an investment to be co-ﬁnanced 
with EU funds. The new law regulates the manner of utilizing resources from structural 
funds in undertakings carried out under PPP. 
Analysts contended that the old Law on PPP was completely unnecessary because 
there was no need for another document that changes a whole array of existing regula-
tions. In response, the new Law on PPP was constructed as a framework document 
and all of the key terms should be included in contracts between the public authorities 
and private partners. The parties to an undertaking enjoy the greatest possible freedom 
concerning the details of cooperation, which should be placed in every contract. Expe-
rience from other countries shows that, when framework regulations are in place and 
psychological barriers are absent due to suﬃcient experience, PPPs develop very well. 
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9. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Poland has apparently taken positive steps toward fostering development of public-private 
partnerships. First, the new Law on PPP replaces a law that, while in force for about 
three years, was eﬀectively invalid due to the lack of any projects implemented under its 
provisions. The new law draws experience from other countries by replacing rigid and 
detailed procedures with framework guidelines. This will undoubtedly draw criticism 
from some proponents of local government, as it may be viewed as providing insuﬃcient 
risk protection for local governments. In addition, while Poland has good examples of 
PPPs in the water and wastewater sector, these examples remain few and far between. 
Second, psychological barriers stemming from a lack of experience are being ad-
dressed with the establishment of the Public-Private Partnership Center, which is 
intended to serve as a clearinghouse of information and best practices on PPPs, while at 
the same time providing technical and ﬁnancial assistance in preparing studies on PPPs. 
These two steps constitute recommendations for other countries, in particular CEE 
countries without a history of public and private cooperation and now developing PPPs. 
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NOTES
1 See both Articles 9 and 56 of the Directive.
2 This is the deﬁnition provided in Directive 2004/18/EC.
3 For example, Piotr Sołtyski, project manager of “Hochtief PPP Solutions” as cited in Jezierska 
(2008). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the past several years, Serbian municipalities have made the ﬁrst tentative steps to introduce 
public-private partnerships to the provision of the local government services. A desperate 
need for new investments in traditionally neglected sectors like public transportation, district 
heating and natural gas supplies, and solid waste management has pushed municipal au-
thorities in Serbia to enter into public-private partnerships and to open their doors for more 
innovative approaches to the traditional forms of public service delivery. However, the number 
of successful public-private projects in Serbia is still quite small relative to the substantial 
need for municipal infrastructure revitalization and an increase in the quality of services.    
Managed under a web of relevant laws on local self-government, utility services, con-
cessions, public procurement, and public enterprises, PPPs currently operating in Serbia 
include contractual PPPs that assign the “the performance of the utility function” to the 
private investor and public-private mixed legal entities (institutionalized PPPs) that perform 
communal/utility services. Although no government agency has yet been established to 
coordinate or advise on the formation PPPs, local governments have been motivated to do 
so by the perceived beneﬁts of supplementing tight public budgets with private ﬁnancing, a 
desire to acquire private sector know-how, and a shift in local governance from an operating 
role to that of organizer, regulator, and supervisor. 
 Serbian local governments are only in the early stages of a process to establish the 
political, legal, and administrative frameworks that will permit and facilitate private sector 
development and public-private partnerships. At the moment, impediments for more vig-
orous private investments in the municipal public services occur mainly within a confusing 
and opaque legal environment and a risky investment market, and are a result of weak or 
incomplete institutional structures, a nonexistent general strategy for the reform of the 
utility enterprises, and the nonexistence of state-administered prices for utility services, etc. 
Moreover, municipalities have been insufﬁciently prepared to effectively manage the differ-
ent aspects and phases of PPP arrangements. 
For its analysis of PPPs in Serbia, this paper draws upon the experiences of the city of 
Belgrade’s struggle with its public transport sector to provide a secure, safe, reliable, and 
clean transportation. Similarly, the city has faced problems with refurbishing and expand-
ing the Vin a landﬁll that handles most of its solid waste, in addition to establishing a large 
PPP to upgrade Belgrade’s water and wastewater network. Two smaller PPPs, the search 
for better parking revenues in the town of Kikinda and the maintenance of the town of 
Smederevska Palanka’s landﬁlls, help to illustrate how PPPs are turning out for smaller 
municipalities than the capital.
The nascent experience of private participation in the Serbian public sector investments 
has revealed that municipal governments so far lack comprehensive experience in project 
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ﬁnancing, structuring, and implementation. Therefore, they need immediate support if 
they are to undertake all the tasks and bear all risks related to soliciting possible partners, 
negotiating and preparing contracts, and maintaining any partnerships. These would involve 
ﬁnancial, legal, administrative, and other areas of public administration.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past several years, Serbian municipalities have made the ﬁrst tentative steps to 
introduce public-private partnerships to the provision of the local government services. 
A desperate need for new investments in traditionally neglected sectors like public 
transportation, district heating and natural gas supplies, and solid waste management 
has pushed municipal authorities in Serbia to enter into public-private partnerships and 
to open their doors for more innovative approaches to the traditional forms of public 
service delivery. However, the number of successful public-private projects in Serbia is 
still quite small relative to the substantial need for municipal infrastructure revitalization 
and an increase in the quality of services. 
 Forms of the PPPs currently operating in Serbia are: 
  Contractual PPPs—in all cases in the form of the “assignment of the performing 
of the utility function” to the private investor, and 
  Public-private mixed legal entities (institutionalized PPPs) that perform 
communal/utility services. 
 
It seems that Serbian local governments are only in the early stages of a process to 
establish the political, legal, and administrative frameworks that will permit and facilitate 
private sector development and public-private partnerships. At the moment, impedi-
ments for more vigorous private investments in municipal public services occur mainly 
within a confusing and opaque legal environment and a risky investment market, and 
are a result of weak or incomplete institutional structures, a nonexistent general strat-
egy for the reform of the utility enterprises, and the nonexistence of state-administered 
prices for utility services, etc. Moreover, municipalities have been insuﬃciently prepared 
to eﬀectively manage the diﬀerent aspects and phases of PPP arrangements. Nascent 
experience of private participation in the Serbian public sector investments revealed that 
municipal governments lack comprehensive experience in project ﬁnancing, structuring, 
and implementation. Therefore, they need immediate support if they are to undertake 
all the tasks and bear all the risks related to soliciting possible partners, negotiating and 
preparing contracts, and maintaining any partnerships. These would involve ﬁnancial, 
legal, administrative, and other areas of public administration. 
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2. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Contractual PPPs, Concessions, and Other Entities
2.1.1 Contractual PPPs 
 
Serbia, like many other Central and Eastern European countries, does not have any gov-
erning laws on public-private partnerships. However, the existing legal framework does 
allow for diﬀerent forms of cooperation between the public and private sector—from 
simple operation and maintenance contracts to the establishment of the institutional 
partnerships in the form of new legal entities. 
 The Republic of Serbia, an autonomous province, or a local self-government, may 
assign the performing of public services to private entities. These may be commercial 
entities (companies), but also other legal entities (nonproﬁt entities), as well as natural 
persons (entrepreneurs). In order for these subjects to be able to perform the above 
activities, it is necessary that the public entity assign the performance of these activities 
to the private entity under a contract, in which the rights and obligations concerning 
the performance of public interest activities are set forth. The aforementioned contract 
sets the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the parties. 
 The Law on Local Self-government (Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 129/07) 
provides for general legal ground on the establishment of PPPs at the local level in Serbia 
by allowing local governments (cities and municipalities) to attribute the execution of 
public services to a legal entity or a natural person through a contract. The Law on Local 
Self-government gives this authority to local autonomous governments, in addition to 
their “classical” power to create public utility enterprises (PUCs) or other organizations 
for the execution of such services. It is obvious that the above provision aims to simply 
present the two options a local autonomous government has regarding the execution 
of a public interest activity: either through a specially created public utility enterprise 
(or institution) or through the creation of a contract with a private investor or mixed 
legal entity established by the city/municipality and private partner. The said law does 
not give any detail as to the procedure for attribution of the municipal services by the 
establishment of the public-private partnerships. 
Activities that represent natural monopolies in Serbia, such as ﬁltration and distri-
bution of potable water, ﬁltration and draining of sewage water, steam and hot water 
production and supply, and tram and trolley bus transportation are utility services to be 
performed exclusively by the public utility companies. As public companies in Serbia 
are the only type of company that may be owned only by public entities (founders of 
the public companies may be only the state, autonomous provinces, and local self-
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governments), in the utility areas that represent natural monopolies, complete or partial 
divestiture (as a sale of assets or shares of a public company to the private sector) is not 
legally possible at the moment. 
However, if the founding of such an enterprise would not be “eﬃcient” for public 
enterprises, the city/municipality may entrust this activity to a private investor. That is, 
local autonomous governments can allow private partners to perform utility services as 
natural monopolies only if the performance of such activities would not be eﬃcient and 
economically sound due to the number of users, level of business activity, or otherwise. 
The Law on Utility Services provides that the municipality stipulates the requirements 
and manner of assigning the performance of utility services. It stipulates in the same 
act how the performance of the activity will be controlled.
By the Law on Utility Services, on the basis of the conducted procedure (public 
competition, tendering, or direct negotiation), an agreement on the assignment of tasks 
has to be reached. It has to be emphasized that the Law on Utility Services allows for 
the exceptional cases when the municipality may assign a private partner to execute 
utility services without a competitive process. The law requires that the special commis-
sion selected by the municipality organize the awarding procedure. This commission 
will examine the submitted oﬀers and will negotiate accordingly. 
The law further provides that a public interest activity may be attributed to such a 
private enterprise for a ﬁve-year period, unless it is attributed to an enterprise that has 
committed itself to invest in the said activity, in which case the attribution shall be for 
a period necessary for return on investments and not more than 25 years. At the end 
of the aforementioned period an enterprise shall have the right to bid under the same 
conditions as other interested enterprises to obtain future attribution of the activity. 
The municipal assembly sets forth the rules and conditions for this competition. When 
assigning public utility services, the state, autonomous province, and/or local govern-
ment are entitled to control the performing of the activity, to determine prices, and to 
otherwise exercise impact over performing of the activity. 
 The relevant provisions of the Law on Utility Services which became law prior to 
the Law on Concessions, includes a period of ﬁve years for the contract, increasing to 
25 years to amortize investments. A tender procedure and an organization to award 
contracts are probably not applicable to PPP transactions, and may indeed (at least as 
they relate to tender procedures) be inapplicable and rendered obsolete by the Law on 
Concessions and the Public Procurement Law, since municipal concessions would be 
awarded under the Law on Concessions and traditional public service procurement 
would be covered by the Law on Public Procurement.
Performing public utility services under the operation and maintenance contract 
of a private operator does not oﬀer the private party the opportunity to autonomously 
engage in or operate activities, that is, without the supervision of the public partner. 
Moreover, in the area of the tariﬀ setting, the operation and maintenance contract 
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gives a limited space for a private partner to inﬂuence criteria for setting the price of 
products or services performed. Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Law on Public Enterprises 
and Performing Activities of Public Interest states that private entities performing the 
public services would have the same duties and responsibilities in the performing of 
public service, as a public enterprise or public institution. That provision implies that in 
the area of the tariﬀ setting, the city/municipality (and also the government of Serbia) 
will retain the right to approve a private partner’s price change. Even when there exists 
a direct link in the PPPs between the private partner and the ﬁnal user (for example, 
the Belgrade public transportation case), and the private partner provides a service to 
the public, the city/municipality retains the right to control the level of charges levied 
on the users of the service. If necessary these charges can be supplemented by subsidies. 
As already mentioned, award of the operation and maintenance contract should be 
performed in compliance with the Law on Public Procurement. This Law sets a legal 
framework of public services attribution for private investors seeking to reduce the pos-
sible procurement risks for procuring entities (including local governments) such as a 
lack of technical capacities and skills, which they may encounter. The objective of the 
law is also to ensure competition, transparency, and to prevent abuse when disposing 
with funds from public revenues. 
The Law on Public Procurement sets a very detailed procedure for the procure-
ment of services. The attribution of contracts for public procurement of the services 
may be done according to three methods: open procedure, restricted procedure, and 
direct negotiation. The main characteristics of the open procedure is that all interested 
parties may participate, without the previous selection of only certain entities and an 
advertisement with an invitation to tender must be published in the Oﬃcial Gazette. The 
restricted procedure includes a two-phase procedure, the ﬁrst phase being the prequali-
ﬁcation phase. According to the Law on Public Procurement, such procedure may be 
applied only where the object of the public procurement are either goods, services or 
construction works which can be performed by only a limited number of bidders with 
adequate technical, human, and ﬁnancial resources. It should be noted that the Law on 
Public Procurement sets some preconditions for the awarding of a public procurement 
contract. The procurement should have been previously included in the program of 
public procurements and funds for the procurement should have been allocated in the 
budget of the city or municipality. 
2.1.2 Concessions 
There are no public-private partnerships on the national level in Serbia. The most impor-
tant reason for this is because of a highly complicated and extremely lengthy concessions 
contractual procedure. For instance, the government of the Republic of Serbia is required 
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to make a decision on a concession proposal within three months. After that, the line 
ministry has six months to prepare and submit a draft concession act to the government. 
So, from the moment a concession contract initiative is conceived to the moment a tender 
procedure is started, anywhere between one year (best case scenario) to two years, can 
pass before a decision is reached. Local governments ﬁnd the complexity of concession 
procedures to be insurmountable hindrances. This goes even for cities that have highly 
developed technical, material, and professional resources, including Belgrade. That is 
why the concession procedure for the landﬁll in Vina lasted, with interruptions, for 
more than three years, until it was suspended until further notice.
 
2.1.3 Mixed Legal Entities 
 
Bearing in mind that Serbia still has not begun the process of privatizing its utility 
companies, the existing legal framework is not very supportive of institutional PPPs at 
the local level. According to the Law on Utility Activities, a public enterprise, which 
performs utility functions, can be sold (privatized) only up to 49 percent of its capital. 
However, public enterprises that perform ﬁltration and distribution of potable water, 
ﬁltration and diverting of sewage, steam and hot water production, and supply tram 
and trolley bus transportation may not be privatized, even partially. The said provision 
is not at all a limiting factor for the introduction of the private sector to the activities of 
public utility enterprises through privatization in the sectors that do not represent private 
monopolies. Still, it is not clear whether a private partner has the right to additionally 
invest in the enterprise and to consequently increase its share in it. 
 
 
2.2 Government Management and Control of Public-private 
 Partnerships 
 
As previously explained, Serbia still does not have a law on public-private partnerships. 
The previous government of Serbia had a very ambitious plan to establish a unit of 
government for public-private partnerships within the Ministry of Finance. This unit 
was seen as the very ﬁrst step towards the establishment of a “special purpose author-
ity” to be charged with overseeing the implementation of public-private partnerships. 
The unit would be given special authority to assume the responsibility of acting as a 
liaison between all parties, including other government departments, to organize and 
execute planning and feasibility studies and conceptual design frameworks, to establish 
ﬁnancial demand models, and to negotiate with development banks and other potential 
funders. It remains to be seen whether the incumbent government will continue in the 
same direction. 
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At the moment, the government has a very limited ad-hoc role in the process of the 
establishment of the public-private partnerships at the local level. Moreover, if public-
private partnerships are organized as “operation and management contracts,” then the 
role of the state does not exist at all. In the concession agreements and in partial priva-
tization contracts (the establishment of the new business venture or selling the state 
capital of the local utility company), the government has to be consulted, and needs to 
approve the transaction. Namely, each sale of assets or shares of a state-owned entity has 
to be approved by the Serbian government. Only the government has the authority to 
decide on the acquisition and sale of the shares of state owned enterprises (state capital 
in public enterprises). All contracts signed contrary to the provisions of this article are 
null and void. However, after approval of the partial divestiture, the government has 
no mandate to oversee the implementation of the PPP agreement. 
The Serbian government’s role is the most important in the concessions agreement 
awarding process. This notion is still theoretical as there are no operational concession 
agreements at the local level so far. The Serbian Law on Concessions sets forth the re-
sponsibility of the government to oversee the awarding, implementation, and operation 
of the PPP contracts. However, as already mentioned, Serbia still does not have imple-
mentation agencies charged with the sole responsibility of overseeing PPP concessions 
(and probably even contractual PPPs). It seems this is an urgent need in Serbia, where 
institutions are still fragile, the level of corruption is rather high, the infrastructure 
investment market is still considered risky, and comprehensive experience in project 
ﬁnancing, structuring, and implementation do not exist. 
3. MONITORING AND EVALUATION—LESSONS LEARNED 
3.1 Assessment Techniques
Rapid urbanization and growing demand has increased the need for investment in 
infrastructure development in the Republic of Serbia. The limited availability of 
funds for the provision of infrastructure development has widened the divide between 
requirements and supply. In current terms, the investment requirement far exceeds 
the availability of budgetary allocation. The local governments, therefore, have been 
encouraging public-private partnerships (PPP) to attract market investment, thereby 
leveraging local government budgetary resources to meet the provisions for infrastructure 
and public services. 
A PPP is recognized in the Republic of Serbia as a general long-term contract between 
a public sector entity (central and local government or a public sector corporation), and 
a private business, covering the design, ﬁnancing, operation, and maintenance of public 
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infrastructure or the design, ﬁnancing, and provision of a service. A public-private part-
nership is a contractual agreement between the public and the private sectors, whereby 
the private operator provides services that have traditionally been executed or ﬁnanced 
by a public institution. 
Legally, it is midway between simple public procurement and privatization as a means 
to providing a public service, and therefore may be used to transfer a large proportion 
of the risk to the private sector. The ultimate goal of PPPs is to obtain more “value for 
money” than traditional public procurement options would deliver. Although the ex 
ante assessment of expected value for money is often extremely complex, in general, a 
PPP can be said to generate value improvements whenever it produces the following 
advantages: reduced life-cycle costs, a more eﬃcient allocation of risk, faster implemen-
tation, improved service quality, and additional revenue. 
Recent years have seen a marked increase in cooperation between the public and 
private sector for the development and operation of infrastructure for a wide range of 
economic activities. The establishing of PPPs in the Republic of Serbia has been driven 
by a combination of several factors: (a) the search for private ﬁnancing to supplement 
tight public budgets, (b) the desire to acquire private sector know-how and operating 
skills, and (c) the structural change in the role of local government, which is becoming 
an organizer, regulator, and supervisor rather than a direct operator. 
This section contains a short overview of the main types of PPP transactions se-
lected for implementation or established by local governments in Serbia. Options of 
PPPs range from those involving minimal private sector involvement, such as through 
the use of service contracts, to those involving extensive private sector participation in 
public sector entity management and infrastructure rehabilitation and investment, such 
as concessions and BOT arrangements. In almost all these options, the public entity 
typically resumes full control of the assets upon termination of the contract with the 
private partner. The following discussion introduces each of these options. 
The examination of case studies enables the identiﬁcation of the key principles 
governing PPP development and application in the local governments of the Republic 
of Serbia. It is important to emphasize that PPP structures are an evolving concept in 
their early stages. 
While the beneﬁts of partnering with the private sector in PPPs are clear, such 
relationships should not be seen as the only possible course of action and are indeed 
complex to design, implement, and operate. Therefore PPPs need to be carefully assessed 
in the context of the project, the public beneﬁt, and the relative gains to be achieved 
under various approaches.
The number of cases presented is obviously small compared to the number of actual 
projects and agreements initiated and realized. The main problem in researching the 
established PPP structures has been a lack of willingness among local governments to 
disclose a PPP contractual agreement and to share their experiences during the assess-
161
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  S e r b i a
ment, procurement, and negotiation processes. Data has been collected from a variety 
of sources including project ﬁnanciers, sponsors, and beneﬁciaries. In order to facilitate 
an analysis of cases, the following criteria were selected: contract type, contract duration, 
value of investment, transfer of responsibility, demand risk, availability risk, market 
ﬁnancial risk, and price risk.
An analysis reveals a number of variations between the PPP models adopted. The 
following conclusions were made, based on the assumed criteria:
  Contract Type. Service and management contracts are the most common forms 
of PPP structures encountered. The concession cases analyzed here have not been 
fully realized yet. Joint companies are registered in the ﬁeld of waste management 
and gas distribution. However, the structure of contract type demonstrates the 
lack of local governments interest in making a comprehensive assessment of an 
appropriate PPP structure. Diﬀerent PPP structures could be explored based 
on the extent of funds that could be diverted from public sources and those 
required from the private sector, service levels targeted, willingness to pay and 
aﬀordability of consumers, and rehabilitation of the existing systems, etc. Local 
governments prefer to enter into service and management contracts instead of 
concession contracts. This is because the service operator selection procedure 
is shorter and easier than the complex legal procedure for the assessment and 
implementation of concessions and a concessionaire selection through an open 
competition procedure (public procurement). Moreover, not assessing the appro-
priate PPP structures results in the loss of additional revenue for the public sector 
that could be realized through the collection of local fees for the use of existing 
public assets and for the right to perform revenue generating public services by 
a private party. Founding a joint venture company represents an additional risk 
in when considering a concession. The founding of these companies in Serbia 
does not generate concession beneﬁts, and is followed by the loss of property 
rights over the public property, the weakening of the negotiation capacities, and 
a loss of local government control. 
  Contract duration has to be identiﬁed with regard to the relationship between 
the amount of capital invested, the degree of private sector involvement, and the 
length of time required to ensure investment and proﬁt recovery. Unfortunately, 
contract duration is regulated in accordance with the aforementioned criteria 
only in case of a concession establishment, pursuant to the Concession Law. The 
contract durations for other PPP transactions involve private partner oﬀers and a 
negotiation process between the two parties, without applying the calculation of 
a payback period for the investment. These duration structures are also indicative 
of the fact that Serbia has not developed long-term markets for infrastructure 
operations. As a result, concession contracts, and even service and management 
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contracts involving small investments in revenue generating services with short 
payback periods, last more than 20 years and tend to dominate. 
  Value of Investment. The water and sewage sectors represent the largest capital 
investments. This is to be expected given the scale of projects and the investment 
requirements. For example, the necessary capital for investment in Belgrade 
water and sewage is estimated at nearly EUR one billion. The smallest ﬁnancial 
investments involving the least risky ﬁnancial consequences are with parking 
services and solid waste management. These investments range from EUR 0.6 
to 40.0 million. Therefore, PPP arrangements in parking service and solid waste 
management involve shorter payback periods and lower risk exposure for private 
partners. As a result the private capital inﬂows are predominantly registered in 
sectors that seek smaller investments.
  The transfer of responsibility is the degree to which the private party is involved 
in the project as deﬁned by the contractual model and obligations, ownership 
of assets or operating rights, and the project operational structure. According to 
reviewed cases, the responsibilities are distributed in relation to the characteristics 
of the project and the parties. The transfer of responsibilities is set forth in the 
tender documents and the ﬁnal contracts. The solid waste, parking, and gas 
distribution cases demonstrate the highest degree of transfer of responsibility 
onto the private party. This is often in relation to the more commercial nature 
of investments in these operations, for which the private partner is expected to 
ﬁnance and assume demand and market risk. 
  The service contract for Belgrade public transportation shows that the private 
partners are responsible for the procurement and the operating and maintaining 
of the asset for a short period of time, while the city bears the ﬁnancial and 
management risks. Revenues for the private partners are linked to performance 
targets. The concession for solid waste in Belgrade gives a private partner 
responsibility for the design, ﬁnance, construction, operation, and maintenance 
of a utility’s assets and then transfers it to the government when the contract 
ends. Revenues for the concessionaire are linked to performance targets and 
commercial risks. 
  — Demand risk is the degree to which the risks of variations in market demand, 
competition, or technological obsolescence are passed onto the private party. 
According to the previously described criteria, the solid waste sector and 
parking services have the highest degree demand risk transfer onto the private 
party. The real level of passed demand risk depends on the development of 
the service and beneﬁciary’s coverage by the service assigned to the private 
party. The risk may be signiﬁcantly reduced by a monopolistic position of 
a utility service operator. 
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   For example, the demand risk assigned by a concessionaire who will operate 
solid waste services in Belgrade is estimated to be very low, due to the 
existence of developed communal services in the ﬁeld of waste collection 
and disposal in the city and stable growing standard of life of the citizens. 
On the other end, demand risk in solid waste for the Smederevska Palanka 
municipality is estimated as signiﬁcant, as there are a lot of households in 
rural settlements that have never used this communal service. Fee collec-
tion from these beneﬁciaries will aﬀect the earnings of the private partner, 
particularly at the beginning of the operation.
  — Availability risk is the degree to which the private party risks delivering 
against the contractual speciﬁcations, fails to meet standards and quality 
levels, delivers services against speciﬁcations, or fails to meet agreed upon 
volumes. The risks under this category are distributed between public and 
private partners in all reviewed PPP cases. The private partner is usually 
responsible for the quality and eﬃciency of the rendering of assigned services 
under the contractual provisions. The public party is the guarantor of good 
performance and delivery of utility services to the citizens. 
   In the case of Belgrade, the concessionaire would have full responsibility for 
the design, ﬁnancing, construction, and operation of the new infrastructure 
and service delivery to the citizens. The city government is responsible for 
the supervision of the concession, with a full right to cancel the contract 
if the concessionaire fails to fulﬁll its contractual obligations. This right 
enables the city to guarantee good performance and delivery of services 
to the citizens. The same regulation is included in other PPP agreements 
analyzed.
  Market ﬁnancial risk is the degree to which the risks of variations in market 
indicators such as consumer prices, interest rates, the dinar exchange rate, petrol 
prices, average gross salary, etc., are passed onto the contractual parties of PPP. 
Many of the cases demonstrate that market ﬁnancial risks are incorporated 
within the calculation and adjustment of the price of utility services. 
  Price risk is the degree to which the risk of variations in the eﬃciency of a 
private partner’s operation and the tariﬀs collection are passed onto the service 
beneﬁciaries. Pursuant to reviewed contracts the service beneﬁciaries are not 
exposed to signiﬁcant price risk, which could be caused by a private partner. In 
all cases, the price of utility services shall be regulated and adopted by the local 
assembly in accordance with contracted criteria. The main criteria for price 
adjustments are oﬃcial market indicators that have an impact on the costs of 
service operation. 
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  For instance, the service contract for Belgrade public transportation regulates 
the structure of total costs of the private partner and the relation between each 
type of cost and matching market indicators. Consequently, there is no place 
for tariﬀs correction as a result of increased costs and the inability of a private 
partner to fully realize their potential.
3.2 Managing PPP Deals
3.2.1 Why Changes Were Needed 
In all of the municipalities analyzed there is the need to invest in order to enhance the 
existing infrastructure and develop the communal services. An example for such a need 
to invest is the construction of the waterworks and sewage system in the city of Belgrade. 
An example of the undeveloped communal activity is the municipality of Smederevska 
Palanka that needs to develop its capacities in the treatment of the solid waste, and also 
the municipality of Kikinda that does not have a developed parking service with the 
necessary infrastructure. In these mentioned cases, local governments were not able to 
assure investment in the deﬁcient infrastructure directly from the budget. 
At the same time, these municipalities have already made use of their crediting 
capacities by taking credit loans from ﬁnancial institutions. In that sense, the only 
possibility they had was to attract funds from private partners that were interested in 
making proﬁt by investing in local infrastructure and by taking over the commercial 
risks in performing communal services. We need to stress, however, that the PPP case 
of public transportation in Belgrade was not motivated by a lack of funds exclusively, 
but also by the need to create competition in public service delivery and to enhance 
service quality. 
3.2.2 How Was the Municipal Decision Made?
Local governments are obligated by the Serbian Constitution and the Law on Local 
Self-government, as well as by the Law on Utility Activities, to ensure conditions for 
performing public activities, regulate the way the activities are performed, enable as-
sets for work and development, and supervise the performance of public activities. To 
this end, the local assembly decides who will perform each public activity through the 
adopting of the decision on the establishment of public entities (institution, organiza-
tion, or enterprise) or the decision on granting performance of the activity to a private 
enterprise or entrepreneur. 
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In order to meet the aforementioned legal obligations, Serbian local self-governing 
units faced a lack of assets and skills for the development of core utility activities. Because 
of the lack of budget resources to be invested in the construction of needed assets and 
further development of public activities, the local governments decided to attract private 
partners to invest in and to take over the management of these activities. 
Following this idea, most local governments decided to establish PPP structures 
based on the lack of public resources for investment in utility assets and operations. 
The way to assess a feasible and adequate PPP transaction depended on the knowledge 
and experience of local governments in performing capital project ﬁnancing and com-
prehensive capital assets and ﬁnancial management. 
The most successful approaches to adequately assess PPP transactions are registered 
in the capital of Serbia. Supported by well-experienced international institutions and 
consultants, funded from foreign grants, the Belgrade administration made a decision 
on PPP transactions based completely on legal, ﬁnancial, economical, environmental, 
and technical due diligence, and an analysis of the existing utility system and its opera-
tions. These examples are in the cases of PPP establishment in public transportation, 
solid waste management, and in the water and sewage system of the city. 
As far as other municipal local governments are concerned, most of them made 
decisions on PPP establishment according to the expected value of the investment by 
a private partner and oﬀered tariﬀ levels that would be paid by the beneﬁciaries. Prior 
to making their decisions, they did not analyze the state of the utility service and the 
ﬁnancial and economic eﬀects of selected PPP transactions on municipal assets.
3.2.3 Arguments For and Against at the Municipal Council
The main argument for PPP establishment is grounded in the possibility of achieving 
beneﬁts for service consumers and the local government, as the result of a private partner’s 
participation in infrastructure investment, public service operation, and management. 
The usual beneﬁts for entering into a PPP transaction recognized by a municipal 
assembly are: 
  Enhances eﬃciency through the introduction of commercial principles in utility 
system operation;
  Improves the level and quality of utility services;
  Ensures long term ﬁnancial, technical, and environmental sustainability of the 
utility system, taking into account end-user aﬀordability;
  Introduces a highly functional system of paying for and carrying out the control 
of utility activities;
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  Develops nonexistent utility services through the introduction of the private 
partner’s technical skills and experience; and
  Improves revenue collection for the municipal budget.
The main arguments against the establishment of PPP that may arise during discus-
sion in the local assemblies are:
  Using the ﬁnancial and economic data generated by an ineﬃcient utility system 
as a baseline for establishment of the contractual performance criteria for the 
new PPP arrangement; 
  Entering the PPP transaction without performing analyses of ﬁnancial and 
economic eﬀects of the selected PPP model among possible alternatives;
  Lack of skilled and experienced people from the municipal side to be involved 
in negotiation with proﬁcient and specialized private sector partners;
  Loss of control over public assets and resources; 
  Fear of the unpredictable eﬀects of applying the full cost of recovery principal 
when tariﬀ setting for a utility service.
3.2.4 How Did the Tendering, Selection, Contracting Process Go?
According to Serbian legislation, local government units are permitted to award service 
and management contracts through public competition pursuant to the Law on Public 
Procurement. The Law on Concessions regulates the granting of concessions in great 
detail through an open bidding procedure. The Law on Public Enterprises permits the 
establishment of a joint venture company and the performing of general interest activi-
ties without regulating the private partner selection. Hence, there is space for direct 
negotiation between local governments and the private partner about establishing a joint 
company without engaging in the competitive selection of a partner.
Analyzed cases show that private partners were selected via a public competitive 
bidding process in accordance with the relevant law. In the cases where service manage-
ment contracts were granted, all local governments applied their experience, acquired 
from the legally based service procurement procedure, during the preparation of tender 
documentation. The content and form of tender documentations was prepared in ac-
cordance with the Law on Public Procurement. Public invitations for the competitive 
bidding process were published in the Oﬃcial Gazette and daily newspapers. Interested 
candidates were required to be qualiﬁed to carry out the required utility services and 
to submit technical and ﬁnancial bids, which are supplemented with bid bonds for the 
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tender procedure. A criterion for the selection of the best bid was the most economically 
advantageous bid, which was selected on the basis of the following subcriteria: technical 
solution for utility service and the total value of investment and service tariﬀs.
The concession for the Belgrade landﬁll would be granted through international 
tender governed by the Serbian Concession Law and the concession enactment of the 
PPP project, approved by the government of the Republic of Serbia. Tender documen-
tation included all necessary elements and instructions for the preparation of the bids 
and a “memorandum on tender procedure,” which included, aside from the rules for 
submission of the oﬀer, other elements relevant to the tender procedure. Interested 
candidates were required to be qualiﬁed and to submit a bank guarantee for the tender 
procedure. The tender procedure has two phases: the ﬁrst phase is the evaluation of 
technical oﬀers, and the second phase evaluates ﬁnancial oﬀers by all candidates whose 
technical oﬀers met the minimum requirements. These two phases are followed by a joint 
evaluation of qualiﬁed candidates’ technical and ﬁnancial oﬀers. The preferred bidder 
will be selected on the basis of the combined evaluation of the technical and ﬁnancial 
oﬀers. Finally, the Negotiation Committee will ﬁnalize the closure of the concession 
agreement with the preferred bidder.
3.3 Methods of Monitoring and Evaluating PPPs
Successful PPPs require an eﬀective legislative and monitoring framework, as well as 
the recognition by each partner of the objectives and needs of the other. Guaranteeing 
a beneﬁt from a PPP requires the recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
type of structure and the aims and objectives of each party. In this respect, the role of 
the public sector, which may transform itself from a service provider to a supervisor of 
service contracts, is of particular importance. This section provides an overview of the 
existing PPP models within the Serbian local government, and methods by which the 
PPPs have been monitored. 
3.3.1 The Private Partner’s Contractual Obligations
The obligations of the private partner are very clearly stipulated by the contract in most 
of the reviewed PPP transactions. This is the main precondition for successful monitoring 
and evaluation of the established PPP transaction from the view of the local government. 
The following private partner contractual obligations are reviewed in several case studies.
In the case of granting the concession for performing treatment and disposal of 
solid waste in the city of Belgrade, the main obligations of the concessionaire shall be: 
to rehabilitate the landﬁll and improve the quality of the services, to enhance eﬃciency 
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and lower costs through the introduction of commercial principles, and to perform 
communal services under the contractual provisions.
The private transportation companies which entered the operation contract with the 
city are obliged: to ﬁnance procurement of a certain number and quality of vehicles and 
to perform city public transportation pursuant to the provisions regulated by the city.
For example, in the case of awarding a contract for parking services operation of 
the municipality of Kikinda, the obligations of the private partners are: to develop 
parking services through investments of EUR one million, to perform parking services 
by introducing commercial principles, and to introduce a highly functional system of 
paying for and carrying out the control of parking activities.
3.3.2 Providing Performance Guarantees by the Private Partner
In order to assure quality and eﬃciency in the rendering of awarded services within the 
agreed period of time, the concessionaire is obliged to submit a performance guarantee: 
for the construction period (10 percent of planned investment value for the construc-
tion period) and for the operation and maintenance period (ﬁve percent of planned 
investment value for the operation and maintenance period). 
The concessionaire shall also maintain in full force and eﬀect throughout the conces-
sion contract following insurances: contractors, pollution legal liability, all risks, third 
parties, professional responsibility, workers, and property. 
On the other hand, the private partners are not obliged to submit a performance 
guarantee by most of the operation and management contracts. These agreements regu-
late the responsibility of the private partner to deliver quality services and to insure the 
permanent functional ability of the utility’s assets, but without any collateral instrument 
to be activated by a local government in the case of bad performance.
3.3.3 Monitoring of the PPP Contract Obligations
The cases presented here show that the monitoring of and carrying out of private partner 
contractual obligations is the responsibility of the local government. In this respect, all 
contracts regulate the private partner’s reporting roles and procedures during the PPP 
duration. 
For example, the concessionaire shall maintain records and prepare reports during 
the concession duration and submit them to the city of Belgrade. These reports shall 
include records on: amount, type and origin (municipality) of the solid waste. The city, 
as a grantor, shall have free and open access to the landﬁll and all facilities for purposes 
of inspections. 
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The city’s public transportation board is responsible for executing the service contract 
provisions by private companies. Thus, the board is obligated to perform the ongoing 
quality control of services delivered by private companies. The board can do this on its 
own or with the commitment of a third legal entity. 
In the municipality of Kikinda the traﬃc department is responsible for overseeing 
the parking service assigned to the private company. The key point in operation and 
management contract supervision is to control revenues collected from parking services 
that are shared between the municipality and the company. This is enabled by a mod-
ern software package for the online management and operation of the parking service, 
created by the company.
3.3.4 Monitoring of Performance Standards for Users 
Performance standards for users should be regulated by the PPP agreements in order to 
ensure the delivery of high quality services to citizens. This is the case with the service 
contract for public transportation in Belgrade. 
Citizens play an active role in the assessment of the quality of public transporta-
tion. They can make complaints regarding public transportation to the transportation 
board. The regulated identiﬁcation of transportation department vehicles and staﬀ al-
lows citizens to submit their complaints regarding noted irregularities within the public 
transportation system. 
The public concession for solid waste also regulates a concessionaire’s responsibili-
ties to its customers. Concessionaire reports will include any complaints that may have 
been articulated by the users and describe the solutions and remedies carried out by the 
concessionaire in relation thereof. Private parking service and solid waste operators have 
to create an overview of the quality of services delivered to their users. 
3.3.5 Contract Termination
All contracted PPP agreements contain a provision regarding contract termination in 
case of a private operator’s failure to perform. In accordance with this provision, a local 
government unit has the full right to cancel the contract if the private partner fails to 
fulﬁll its contractual obligations. This right enables the municipality to guarantee high-
quality utility services to its citizens. In the case of contract termination the municipality 
may have a preemptive right to purchase previously constructed and installed assets. 
The notiﬁcation period allows the municipality to further regulate service performance 
in case of contract cancellation. If the private partner terminates the contract, it is 
obligated to cover all costs that have been incurred by the municipality following the 
contract cancellation. 
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3.4 What Are the Initial Experiences? 
The initial facts about the implementation of PPP in Serbian local governments are 
diﬃcult to evaluate because all the contracts are in the early stages of implementation 
and operation. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn at this stage.
In all of the implemented PPPs to date, the private partner was given incentives for 
the timely delivery and operation of project assets. The main reason for this is the ac-
cepted commercial risks of the utility service operation contained in the “no service—no 
pay” principle. Hence, all investments were completed within the agreed upon time 
frame. The private partner was further encouraged to ﬁnd innovative means to manage 
the operational risks that came with the project. The most visible result of implemented 
PPPs in Serbian local governments was a signiﬁcant improvement in the quality of 
services delivered by the private partners. 
In Belgrade, the implementation of the service contract for public transportation 
enabled the city to: expand public transportation infrastructure plants by 30 percent 
without dipping into public resources; create a competitive framework for the public 
transportation operator that resulted in an increase in eﬃciency and proﬁtability; and 
improve the quality of services delivered to citizens without an increase in tolls.
Implementation of a parking services operation contract in Kikinda resulted in: the 
development of parking services with a functional system for paying for and carrying 
out the control of parking activities, and the establishment of a new parking system and 
payment method by text message that led to better quality for users.
Implementing the contract for the maintenance and sanitation of landﬁlls in the mu-
nicipality of Smederevska Palanka has resulted in the elimination of illegal waste dumps, 
the development of waste management, improved sanitation, and the growth of landﬁll 
capacities. The contract has also met the needs of citizens whose focus was on environmental 
protection, healthier living, and a more aesthetically pleasing surroundings. 
The municipality must review operation reports and ﬁnancial statements from its 
private partners to evaluate the ﬁnancial eﬀects on the local budget. Unfortunately, we 
have no data from the submitted reports to make adequate comments on the achieved 
ﬁnancial results of PPPs.
4. RETHINKING THE SERBIAN PPP APPROACH
4.1 Identiﬁcation of the System Inefﬁciencies
Public-private partnerships have a very short history in the Republic of Serbia. Since all 
PPPs have been established recently, it is diﬃcult to oﬀer an overall and accurate assess-
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ment of the eﬀects of the established partnerships, especially since there is no organized 
monitoring of the way PPPs are established in Serbia or of the eﬀects of those so far 
established ones at the state or local level. Examples analyzed in the previous section 
could make one believe that the PPP development is more successful than it really is. 
Here, we analyzed PPP cases from municipalities that were willing to share their 
experience, as they obviously respected the legal framework, received foreign aid, and 
received consultants’ input in the creating and establishing of PPPs. As for other PPPs 
that have been established, we cannot comment on them, as we have no data on the 
nature of their constitution. Because we lack ﬁnancial and economic indicators that 
track PPP eﬀects, we will analyze the practice of establishing PPPs in Serbia, explaining 
the risks that may occur during the implementation phase in the following section. 
An increase in partnerships, primarily in local communal service and infrastructure 
development and regeneration, was the result of a range of conditions and prerequisites 
found in Serbian local governments. They included addressing the challenges and tasks 
confronting local governments as a consequence of structural economic transformation, 
changing market conditions and intensifying competition, and the search for new ap-
proaches in order to meet these challenges. 
The number and composition of public and private participants in partnership 
projects are not subject to deﬁnite rules, and they diﬀer from one case to the next. In 
spite of these diﬀerences, however, partnership participants have much in common: 
  participants from the public sector are predominantly local government repre-
sentatives, and
  private sector partners are ﬁnancially powerful actors like property developers 
and large groups of companies engaged in a broad range of public services and 
infrastructure development sectors, or a wide variety of ﬁrms operating in sewage 
and waste disposal.
The expectations of public and private partners concerning cooperation diﬀer ac-
cording to their speciﬁc functions and roles. The public sector, which in the majority 
of cases is the initiator of PPP projects, expects: a mobilization of private funds, relief 
with regard to limited local budgets, access to the professional competencies and capaci-
ties of the private sector, and the accelerated and professional completion of projects. 
Private actors set high hopes in the completion of joint ventures because of the 
promised access to local powers and authorities, greater inﬂuence on planning procedures 
and decisions, and well-funded and largely risk-free project implementation.
In the Serbian municipalities, PPPs may be set up for all public local services as long 
as there are no statutory obstacles. Where partnerships are actually established and for 
what purpose depends, as Serbian experience has shown, on one crucial factor: whether 
the private partner can earn a proﬁt from a satisfactory return on his investment or from 
suﬃcient public subsidies. 
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Project priorities for PPPs are, ﬁrst of all, construction, communal services develop-
ment, and infrastructural improvements in most cases. As a rule, these are projects that 
are expected to improve the local area or the city concerned. Private partners showed 
increasing interest in the proﬁtable areas of city transportation, gas distribution, and 
waste management infrastructure. Apart from these activities, “practical” projects (like 
renovation, operation, and management) within a wide range of public facilities should 
be encouraged by Serbian local governments.
As experience with projects from diﬀerent local governments and diﬀerent countries 
shows, Serbian local governments may be confronted by a series of potential problems 
and dangers during a lifetime of recently established PPPs. These include, in particular: 
  A reduction in control and inﬂuence for democratically legitimized representa-
tives at the local level, as a result of the special situation frequently created in 
public-private cooperation (exemption from the normal administrative process, 
reduction of the public domain to a very few protagonists relevant to urban 
planning and development policy, etc.);
  A waiver of long-term, strategic perspectives in favor of comparatively short-term 
commercial calculations, as a result of a increased inﬂuence of proﬁt-oriented 
thinking on local authority planning, planning aims, and priorities; 
  A reduction in local competencies and maneuverability resulting from the 
transfer of local authority and responsibility to private partners; and
  An unequal distribution of risk between partners, often imposing unforeseen 
procedural diﬃculties and ﬁnancial deﬁcits on the public sector.
Whether or not these problems actually occur depends on a number of factors, not 
least of all on objectives and interests, and the quality of information and qualiﬁcations 
of public protagonists contribute to cooperative undertakings with private business.
4.2 Proposals for Improvement
Fundamental requirements for successful PPPs are:
  A credible legal and regulatory framework that protects private sector interests 
and property rights and enables commercial contracts to be legally enforced;
  Government agencies with the necessary authority to grant concessions and 
licenses, whether through speciﬁc concession laws or other implementing 
legislation or regulations; and
  Mechanisms to permit the resolution of disputes and potential conﬂicts of 
interests in a cost-eﬃcient, fair, and enforceable manner.
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Successful PPPs deliver high-quality services to consumers and the government at 
signiﬁcantly lower cost than would be the case with public investment and government 
provision of the same services. An appropriate institutional framework is critically needed 
if PPPs are to succeed. The challenges in this relationship are numerous in the Republic 
of Serbia, an emerging market economy.
Political commitment and good governance are prerequisites for the success of 
public-private partnerships. A PPP is a major commitment on the part of the private 
sector, which needs to know that politicians are also committed to private involvement. 
Uncertainty in this regard gives rise to political risk that is not conducive to making 
long-term business decisions. Therefore, it is important to establish clear channels of 
responsibility and accountability for government involvement in PPPs. An appropri-
ate legal framework can provide reassurance to the private sector that contracts will be 
honored. This requires changes or additions to existing laws in Serbia.
The Serbian government should develop a detailed and explicit policy on PPPs 
that would govern PPPs at all levels of government, and place an emphasis on value 
for money, with the public interest as a key feature of the policy. This policy would 
complement existing legislation in the ﬁscal area, including the Concessions Law and 
the Procurement Law. It should be useful to consider the establishment of a competent 
body to be responsible for overall coordination of the PPP program and the approval 
of speciﬁc projects.
PPPs require the development of expertise in the government. This covers the full 
range of skills required to manage a PPP program. Particular attention should also be paid 
to skill development by subnational governments, since in many countries the respon-
sibility for spending in areas that are likely candidates for PPPs is transferred to them.
The government will also have to reﬁne its project appraisal and prioritization. 
First and foremost, the decision whether to undertake a project, and the choice between 
traditional public investment and a PPP to implement it, should be based on technically 
sound value-for-money comparisons. It is particularly important to avoid a possible bias 
in favor of PPPs simply because they involve private ﬁnance, and in some cases generate 
a revenue stream for the government.
The PPP policy/regulation has to contain provisions to minimize the exposure of 
private partners to institutional risk. Key elements to contain the risk of non-payment 
by the government include: (1) granting seniority to PPP contract payments over other 
categories of expenditure, except for debt service and constitutionally mandated spend-
ing; (2) permitting private partners to pledge future payments from a PPP contract to 
ﬁnancial institutions; (3) allowing the earmarking of revenue to meet PPP contract 
payments; and (4) the creation of trust funds to guarantee PPP contract payments. 
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5. CASES OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
5.1  Public Transportation in the City of Belgrade
Case Study Belgrade city awarding a service contract for public transportation
Objectives of PPP Quality improvement and extension of the public transportation 
infrastructure 
PPP Actors City of Belgrade, public transportation department and licensed private 
transportation companies
Financial Structure Own or borrowed resources from private partners
Foreign Grants No
Contract agreement Service contract 
Contract duration 7 years
Risk allocation Commercial risk is assumed by the city
Management Transportation department controls contract performance
Tariff setting City, pursuant to the contractual agreements
Strong Points Create competitive framework for the operation of PUC GSP.
Investing in public infrastructure, without spending public resources.
Weak Points Commercial risk is assumed by the city through guaranteed level of revenue 
for the private partners according to delivered services.
The Belgrade case illustrates a way of establishing a partnership with private transporta-
tion operators. These private operators had to show their qualiﬁcations for performing 
public transportation services and a capacity for investing in transportation infrastruc-
ture. The PPP is aimed at establishing and improving the quality standards for public 
transportation in Belgrade.
5.1.1 Background
Belgrade’s public transportation services are handled by: PUC GSP “Beograd” (buses, 
trolleys, and trams), private bus transportation companies, taxis, SP “Lasta” (suburban 
and local bus transportation), Beovoz city railway, and express minibus. Private bus 
transportation companies appeared in Belgrade’s streets in 1997 because the PUC GSP 
was unable to provide public transportation services on its own, due to the ﬁnancial 
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deﬁcits. Private companies required payment for single tickets, independent from the 
tickets and toll system applied in the PUC GSP buses.
During 2005 the city government recognized the possibility for the implementation 
of an integrated toll system for the city’s public transportation system. The integrated 
toll system consolidated operations of the PUC GSP and the private transportation 
companies and the use of single tickets and pre-paid passes by the citizens in both 
PUCs and private buses. Therefore, the city awarded public contracts to qualiﬁed 
private transportation companies that had submitted the best bids to carry out public 
transportation services. Thus a PPP was established between the city of Belgrade and the 
private transportation companies by using the best practices from developed market-
economy countries.
5.1.2 The main principles of established PPP
  Possibility for achieving beneﬁts for both the city and the private partner. The 
city should achieve the improvement of the public transportation infrastructure, 
without spending budget resources and PUC’s revenues for the procurement of 
the new vehicles. Moreover, the city has created a competitive framework for 
the operation of PUC GSP that should result in an increase in eﬃciency and 
proﬁtability. The private transportation company, by entering into the contract, 
insures its long-term revenues for the next seven years, which depends on the 
performance of public transportation. Meeting the contractual obligations 
enables the private company to generate proﬁt, which does not have to do with 
the variance in number of passengers using public transportation.
  Private partners are selected by public competition. The content and form 
of tender documentation were prepared in accordance with the Law on Public 
Procurement of the Republic of Serbia. Each private transportation company, 
which assessed the tender, had to prove its qualiﬁcations for carrying out public 
transportation services and their ability to insure a rolling plant as stipulated in 
the technical speciﬁcations.
  The private partner is obligated to invest in a rolling plant, according to 
the condition from the tender documentation (certain number and quality of 
vehicles). Showing ﬁnancial capacity for the procurement of a rolling plant was 
the key criteria for the qualiﬁcation of the private partner during the tender 
procedure. 
  Revenue realization of the private partner is guaranteed and calculated on 
the basis of realized eﬀective kilometers and the contracted price of transporta-
tion delivered. The revenue is collected from the following resources: (1) from 
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an integrated toll system (2) from the selling of the single tickets on the buses, 
and (3) from the city budget to complement a guaranteed level of revenue.
  Risks are shared between the parties during the contract's lifetime. Demand 
risk is accepted by the city due to the price of tickets, and is subsidized by the 
budget. Market ﬁnancial risks (consumer prices, petrol prices, dinar exchange 
rate, and average gross salary) are incorporated into the calculation and adjust-
ment of the price of public transportation. This price is adopted by the city 
government, in the proposal completed by the public transportation depart-
ment pursuant to the methodology regulated by the contract. Damage risk is 
covered by an insurance policy. Risk of outperforming the contractual obligation 
of the private partner is covered by a guarantee issued by a bank.
  The contractual obligations of the private partner are to ﬁnance procurement 
of a certain number and quality of vehicles and to provide public transportation 
services across the city.
  The carrying out of transportation public services is regulated by the 
contract. The public transportation department is obligated to perform the 
ongoing quality control of services delivered by private companies. The board 
can do this on its own or with the commitment of a third legal entity. In this 
respect it controls the following criteria of public transportation quality: the 
contracted level of services, the frequency of service delivery, the availability of 
equipment, the cleaning of vehicles, and the informing of citizens.
  Contract termination in case of bad performance. The contract may be 
canceled by the private partner, but not prior to the time deﬁned in the contract. 
The public transportation department may terminate the contract at any time 
when establishing the fact that the private partner failed to perform its contrac-
tual obligations. 
  Delivering high quality services to the citizenry is guaranteed by the contract 
that regulates the following: the number of vehicles for public transportation on 
the awarded lines, the number of reserved vehicles, the timetable of transporta-
tion, the marking of the vehicles, the method of informing and advertising in 
the vehicles, the selling of the tickets in the vehicles, the dress code and iden-
tiﬁcation of staﬀ on the vehicles, the emergency measures in case of accidents 
and unpredicted events, the maintenance of rolling plant, the public security in 
the vehicles, and the submission of monthly and annual public transportation 
performance reports.
Citizens play an active role in the assessment of the quality of public transporta-
tion. They can make complaints regarding public transportation to the department of 
public transportation. The regulated identiﬁcation of the vehicles and the staﬀ allows 
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the citizens to submit their complaints on noticed irregularities within the public 
transportation system.
5.2 Treatment and Disposal of Solid Waste in the City of Belgrade
Case Study Granting the concession for performing treatment and disposal of solid waste 
in the city of Belgrade
Objectives of PPP Improve the services and rehabilitate the landfill while conforming to EU 
environmental regulations and standards
PPP Actors City of Belgrade and concessionaire 
Financial Structure City invests land and infra EUR 40 million 
Foreign Grants Grant of French government for legal consultancy fees
Contract agreement Concession (BOOT)
Contract duration 25 years
Risk allocation Commercial risk assumed by private partner;
market financial risks covered by tariffs-setting procedure;
assets loss covered by an insurance policy
Management City controls contract performance
Tariff setting City pursuant to the contractual agreements
Strong Points Concessionaire invests in communal infrastructure facilities and improvement 
of the services while bearing commercial risk
Weak Points City will not collect significant revenue from the concession fee due to the 
concessionaire’s investment being overvalued in comparison to the value of 
existing assets on the landfill
This case demonstrates the public competition process of granting the concession for 
treating and disposing of solid waste, aimed to ensure long-term ﬁnancial, technical, 
and environmental sustainability of the solid waste services in the city without using 
public resources.
5.2.1 Background
The Vinča landﬁll has been operated for 25 years by the city public enterprise “Grad-
ska čistoća” (PUC GC), which handles collection and disposal services in the territory 
of Belgrade. The amount of waste landﬁlled in 2002 was about 400,000 tons with 
an increase to 530,000 tons in 2005. The population covered by the waste collection 
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service of PUC GC was about 1.45 million, with a unit generation of about 320 kg 
per capita per year. Future waste generation is likely to continue to grow in line with 
economic growth, which is predicted to be high in Serbia over the coming years with 
EU accession approaching. 
The city of Belgrade and the Republic of Serbia do not have budget resources for 
the rehabilitation of the Vinča landﬁll so that it may be brought up to current environ-
mental and waste management regulations and standards. Therefore, in the course of 
2006, the government of Serbia passed the proposal for the city of Belgrade to grant 
the concession for the construction, maintenance, and use of the facilities for the re-
ceipt, treatment, and disposal of solid waste on the Vinča landﬁll with the purpose of 
performing municipal services within those facilities.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, 
was selected to advise the city of Belgrade for the structuring and implementation of 
the PPP. 
Because of the changes that occurred in the political establishment of the city of 
Belgrade, and the adjustments in the technical features to be applied to solid waste 
management, the city has decided not to engage a concessionaire. However, we have 
chosen to illustrate the key elements of the concession that should have been established.
5.2.2 The main principles of the PPP
  Possibility for achieving beneﬁts for both the city and the concessionaire. The 
city of Belgrade should: (a) improve the quality of the services in the city, (b) 
rehabilitate the Vinča landﬁll and bring it into conformity with applicable envi-
ronmental and waste management regulations and standards, and (c) enhance 
eﬃciency and lower costs through the introduction of commercial principles. 
The private partner should obtain the rights to perform municipal services 
by using the existing facilities on the landﬁll under a symbolic concession fee 
payment, and to earn stable revenue over the long term with minimal risk to 
its collection. 
  The concession will be granted on the basis of a public tender procedure governed 
by the Serbian Concession Law and the Concession Enactment of the PPP 
project (approved by the government of the Republic of Serbia in December 
2006). Tender documentation includes all necessary elements and instructions 
for the preparation of bids by participants in the bidding process, including: 
  — Instruction on how to structure the bid and the bidding form; 
  — A form announcing the bidder and his acceptance of the bidding conditions 
in the public announcement; 
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  — The nature and scope of the construction works; 
  — Deadline for the completion of construction; 
  — Technical documentation; 
  — Instructions on quality control guarantees and performance; 
  — Stipulation of the type of ﬁnancial guarantee that fulﬁls bidders’ ﬁnancial 
and other duties; 
  — Type and content of the documents, which shall be presented as a proof of 
meeting all conditions for the participation in the public tender; 
  — Other elements relevant to the subject of concession. 
  Interested candidates were required to be qualiﬁed and to submit technical and 
ﬁnancial oﬀers, which would be supplemented with a bank guarantee for the 
tender procedure. 
  The tender procedure had two phases: the ﬁrst phase is the evaluation of technical 
oﬀers, and the second phase evaluated ﬁnancial oﬀers by all candidates whose 
technical oﬀers meet the minimum requirements. 
  The prospective bidder had to meet the following technical, ﬁnancial, and 
relevant experience requirements:
  — Must have been active in the waste management sector for a minimum of 
ﬁve years, at least two of those in successful direct operation of an EU or 
EPA Class II-compliant landﬁll of at least one 500 tons per day (TPD) or 
larger;
  — Must demonstrate experience in the operation of the runoﬀ collection 
and treatment systems, and relevant experience in both the design of new 
landﬁlls and successful closure of abandoned solid waste dump sites;
  — Must demonstrate minimum ﬁnancial experience in the development of a 
project staging plan for an existing or planned landﬁll. 
  During the due diligence phase bidders were invited to submit comments 
regarding the draft concession contract. A ﬁnal version of the draft concession 
contract had to be produced prior to the submission of bids.
  The concessionaire shall invest at all stages of the concession. The total invest-
ment program is expected to be worth approximately EUR 40 million and shall 
include: (a) the remediation to the greatest extent feasible of the existing waste 
dump site, (b) the construction of additional landﬁll cells around the original 
site in accordance with relevant regulations and standards, and (c) the closure 
of the existing landﬁll site once it has reached capacity and its aftercare. The 
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concession contract is structured in two phases: the active phase would have 
an expected duration of 12 to14 years and the aftercare phase, a ﬁxed, 10-year 
duration. At the end of the concession, the ownership of all new constructed 
facilities shall be transferred from the private concessionaire to the city. 
  The city will pay the concessionaire an amount based on the agreed “tipping fee” 
per ton of municipal waste delivered by PUC GC to the landﬁll for disposal. 
The concessionaire will charge the “tipping fee” directly to those commercial 
and industrial entities that will dispose waste directly at the landﬁll (without 
utilizing the collection services of PUC GC). 
  The concessionaire will pay a concession fee for using goods and performing 
activities; this will be a symbolic amount because its investment is greater than 
the value of existing landﬁll assets.
  Risk sharing is regulated during the concession. The low demand risk exposure is 
allocated to the private concessionary. The city, when adjusting for the “tipping 
fee” by request of the concessionairy, will manage market ﬁnancial risk. Damage 
(loss) risk is covered by an insurance policy. Obtaining an insurance policy is the 
contractual obligation of the private concessionary. 
  Protection of the employees actually employed in the city PUC is regulated by the 
tender documents, which included guidelines such as the amount of necessary 
employment and qualiﬁed manpower for the realization of the concession. 
  The concessionaire shall provide performance guarantees: for the construction 
period (10 percent of planned investment value for the construction period with 
a maximum limit of EUR one million) and for the operation and maintenance 
period (ﬁve percent of planned investment value for the operation and mainte-
nance period, with a maximum limit of EUR one million.) The concessionaire 
shall maintain in full force and eﬀect, throughout the concession contract, the 
following insurance coverage: contractors,’ pollution, legal liability, all risks, 
third parties, professional responsibility, workers, and property. 
  The concessionaire shall maintain records and prepare reports during the conces-
sion duration and submit them to the city. These reports shall include records on: 
amount, type and origin (municipality) of the solid waste, and any complaints 
that may have been lodged by the users. The city as a grantor shall have free 
and open access to the landﬁll and all the facilities for purposes of inspections. 
  The right to terminate the concession enables the city of Belgrade to guarantee 
good performance on a public service; this is regulated by the agreement. 
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5.3 Belgrade Waterworks and Sewage
Case Study Strategy for the development of the PPP transaction for Belgrade waterworks 
and sewage 
Objectives of PPP Construction of sewer network, improvement of wastewater treatment, and 
restructuring of the utility services
PPP Actors City of Belgrade, Water direction, PUC “Belgrade Waterworks and Sewage” 
(BVK) and Private partner
Financial Structure City budget revenue, 
private partner equity, borrowed money on capital market
Foreign Grants European union grant
Contract agreement Concession and DBFO contract
Contract duration 25 years
Risk allocation Commercial risk assumed by private partner; market financial risks covered by 
the tariffs-setting procedure
Management City does supervision of the contract’s performance
Tariff setting City of Belgrade Assembly
Strong Points Construction of local infrastructure with long term financial, technical, and 
environmental sustainability of the system, carrying it over into end-user 
affordability.
Weak Points The private partner might be exposed to high commercial risk because of the 
lack of accurate data on state/status and operations of the existing utility system.
This case highlights the example of a strategic approach to ﬁnding an adequate model 
of the PPP transaction for Belgrade waterworks and sewage, aimed at the construction 
of needed infrastructure facilities, and an increase in eﬃciency of the utility system 
through its restructuring process.
5.3.1 Background
The water and wastewater system for the majority of the city of Belgrade are currently 
operated by the city public enterprise, “Belgrade Waterworks and Sewage” (BVK). Its 
service area covers 1.4 million people out of the city’s 1.6 million total. 3,700 employees 
perform BVK operations .
BVK has a comprehensive potable water supply system with service provided to 
virtually all people within its service area. Wastewater services are more restricted, in that 
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a sewer network connection is only available to some 50 to 70 percent of the potable 
water customers. With the exception of localized septic tank treatment, there are no 
other operational treatment facilities.
Because of the lack of budget resources and BVK income to be invested in the 
construction of a badly needed sewer network, the city decided to create a strategy for 
entering into a partnership with a private partner who is interested in investing in this 
public system.
The strategy for development of the PPP transaction falls into two phases:
  Phase one involved complete legal, ﬁnancial, economical, environmental, and 
technical due diligence in the analysis of the existing water and wastewater 
system and operations, to be presented in a strategy report detailing the recom-
mendations for the structure of the PPP. 
  Phase two will comprise the implementation of the PPP contract including: 
marketing of the transaction, identiﬁcation of a potential partner to the PPP, 
the drafting of contractual documentation, the tendering and selection of the 
winning bidder, and the negotiation and contracting of the PPP contract. This 
phase will be monitored by EAR and IFC.
As the ﬁrst phase was completed, the city of Belgrade received the feasibility study 
for the establishment of a PPP in the water and wastewater system. This study identiﬁed 
and suggested an eligible model of PPP transactions to be selected and implemented 
by the city in the next phase. 
5.3.2 Funding and Management
Table 5.1
Assumptions of the Study
Total resources shall be obtained in the next 25 years
Investment description Amount (EUR) Percent
Capital maintenance and improvement of water system in the course 
of 25 years 407,000,000 41
Construction of sewer network and improvement of wastewater 
treatment 525,000,000 53
Restructuring of the PUC “Belgrade Waterworks and Sewage” 55,000,000 6
Total investment costs 987,000,000 100
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Resources of financing
– Capital subsidies from the city budget: EUR 15 million during first three years of PPP 
– EU Grant, beginning in fourth year of PPP 
– Private partner resources: equity EUR 16.5 million or senior debt of EUR 15.0 million 
during the period of investment 
– Resources generated through operations for capital investments 
– Capital transfer from the environmental fund, established for Sava and Danube rivers 
protection of EUR 6.4 million per year. 
– Borrowing EUR 77 million from the financial markets 
Financial modeling/assumptions
– Debt/Equity ratio 70:30 (average in the region) 
– Equity return requirement in the region 20–22 percent by year 15 of the concession 
– Available dividends will be distributed to the investor beginning in year three, in order to 
achieve a target payback period for initial investor funding of five to six years
– Maximum senior debt tenor 22 years, under margin of four percent and upfront fee of 1.5 
percent.
Communal services tariffs
Current water tolls (28.15 RSD/m3—households, 56.87 RSD/m3—legal entities) would, 
though gradually increase until 2019, reach a level of 132 RSD/m3. Therefore, water tariffs 
would not go above EUR 1.0 the timeframe of the PPP arrangements.
Customer survey
– A very high level of support for improvements in the treatment of wastewater to solve the 
problem of pollution in the Danube and Sava rivers
– A high desire among citizens for the city to prioritize activities that would lead to environ-
mental improvements
– Low customer satisfaction with the quality of water and the condition of the water and 
wastewater system
– Strong support for partnering with the private sector to affect positive changes
– Overall willingness to pay for improvements to the system
– A preference for EU accession
Suggested eligible model for PPP transactions
1. Full integrated water, sewage, and wastewater concession
2. Separate partial concession for water and sewage services and DBFO for wastewater treat-
ment plant
3. Partial concession for water and sewage services and separate contract with a private partner 
for the design, financing, operation, and maintenance of wastewater treatment assets
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The main principles of full, integrated water, sewage, and wastewater concession are:
  Granting the concession for water, sewage, and wastewater would be based on 
the government of Serbia’s decision to grant the concession, pursuant to the 
Serbian Concession Law. The agreement would be ﬁnalized between the city 
of Belgrade and the newly established enterprise “New BVK“ (Special Purpose 
Company). New BVK as a SPC would be responsible for the fulﬁllment of the 
agreement. The PUC BVK and the selected private partner would establish this 
New BVK. 
  The main criteria for the selection among the qualiﬁed private partners who 
meet investment requirements from tender documentation are the proposed 
service charges. 
  The concessionaire would be responsible for: (1) operating and maintaining the 
existing infrastructures, (2) restructuring the PUC BVK, and (3) ﬁnancing and 
executing capital investment in water, sewage, and wastewater treatment. The 
tender and the concession dictate the overall design, ﬁnance, construction, and 
operation of the new infrastructures. 
  Financing for capital investment would come from internally generated funds 
(tolls), private partner’s equity, and debt capital funding or public grants, if 
legally compatible with the legal statutes of the concessionaire. 
  The concessionaire would take the risk of ﬁnance, construction, operation, and 
tariﬀs collection and improvement. 
  The concessionaire may be the owner of the new infrastructures constructed, 
which have to be transferred to the city at the end of the concession. It would 
have the right to operate the existing infrastructures. 
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 5.4 Parking Services in the Municipality of Kikinda
Case Study Awarding a contract for parking services operation
Objectives of PPP Development of parking services 
PPP Actors Municipality of Kikinda and “Parking System and Garage Ltd., Co.”
Financial Structure Municipality invests land; 
private partner invests EUR 1,000,000
Foreign Grants No
Contract agreement Lease or *[Affermage] Contract 
Contract duration 22 years
Risk allocation Commercial risk assumed by private partner
Management Municipality supervises contract performance
Tariff setting Municipal Assembly per the request of private partner
Strong Points Develop parking services and invest in parking assets without spending 
municipal revenues
Weak Points Collection of land-use fees for the municipal budget is the source of income 
earned by the private partner through parking operation. Therefore, budget 
revenue is subject to the commercial risk that has to be passed on to the private 
partner. 
This case illustrates how a PPP can be used by the public sector to attract innovative 
technology and knowledge from the market to develop modern parking services that 
were not developed by the municipality.
5.4.1 Background
The municipality of Kikinda entered into a partnership with the private company 
“Parking System and Garage” Belgrade. For the purpose of this analysis we received the 
description of the PPP transaction from the private company. 
The granting of the utility services operation contract was done in accordance 
with the Law on Utility Services, the Law on Public Procurement, and the municipal 
assembly’s decision on granting a contract for the operation of public parking services 
in the town.
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5.4.2 The Main Principles of Established PPP 
  Possibility for achieving the beneﬁts for both the municipality and the 
company. The municipality should achieve, without the investment of public 
resources: (a) developed parking services through the introduction of commercial 
principles in this underdeveloped utility service (b) introduce a highly functional 
system of paying for and carrying out the control of parking activities, and (c) 
improve revenue for the municipal budget. The company should acquire the 
right to realize stable revenue on a long-term basis as a means of recovery for 
investment made in parking services and the accepted commercial risks.
  The operation and maintenance contract was granted on the basis of a public 
tender procedure. A criterion for the selection of the best bid was the most 
economically advantageous bid, which was selected on the basis of the following 
subcriteria: technical solution for parking service, total value of investment, and 
parking tariﬀs.
  The private partner shall invest EUR one million in parking places (open carparks 
and garage carparks) and the operation equipment (for collection of parking 
tickets and its control), and will maintain parking facilities and equipment. 
  Collected revenues from the parking services are shared between the municipality 
and the company. Ten percent of realized revenue goes to the municipality, and 
the rest, 90 percent, goes to the company for the term of 22 years. An agreed 
upon portion of the revenue is paid to the municipality as a fee for using the 
land for parking locations.
  Risks are shared during the contract. Demand risk is taken over by the private 
partner who collects revenues from the users of the parking services. The munici-
pality will consider market risk during parking ticket level adjustments. The ticket 
level should be corrected in accordance with the average ticket price of three big 
cities in the region. The ticket level is decided and adopted by the municipal 
assembly. Damage (loss) risk is the responsibility of the private partner who can 
use an insurance policy.
  Contractual obligations of the private partner are: (a) to develop parking services 
through investments of EUR one million, (b) to perform parking services by 
introducing commercial principles, and (c) to introduce a highly functional 
system of paying and carrying out the management of parking activities.
  The private partner had to submit a large bond in order to assess the tender. 
During the signing of the contract the private partner was requested to submit 
a payment guarantee of all ﬁnancial liabilities toward the municipality until the 
end of the contract. 
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  The private partner shall maintain records and prepare reports during the 
contract duration and submit them to the city once a year. 
  The municipal traﬃc department is responsible for overseeing the operations 
of the parking service. The key objective of the contract supervision is the 
monitoring of the collected revenues from parking services, due to revenues 
being shared between the municipality and the company. This is enabled by 
a modern software package for the online management and operation of the 
parking service, created by the company. The parking fee payment function by 
text messages and the collection control by PDA devices are only a part of the 
integral information system, which monitors the company’s operations. 
  The municipality has a full right to cancel the contract if the private partner fails 
to fulﬁll its contractual obligations. This right enables the municipality to guar-
antee the performance of parking services to the citizens. In case of the contract 
termination, the municipality has the preemptive right to purchase the installed 
equipment and garage carparks. If the private partner terminates the contract, 
it is obliged to cover all costs that have been incurred by the municipality by 
this contract cancellation. 
5.5 Maintenance of Sanitation and Landﬁlls in the Smederevska Palanka 
 Municipality
Case Study Granting a contract for maintenance of sanitation and landﬁlls of the municipality 
of Smederevska Palanka
Objectives of PPP Development of the utility services
PPP Actors Municipality of Smederevska Palanka and Trojon & Fischer EKO
Financial Structure Municipality invests land; private partner invests EUR 600,000
Foreign Grants No
Contract agreement Operation and maintenance contract
Contract duration 15 years
Risk allocation Commercial risk assumed by private partner
Management Municipality supervises contract performance
Tariff setting Municipal Assembly
Strong Points Private partner invests in improvement of public service and development of 
landfill while assuming tariff collection risk
Weak Points Municipality does not collect any revenues from service operations
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The case illustrates a long-term development plan for solid waste disposal through the 
granting of a contract for maintenance of sanitation and landﬁlls to a private partner. 
The municipality has become the supervisor of the public service operation.
5.5.1 Background
The contract between the Municipality of Smederevska Palanka and the Serbian-German 
Utility Company Trojon & Fischer EKO (T&F Company) was signed in August 2006. 
Granting of the operation and maintenance contract of the utility service was done on 
the basis of the Law on Utility Services and a municipal assembly decision granting 
an operating and management contract of/for maintenance of sanitation and landﬁlls.
The municipality is obligated to ensure adherence to the decision on municipal 
services and render assistance to T&F in their start-up phase.
In the beginning of 2006, T&F Co., and the GTZ Project, “Modernization of 
Municipal Services” started a joint PPP project aimed at improving solid waste man-
agement. The project encompasses a public awareness campaign on the ecological and 
economical aspects of waste management directed at citizens in all parts of Serbia, as 
well as in the municipality. Intensive education and information activities were done 
for the illumination of citizens of Smederevska Palanka through a media campaign, 
school activities, seminars, publishing of informative material, etc., all in cooperation 
with the municipal administration.
5.5.2 The main principles of the established PPP 
  Possibility for achieving the beneﬁts for both the municipality and the T&F 
Company. The municipality should, without investment of the budget funds: 
(a) develop and improve utility services, (b) maintain landﬁlls and eliminate 
illegal waste dumps, and (c) improve organization and eﬃciency through the 
introduction of commercial principles in utility service operations. The operation 
and maintenance contract gives the T&F Co. responsibility for: the operation 
and maintenance of a utility’s assets and the ﬁnancing of development of utility 
services. In return for assuming this responsibility, the company is given rights 
to collect revenues for the contracted period of 15 years. The duration can be 
extended to 25 years.
  The operation and maintenance contract was granted on the basis of a public 
tender procedure. Interested candidates were required to demonstrate their 
qualiﬁcations to perform maintenance of sanitation and landﬁlls and to submit 
technical and ﬁnancial oﬀers, which were supplemented with bank guarantees 
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for the tender procedure. The main criteria used to evaluate qualiﬁed candidates’ 
ﬁnancial oﬀers were the tariﬀs proposed for waste collection, disposal services, 
and sanitation. 
  The private partner shall invest EUR 600.000 in the equipment necessary for 
utility services operation in their start-up phase, and in further services develop-
ment during the 15-year contractual phase. Extending the O&M contract for 
an added 10 years depends on the total amount invested in the utility services 
development by the company during the ﬁrst contracted period of 15 years. 
  Total revenues collected for services go to the company to cover its initial invest-
ment, maintenance, and operation costs as well as projected proﬁt for the entire 
period of the contract duration.
  Demand risk is taken over by the private partner who collects revenues from 
households and legal entities. Demand risk is estimated as signiﬁcant, due to 
the fact that there are many households in rural settlements that have never 
used this public service. Fee collection from these beneﬁciaries will aﬀect the 
revenue fulﬁllment by the private partner, particularly at the beginning of 
the operation. Market ﬁnancial risk is not clear regulated by the contract. The 
Municipal Assembly may consider it during settlement of tariﬀs in the future. 
Damage (loss) risk is the responsibility of the private partner who can use an 
insurance policy.
  T&F Co., took more than 72 employees from the municipal public utility 
company “Mikulja,” which previously carried out public sanitation services in 
the municipality. 
  Contractual obligations of the private partner are: to invest in the development 
and improvement of utility services, to maintain landﬁlls and eliminate illegal 
waste dumps, and to improve organization and eﬃciency through the introduc-
tion of commercial principles in the utility service operation.
  Providing guarantees by the company. The security of contract obligations is 
not regulated by the operation and maintenance contract. The operation and 
maintenance contract regulates the responsibility of the company to insure 
permanent functionability of the utility’s assets, equipment, and installations. 
  The company shall maintain records and prepare reports during the contract 
duration and submit them to the municipality on a yearly basis. All members of 
the Municipal Assembly have a right to be informed or receive reports regarding 
the company’s operation by request.
  The municipality has a full right to cancel the operation and maintenance 
contract if the private partner fails to fulﬁll its contractual obligations. The 
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company also has a right to cancel the contract, with a notiﬁcation period of a 
minimum of six months. This notiﬁcation period is needed for the municipality 
to regulate further performance by the utility services in case of the cancellation 
of the the contract.
  Guaranteed performance standards for users. Thanks to modern mechanization 
and qualiﬁed human resources, T&F strives to fulﬁll the needs of citizens and 
local government with the aim of environmental protection, healthier living, 
and more beautiful surroundings.

Public-Private Partnerships takes a look at the successess and 
failures of such agreements between government and the private 
sector in Central Europe. This book covers the development policies 
and projects in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Serbia 
that have attempted to alleviate the burden on governments to 
fund the largest development projects as they have formed formal 
partnerships with the private sector. These partnerships are typically 
designed to provide better public services or better infrastructure, 
while alleviating risk, even if they may encounter serious regulatory 
barriers if the legislative framework is not properly in place. Leading 
experts from around the region have contributed to its ﬁ ndings, 
and also focused on such important elements as EU funding that has 
driven many such projects across the region.
 After an brief introduction by Gábor Péteri, country reports 
follow on:
• The Marketization of Public Services at the Municipal Level: 
Public-private Partnerships in Bulgaria
 Stefan Vladkov and Angel Markov
• Public-private Partnerships in Croatia: Institutional Framework 
and Case Studies
 Dubravka Jurlina Alibegovic
• Risk Assessment of Public-private Partnerships Implemented in 
Hungary: Risks, Management Efﬁciency, and Fiscal Relations
 Charles Jókay
• Public-private Partnerships in Poland: Overcoming Psychological 
Barriers and Rigid Regulation
 Rafal Stanek and David Toft
• Public-private Partnerships in Serbia: Towards Policies That 
Provide Risk Sharing and Value-for-Money Investment
 Tatijana Pavlovic-Krizanic and Ljiljana Brdarevic
